The Semantics and Pragmatics of Metarepresentation in English:

A Relevance-Theoretic Approach

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For my parents

With love and gratitude

Abstract

This thesis deals with the nature of metarepresentation in language. It proposes linguistic-semantic and pragmatic analyses of a variety of metarepresentational expressions in English, using the framework of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995). The main aim is to deepen the relevance-theoretic analysis of metarepresentation, to apply it to a range of data which have not been previously analysed in this framework, and to compare the resulting account with alternative semantic and pragmatic accounts.

Chapter 1 looks at various types of quotation (including mention, reported speech and thought, and mixed quotation) and surveys some of the problems encountered by traditional and more recent alternative accounts; the chief problem being that they either do not acknowledge the range and variety of semantic indeterminacies in quotation, or do not provide an adequate account of how these indeterminacies are resolved during utterance comprehension. Chapter 2 introduces relevance theory and shows how the comprehension strategy it provides can be used to resolve the various indeterminacies in quotation. It also shows how the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation (representation by resemblance) can be applied not only to paradigmatic cases of direct and indirect quotation, but also to a range of other cases involving the exploitation of linguistic or conceptual resemblances. What is common to all these cases is that a representation is used with a guarantee of faithfulness to some other representation, rather than truthfulness to some state of affairs. The claim that a metarepresentation can be faithful enough without being identical to the original is illustrated and explored.

The remaining chapters extend the analysis to more complex and controversial cases. Chapter 3 looks at previous accounts of metalinguistic negation, and develops a relevance-theoretic account whose linguistic-semantic and pragmatic

properties are investigated and compared with previous relevance-theoretic accounts. Chapter 4 looks at previous treatments of echo questions, both inside and outside relevance theory and extends the relevance-theoretic analysis to deal with some standard and non-standard types of echoic question. Chapter 5 deals with a variety of metarepresentational conditionals, and develops a relevance-theoretic account, comparing it with previous accounts. My conclusion is that the relevance-theoretic approach can yield analyses that are better justified than previous accounts on both descriptive and explanatory grounds.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 5: METAREPRESENTATIONAL USES IN CONDITIONALS

Introduction

Metarepresentation in Communication

Humans have the ability to construct mental and public representations of many different types. Some are sensory: we can represent in our mind the sound of church bells, the appearance of the beautiful roses we saw this morning, and the taste of the food we had in Italy. We can publicly represent them in a recording, in a painting, in a photo, etc. Others are conceptual, logical or mathematical: we can represent in our mind a thought, a logical argument or a mathematical proof. We can publicly represent them in an utterance, a dissertation or a mathematical formalism. According to Fodor (1983), the mind must have several different systems of representation and computation which together account for these abilities.

Humans also have the ability to construct mental and public representations of these representations. We can represent the utterances made by our friends, the news we listened to on TV, or the ideas of some philosopher we have read. This metarepresentational ability has received much attention in recent work in philosophy and psychology, where the focus has been on the so-called 'theory-of-mind', i.e. the ability to explain and predict the behaviour of others by attributing to them certain beliefs, intentions and desires. (See the contributions in Astington, Harris and Olson (eds.) 1988; Byrne and Whiten (eds.) 1988; Carruthers and Smith (eds.) 1996; *Mind and Language* 13.1 (1998); Carruthers and Boucher (eds.) 1998; and Wellman 1990; Gopnik 1993; Leslie 1994).

Research on 'theory-of-mind' has concentrated on three main areas: one is the development of the theory-of-mind skill in children (e.g. Wellman 1990; Perner 1991); another is the possibility of theory-of-mind abilities in non-human primates (e.g. Premack and Woodruff 1978; Byrne and Whiten (eds.) 1988); and the third is the absence of theory-of-mind in some humans, particularly in autistic people (e.g.

Baron-Cohen *et al.* 1985; Happé 1992). Despite various disagreements among existing accounts about how these abilities are best explained, it is generally agreed that young children who have not reached the stage of having the theory-of-mind and autistic people lack the theory-of-mind ability. It is also generally agreed that full-fledged inferential communication in humans draws on this same ability to attribute underlying beliefs, intentions and desires to others (Grice 1989; Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Sperber 1996). This is one way in which metarepresentational abilities play a role in human communication. I will look at it briefly before moving on to a second type of metarepresentational ability, which will be my main concern in this thesis.

Grice's (1989) inferential account of utterance interpretation is based on the hearer's ability to metarepresent a communicator's intention. In Grice's framework, the hearer does this by assuming that the speaker intended her utterance to satisfy a Co-operative Principle and maxims of truthfulness, informativeness, relevance and clarity. Consider (1):

(1) *Peter*: Where are you going?
Mary: We need coffee.

According to Grice, in (1), Mary's reply is not as informative as is required. Assuming that Mary is obeying the Co-operative Principle and maxims, Peter looks for an interpretation that satisfies them: for example, he assumes that she is going to buy some coffee; and he attributes to Mary the intention to convey this interpretation. Thus, Grice's Co-operative Principle and maxims might be seen as an integral part of the 'theory-of-mind' ability as applied to the production and interpretation of utterances.

However, Grice's account of inferential communication does not fit straightforwardly into a metarepresentational 'theory-of-mind'. In the first place, 'theory-of-mind' abilities are generally seen as innately determined, unconscious and modularised, whereas Gricean inferential comprehension looks more like a conscious reasoning process and the source of the Co-operative Principle and maxims is

debatable. It has also been argued that the Co-operative Principle and maxims are descriptively and explanatorily inadequate, and should be replaced by a communicative principle that fits better with general assumptions about human cognition. (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Sperber and Wilson 1987b).

In the second place, it is not clear how Grice's account of inferential communication fits with what is known about the development and breakdown of 'theory-of-mind' abilities (see references above). It is well established that these abilities develop over time, and that children and autistic people in whom they are not fully developed can engage in some degree of inferential communication; but it is not clear how Gricean inferential communication can be achieved to a greater or lesser degree. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: chapter 1, sections 11 - 12) attempt to deal with these issues by attributing to communicators two types of intention, involving different degrees of metarepresentational ability: an informative intention, and a higher-order communicative intention (i.e. an intention that the hearer should recognise the informative intention). They argue that some degree of communication may be achieved as long as the informative intention is recognised, even if the ability to metarepresent the higher-order communicative intention is not there.

Sperber (1994a) develops these ideas, arguing that even the ability to recognise the basic informative intention may involve different degrees of metarepresentational ability in different circumstances. I will illustrate this claim using Grice's maxims of truthfulness, 'Try to make your contribution one that is true; do not say what you believe to be false,' as applied to example (1) above (where the informative intention is the intention to inform Peter that they need coffee and that Mary is going to get some).

Suppose that, in (1), Peter has bought some coffee on his way home, so that there is no need to buy coffee. If Peter expects Mary always to say something that is **actually** true, he will have to reject the most straightforward interpretation of Mary's utterance, as intended to inform him that they need to buy coffee. This is not, of course, what happens, and Grice's maxims of truthfulness allow for this. Using these maxims, Peter may interpret Mary's utterance correctly, not by looking for what actually **is** true, but by looking for what she might have **thought** would be true. As

Mary did not know that Peter had bought some coffee, she might have thought that they needed coffee and intended him to believe that she was going to buy some coffee. In order to arrive at this intended meaning, he needs to attribute to Mary the false belief that they need coffee. This is a theory-of-mind ability which is lacking in children below a certain age, who will therefore be unable to use Grice's maxims of truthfulness, and should make characteristic mistakes in comprehension. In this way, development of communicative abilities is clearly linked to 'theory-of-mind'.

Consider now the case of lying. Here, the speaker covertly violates the maxim of truthfulness by saying something she believes to be false. Grice handles this by saying the speaker covertly violates the maxim of truthfulness. What he does not explain is how the hearer can sometimes understand the intended interpretation, even when he knows the speaker is lying. Consider (1) again. Suppose Mary knows that Peter bought some coffee, but she does not know that Peter knows that she knows it. Then Mary's utterance in (1) is a lie. If Peter knows this too and assumes that she always says something she believes to be true, he will be unable to identify the intended meaning. If he does not have this expectation, he may be able to arrive at the intended interpretation using a more complex metarepresentation of the form: 'Mary intends me to believe that she believes P (= We need coffee)'. This strategy involves a complex, multi-layered metarepresentational inference, which will again be beyond the capabilities of people at certain developmental stages in 'theory-of-mind'.[1]

In this thesis, I will be concerned with a different type of metarepresentational ability, which has been much less studied in the 'theory-of-mind' literature (though see Happé 1993). This appears in cases where the communicated information (the 'message') itself contains a metarepresentational element, which is intended to be recognised as such. Consider (2):

[1] Sperber (1994a) illustrates these strategies using the framework of relevance theory. He also comments (p. 198) 'The ability to use such complex meta-representations is ignored in psychology, where the study of much simpler meta-representation is a relatively new subject'. For details, see Sperber (1994a) or Wilson (forthcoming a).

(2) a. Mary believes that I sent the letter.

b. Mary said that I had sent the letter.

c. It is false that I sent the letter.

Here, three types of representation with conceptual content are metarepresented: a belief in (a), an utterance in (b) and a proposition in (c). A belief is a mental representation of the type primarily focused on in the literature on theory-of-mind. An utterance is a public representation, and a proposition is an abstract representation. As these examples show, all three types of metarepresentation can appear in the communicated content of an utterance. The main aim of this thesis is to provide an account of how such metarepresentational utterances are understood.

The examples in (2) metarepresent the content of the original representation, but it is also possible to metarepresent various aspects of form. Consider (3):

(3) a. Mary said 'She sent the letter'.

b. Mary said 'He seems like to think like it's like a bit like squishy'.

By directly quoting Mary's utterance, the speaker of (3) gives the hearer some idea of the form of the original. The purpose may be merely to inform the hearer of what Mary said, or it may be to express an attitude, e.g. to Mary's frequent use of 'like' in (3b).

In (2) and (3), the presence of a metarepresentational element is overtly indicated by use of verbs such as 'believe' or 'say'. However, metarepresentation is not always overtly indicated. Consider (4):

(4) *Jane*: What did Mary say?

Peter: He seems like to think like it's like a bit like squishy.

In (4), there is no indication that Peter's utterance contains a metarepresentational element, yet it is plausibly interpreted as a metarepresentation of Mary's utterance. Apart from studying the varieties of metarepresentation that may be overtly indicated,

I also want to provide an account of how the presence of a metarepresentational element may be inferred.

In relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995), metarepresentation is defined as the use of one representation to represent another in virtue of some resemblance between them, whether in content or form. My main aim in this thesis is to apply the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation to various types or uses of linguistic metarepresentation, and provide an explanation of how they work.

Chapter 1 looks at various types and uses of quotation: direct and indirect quotation, pure quotation (mention), and mixed quotation. These vary as to the type and source of the original, the degree of resemblance between original and quotation, the purpose of using the quotation, etc. not all of which are linguistically marked. The chapter surveys both traditional and more recent accounts of quotation, and argues that they do not pay enough attention to indeterminacies in interpretation, or provide a pragmatic framework in which these indeterminacies can be resolved.

Chapter 2 starts with a brief outline of relevance theory and the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy. It introduces the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation and shows how some paradigmatic cases of quotation would be dealt with on a relevance-theoretic account. The account is then applied to a range of further data not generally considered in the literature on quotation, which are also cases of metarepresentational use. The truth conditions of metarepresentational utterances are briefly considered, and analysed in terms of the notion of pragmatic enrichment (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Carston 1998a). In the Appendix, the account is applied to the Korean dialect expression 'kesiki'.

The remaining chapters extend the analysis to more complex and controversial cases. Chapter 3 concentrates on metalinguistic negation. It surveys previous accounts of metalinguistic negation, both inside and outside relevance theory, and further develops the relevance-theoretic account. Its main claim is that metalinguistic negation is as truth-functional as descriptive negation once the metarepresentational element is properly analysed. My account thus makes it possible to maintain a unitary semantics for 'not'. The account is briefly compared with the

position of Carston (1994/1996; 1998c/in press). In the Appendix, Korean negation is briefly investigated from the point of view developed in the chapter.

Chapter 4 explores echo questions. It looks at previous treatments of echo questions, both inside and outside relevance theory, and extends up the relevance-theoretic analysis to deal with some standard and non-standard types of echoic question. Echo questions are analysed as ordinary interrogatives involving metarepresentational use, whose propositional form is the result of pragmatic enrichment. The account is briefly compared with the position of Blakemore (1994).

Finally, chapter 5 deals with a certain range of 'non-basic' indicative conditionals, and develops a relevance-theoretic account, comparing it with previous accounts. 'Given' conditionals are analysed as cases where the antecedent is metarepresentational, and 'speech-act conditionals' as cases where the consequent is metarepresentational. As a result of pragmatic enrichment, the propositional form exhibits a standard truth-functional relation between antecedent and consequent, as predicted by the truth table for 'if'; hence my account maintains a unitary semantics for 'if' in both 'basic' and 'non-basic' conditionals.

Chapter 1

Analyses of Quotation

1.1 Introduction

Linguistic metarepresentation, as I have defined it, involves the use of an utterance (a public linguistic representation) to represent some other representation than a thought of the speaker's at the current time. In the existing literature, two types of linguistic metarepresentation have been extensively discussed: mention (or 'pure quotation'), in which a linguistic expression is used to represent the abstract type of which it is a token, and reported speech and thought, in which an utterance is used to represent an utterance or thought attributed to someone other than the speaker at the current time. This chapter will look at these two central cases of quotation, and survey some existing semantic and pragmatic analyses, as a background to the relevance-theoretic account which I develop in chapter 2.

Some typical cases of pure quotation or mention are given in (1):

(1) a. 'Life' is monosyllabic.
b. 'Life' has four letters.
c. 'Life' is a noun.

In (1), 'life' is not used to convey one of its standard dictionary meanings. Rather, it refers to itself, or, more precisely, to the word type of which it is a token. 'Life' in (a) refers to the word type as a spoken form, in (b), as a written form, and in (c), as an expression belonging to a certain grammatical category. An adequate account of mention should describe and explain how such uses of language work.

Some typical cases of reported speech are given in (2):

(2) a. Socrates said, 'Know yourself!'

b. Socrates said that we should know ourselves.

(2a) is a case of direct speech, which preserves many of the formal as well as the semantic properties of the original utterance being quoted. (2b) is a case of indirect speech, which preserves the semantic properties, but not necessarily the formal properties, of the original utterance. Another commonly discussed type of quotation is free indirect speech, which has similarities to both direct and indirect speech, but also differs from both. These three types of quotation differ from mention (pure quotation) in that they are used to represent attributed utterances (or thoughts), rather than abstract linguistic types. An adequate account of quotation should describe and explain how such examples work.

My first aim in this chapter is to survey the various types and uses of quotation. Some of these have been widely discussed in the literature, but others have not. At the same time, I will look briefly at some existing analyses of quotation, drawing attention to some features which I believe should be shared by any adequate account, and to others which I believe should be replaced. I group these accounts into two categories: the traditional and the recent. Recent accounts remedy many of the weaknesses of more traditional accounts, but I will argue that they still leave some work to be done.

Traditional accounts of quotation tend to focus on either the case of mention or the case of reported speech. A tacitly shared assumption of both accounts is that quotation involves identical reproduction of the original. (Even in indirect speech, where the form of the report may differ substantially from the original, the report clause is analysed as having the same semantic structure as the original.) However, consider (2) again. Socrates did not know English. What he actually uttered was a Greek sentence; and even in English, the translation was given as 'Know thyself!' a few centuries ago. So identical repetition may not be necessary to quotation. My second aim in this chapter is to show that traditional theories are too restrictive to be used for analysing quotation in general.

Recent accounts of quotation avoid these weaknesses. They deal with mention and reported quotations together, and argue that some types of quotation may not have the same semantic or formal properties as the original. My main concern in this chapter is with these recent approaches. I will argue, first, that they need to recognise that resemblance rather than identity is the very essence of quotation, and second, that for lack of an adequate pragmatic framework, they are more descriptive than explanatory. In chapter 2, I will develop an account designed to remedy these defects.

This chapter is organised as follows: In section 1.2, I will survey various types and uses of quotation. In section 1.3, I will look at some traditional accounts of the use-mention distinction, and of reported speech and thought. In 1.4, I will look more closely at recent alternative approaches to quotation, pointing out some of their strengths and weaknesses. Section 1.5 is a summary and conclusion.

1.2 Varieties of Quotation

In this section, I will look at various types and uses of quotation: mention, reported speech and thought, and mixed quotation. I will argue that they are used to represent three main types of original: abstract representations (e.g. sentences, propositions), public representations (e.g. utterances) and mental representations (e.g. thoughts). I will also illustrate the ways in which a quotation may merely resemble the original, rather than being an identical or verbatim reproduction. A central question that arises is how the hearer recognises the presence of a quotation, the type and source of quotation, and the degree of resemblance being attempted. My main interest in alternative analyses of quotation is in seeing what answers (if any) they provide to these questions, or what features they offer which might be used in developing answers of my own.

1.2.1 Pure quotation (Mention)

One reason for mentioning a linguistic expression is to comment on it. Consider (3), repeated from (1):

(3) a. 'Life' is monosyllabic.
b. 'Life' has four letters.
c. 'Life' is a noun.

As we have seen, in (3), 'life' is used to refer to the abstract linguistic type of which it is a token, specifically to the spoken form in (a), to the orthographic form in (b), and to the grammatical category in (c). In each case, part of an utterance is being used to represent an abstract representation, which may be seen as having purely linguistic properties (assuming that spelling is a purely linguistic property). These are the classic cases of mention, discussed in all accounts.

However, what is mentioned need not be an abstract linguistic representation, and the reason for the mention may go beyond the purely commentative. Consider (4), written on the Kellogg's box, and (5), on an instant national lottery ticket (in the U.K.):

(4) If you don't see ***Kellogg's*** on the box, it isn't ***Kellogg's*** in the box.

(5) MATCH 3 TO WIN OR MATCH 2 AND 'DOUBLE' TO DOUBLE YOUR WIN OR MATCH 2 AND 'TRIPLE' TO TRIPLE YOUR WIN

In (4), there are two occurrences of Kellogg's in bold type: the first is mentioned and the second is used. Here, what is mentioned includes the shape of the word including a capital letter and italic style. Similarly, in (5), the mentioned 'DOUBLE' and 'TRIPLE' are sure to be capital letters in the hidden original. In these cases, what is mentioned is not an abstract linguistic but a public representation, again a type rather

than a token. These contrast with the other uses of '***Kellogg's***' and 'DOUBLE' or 'TRIPLE', to which the shapes are immaterial.

Not only words, but also phrases or sentences can be mentioned. Consider (6) - (8):

(6) 'Kick the bucket' has three words.

(7) 'Regent's Park is near UCL' is a sentence of English.

(8) 'It's spring. Weather couldn't be better. I have stayed in my room for three days' has a different subject in each sentence.

In (6) - (8), a phrase, a sentence, and a group of sentences are mentioned, respectively. In the same vein, a single letter can be mentioned, as in (9):

(9) 'G' is a consonant/ a capital letter/ difficult to pronounce/ the seventh letter in alphabet/ my favourite letter/ stands for the fifth musical note ...

In each case, what is metarepresented is an abstract object with linguistic properties, which may be singled out and drawn to the audience's attention.

In the literature, mention is generally seen as a case where a linguistic expression is used to refer to itself. I have already suggested that this needs some qualification. It is also worth pointing out that the properties of the original that are singled out may be rather far removed from those of the quoting expression. For example, we can represent a word's pronunciation by using its written form, as in (3a), and its written form by using its spoken form, as in the spoken version of (3b).

It is also generally assumed that mention always involves the representation of formal properties, as in the above examples. However, there is no obvious reason why content cannot be mentioned. Consider (10) - (11):

(10) 'John is a bachelor' entails 'John is a man'.

(11) 'Life' means 'a manner of life' in this context.

In (10), what is picked out by mentioning the two sentences is not their form but their content, including semantic and logical properties. In the same way, in (11), it is the meaning of 'manner of life' that is mentioned, rather than its form. These cases are very similar to standard cases of mention, in that their originals are abstract linguistic representations. I propose to include them under mention, as cases of mentioning a meaning.

There are some more obvious cases of mentioning a meaning, which involve explicit indication that a proposition is involved, as in (12):

(12) On this occasion 'I am here' expressed the proposition 'Eun-Ju Noh is in London on the 14th of June, 1998'.

Utterances may also be used to represent mathematical formulae and logical arguments. Further examples involving mention of non-linguistic abstract representations are given in (13) - (14):

(13) '13' is a sinister number in this culture.

(14) '*' marks ungrammaticality in syntax.

The number '13' in (13) and the sign '*' in (14) should also be treated as cases of mention. So the types of abstract representation that can be mentioned go well beyond the purely linguistic.

It is also worth noticing here a range of so-called discourse-oriented expressions which refer to abstract linguistic expressions without actually mentioning them. Consider (15), adapted from Levinson (1983: 86):

(15) A: That's a rhinoceros.
B1: Spell **it** out for me.
B2: Don't give **it** a biscuit.

According to Levinson, 'it' in (B1) is a discourse-deictic pronoun, which refers to a linguistic expression, whereas 'it' in (B2) is a regular anaphoric pronoun, which refers to the same entity as a prior linguistic expression. 'It follows that there is a close, but quite unexplored, relation between discourse deixis and mention or quotation' (Levinson 1983: 86).

Davidson (1979) makes a similar point, with examples that might be seen as midway between regular mention and discourse deixis. Consider (16), from Davidson (1984: 81) (my own emphasis), and (17):

(16) Dhaulagiri is adjacent to Anapurna, the mountain whose conquest Maurice Herzog described in his book of **the same name**.

(17) Barbarossa was **so-called** because of his red beard.

Davidson analyses these examples as mixed cases of use and mention. The idea is that to give the truth-conditions of (17), for example, one must produce a paraphrase containing one use and one mention of the same expression, e.g. 'Barbarossa was called "Barbarossa" because of his red beard'. These examples, like Levinson's, are interesting, because they suggest that ordinary use of a linguistic expression makes the abstract type easily available for later exploitation at either the referential or the truth-conditional level. In metarepresentational use proper, when a single occurrence of an expression is used to represent the abstract type of which it is a token, the same easy availability is exploited, though in a slightly different way.

Overt quote marks (e.g. double or single apostrophe, finger dancing, the words 'quote ... unquote') are not necessary in either written or spoken quotation. When the marks are absent, the presence of a quotation can often be inferred. Most

of the examples used so far would be comprehensible without overt quote marks, especially in spoken form. Or consider another example:

(18) There is no parody, only paradise.

Suppose the speaker of (18) is looking for the entry 'parody' in the subject index of a book. In that case, 'parody' would be mentioned rather than used. But the spoken form of (18) would be straightforwardly understood without overt quote marks. An adequate account of quotation should explain how the presence of a quotation, when not overtly encoded, can be inferred.

In this section, I have looked at various types and uses of pure quotation (or mention). In pure quotation, the original is an abstract linguistic or non-linguistic representation, and what is singled out may be its form or content, its linguistic or non-linguistic properties. One question raised by this discussion is how the audience recognises the presence of a mention, the type of the original and the particular properties that are being represented. These points will be discussed further below.

1.2.2 Reported speech and thought

Another type of quotation is reported speech and thought, where what is quoted is not an abstract representation but an attributed utterance or thought. Traditionally, three types of reported speech have been distinguished: direct speech, indirect speech and free indirect speech. Direct speech is often analysed as a type of quotation involving representation of the surface form of the original utterance. Consider (19):

(19) a. *Peter to John*: Leave here at once, and never come back.
b. *Mary*: Peter said, 'Leave here at once, and never come back'.

In (19), Mary reports Peter's utterance in the form in which it was uttered: The imperative sentence type is preserved, the tense of verb, the deictic 'here' and personal pronoun 'I' are all as they were in the original.

Indirect speech is often analysed as a variety of quotation involving reproduction of the content of the original rather than its surface form. Peter's utterance in (19) might be reported in indirect speech as in (20):

(20) *Mary*: Peter told John to leave there at once, and never come back.

In (20), Mary is reporting the content of Peter's utterance. The report is embedded under a verb of saying, and person and deictics are all shifted from those of the original: from unexpressed subject 'you' to 'John' and from 'here' to 'there'. What form the result takes depends on context. For example, if Mary is talking to John (when he has not heard the utterance properly), she may say, 'Peter told **you** to leave **here** at once, ...'. Tense is also back-shifted, as in (21):

(21) a. A: I **am** going to meet my boss soon.

b. B: A said that he **was** going to meet his boss soon.

In (21), B's indirect speech shows that present tense 'am' is backshifted to past tense 'was'. Personal pronouns 'I' and 'my' are also shifted to 'he' and 'his'.

A central issue in the utterance on indirect speech is how to deal with the ambiguity between *de dicto* and *de re* readings.[1] A classical example is that of Oedipus, who unwittingly married his mother Jocasta:

(22) Oedipus said that his mother was beautiful.

(22) has at least two readings: On the *de dicto* one, Oedipus said 'my mother is beautiful'; on the *de re* one, he may have said 'Jocasta/my wife is beautiful' without

[1] For representative discussion, see e.g. Quine 1956, 1960; Davidson 1968; Partee 1973; Coulmas 1986; Bertolet 1990. The literature is mainly philosophical, and the issue is not discussed in the standard linguistic and literary works on indirect speech.

knowing that the woman he referred to is his mother. Such examples raise many problems. The one that interests me here is the pragmatic one: how does the hearer decide what interpretation the speaker intended to convey? In connection with this, let us look at Donnellan's (1966) example:

(23) The man drinking the martini is a famous philosopher.

In (23), 'the man drinking the martini' can be used in two ways: referential and attributive. That is, it can be used to refer to a specific person under a particular description which may or may not be true, or to pick out whoever it is that fits the description, whether or not the speaker is aware of this. If someone says (23), intending to refer to a specific person who is in fact drinking water, the resulting statement may be true, despite the fact that it contains a false description. The question that interests me is how such an utterance would be reported. There are two possible ways, given in (24):

(24) a. He said that the man drinking the martini is a famous philosopher.
b. He said that the man drinking water is a famous philosopher.

I believe that in different circumstances, either of these would be possible. Or consider (25), which displays a different but parallel ambiguity involving an expressive element:

(25) He told me that he submitted the rubbish to a journal.

In (25), the expression 'the rubbish' may be attributed to the original speaker, but is more likely used by the reporter to express an opinion of the work submitted.

My concern with these examples is with how the hearer can decide on the intended meaning: that is, on who is being talked about in (24a - b) and whose expression 'the rubbish' is in (25). If the speaker wants to indicate the intended interpretation overtly, she can use quote marks in (24a) and (25), to indicate that she

is directly quoting the original utterance (this is a case of mixed quotation; see next section). By the same token, (22) can be used whether or not Oedipus knew that his wife was his mother. What the hearer has to infer is whether the expression 'mother' is attributed to Oedipus or used by the reporter himself. In section 1.3.3.2, I will look in more detail at semantic accounts of indirect speech, where the complement clause of indirect speech has been analysed in various ways.

So far, I have looked only at cases where the reported speech is embedded under a verb of saying. This overtly indicates the presence of a quotation, and the source of the original utterance (real or imagined). There is another type of reported speech in which no such indication is given. This is the case of free direct or indirect speech. Consider (26):

(26) He came toward me in the dark.
'Who are you? Stay away.'
But he kept on towards me.
'Help!'
Nobody seemed to hear me.

Passages such as those in (26) are often found in novels. (26) contains two direct speech reports which are not overtly marked as such. These are cases of free direct speech.

An example of free indirect speech is given in (27):

(27) A: What did she say?
B: We should look after ourselves.

In (27), B's utterance may be interpreted as communicating that B believes/says we should look after ourselves, but it is more likely to be understood as a variety of indirect speech, communicating something like 'She said that we should look after ourselves'. As the quotation corresponds with the embedded clause of indirect speech, it is called free indirect speech, that is, indirect speech without the

introductory clause. In free direct and indirect speech, the presence of the quotation has to be inferred, i.e. recognised by pragmatic means.

Free direct speech raises few theoretical problems, and everyone would agree that 'free' means 'not overtly marked', e.g. by embedding under a verb of saying. However, in the case of free indirect speech, there has been more room for disagreement, because the phenomenon is much richer. Most people would agree that omission of an explicit verb of saying converts indirect speech into free indirect speech, as in (27b). Other characteristics of free indirect speech may be present even when an explicit verb of saying is used. (See also section 1.3.3.3.) Thus, consider (28):

(28) a. She asked, did he have some money?
b. Did he have some money, she asked.

In (28a - b), the quotation, as in regular cases of free indirect speech, preserves the sentence type of the original, with tense and person shifted. It thus seems preferable to analyse it as a case of free indirect speech, treating the verb of saying as parenthetical.

While regular indirect quotations convert originals of interrogative form to embedded declarative clauses, free indirect speech preserves the sentence type of the original, with person and tense shifted as in (29b), where the original utterance might be (29a):

(29) a. A: Do you have some money?
b. B: Had he some money?

It is sometimes hard to tell such free indirect reports from ordinary non-reporting descriptions. Occasionally, the shifted person and tense can help to disambiguate them, as in (30), from Banfield (1982: 98):

(30) To-morrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week!

(Lawrence, *Women in Love*, p.185)

In (30), the fact that 'tomorrow' is used to refer to a past time, and co-occurs with 'was', serves as an indicator of (free) indirect speech.

So far, I have taken for granted the assumption found in most of the literature, that the main function of direct and indirect speech is to report attributed utterances and thoughts. Notice, now, that not all repeated utterances are used to report. Many cases of free indirect speech are used for other purposes. Consider (31) - (32):

(31) a. A: Are you a student?

b. B: Am I a student?

(32) a. A: Leave me alone.

b. B: Leave you alone!

In (31), B repeats A's utterance, using free indirect speech. (Notice the sentence form and shifted person.) However, (31B) is not a report: B is asking a question about what he has heard. In the same way, in (32), B repeats A's utterance, and perhaps expresses a sarcastic attitude to what he has heard.

Direct and indirect speech and thought can also be used for other purposes than reporting. Consider (33):

(33) a. *Peter*: I'm the best cook in England.

b. *Mary*: You say you're the best cook in England.

c. *Mary*: You think you're the best cook in England.

In these examples, Mary's utterance is appropriate not because it reports to Peter what he himself has just said or thought, but because it shows him that she has heard it and is thinking about it. If quotations have more than one function, we need to

know how they are recognised and how they may be appropriate or relevant. Any adequate theory of quotation has to provide some account of this.

As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, a quotation does not necessarily repeat the original verbatim. Consider (34):

(34) A: What did he say?

B: a. Well, he said there's no way to help me.

b. He said that there was no way.

c. He said, 'Sorry, there is no way for me to help you with this matter.'

d. He said 'There's no way.'

e. There's no way.

All the utterances in (B) can be used to quote the same original utterance. It follows that we do not have to reproduce it verbatim. This raises a number of questions which will be dealt with in more detail below.

Notice, first, that the degrees of looseness permitted or expected in quotations differ depending on the circumstances. For example, in academic writing, anything within quote marks is supposed to reproduce the exact words of the original writer (except where the quotation is a translation). In court, witnesses are expected to report what they heard as precisely as possible, whether directly quoting or not. By contrast, the exact words may not be necessary in some contexts. For example, we do not expect reported speech to be identical with the original when talking about the weather. Consider (35):

(35) a. The weather forecast says that tomorrow will be better than today.

b. The weather forecast said that today would be better than it is.

In (35a), it is not crucial whether the weather forecast said exactly 'Tomorrow will be better than today' or something like 'Tomorrow we will have more sunny weather' or 'Temperature will rise tomorrow'. A classic example where the indirect quotation should **not** be identical to the original is (35b). Here, it is most unlikely that

the weather forecaster made the contradictory statements 'Tomorrow will be better than it is'. As in other cases we have seen, the reporter is paraphrasing in his own words, and perhaps elaborating as the original, and would expect to be understood as such.

Another case where there is no need for verbatim reproduction is when we quote someone's utterance for his accent or attitude. Take an example:

(36) He must be from Scotland. He said 'Tell me where the park is'.

In (36), if the speaker uses a Scottish accent in the direct quotation, he would be justified in considerably simplifying the content of the original, which may add little to what he wants to get across.

The assumption of verbatim reproduction is also undermined by reported speech in translations from other languages. Translation obviously does not preserve the exact words of the original; moreover, word-for-word translations are not always the most appropriate, and even semantic or logical identity may not be achievable. This is obvious to anyone faced with translated speech, whether direct or indirect. We merely expect the translation to be faithful enough.[2]

In this section, I have tried to show that reported speech and thought - like mention - may be used to draw attention to either the form or the content of the original. Its presence may be overtly marked or left to be inferred. I have also argued that quotations need not be verbatim reproductions of the original. This point will be discussed further below.

[2] Moreover, even the notion of verbatim reproduction is different from language to language. See Coulmas (ed.) (1986) for reported speech in different languages. For the role of resemblance in translation, see Gutt (1991).

1.2.3 Mixed quotation

Mixed quotations are cases in which an expression is simultaneously used and mentioned (see Clark and Gerrig 1990; Cappelen and Lepore 1997a; Wilson 1997). Consider (37):

(37) The teacher used 'the rod of love' to make us learn better.

In (37), the speaker simultaneously asserts that the teacher used the rod and alludes to the teacher's (or some other person's) actual words. Normally, when an expression is directly quoted, its semantic content is considered immaterial to the interpretation process: the quoted expression may be in another language, or a nonsense form, without affecting the acceptability of the utterance. In mixed quotation, though, the semantic content of the quoted expression makes an essential contribution to the interpretation process. An adequate account of quotation should explain how this type of quotation is recognised, and how it contributes to the overall interpretive process.

Mixed quotation is also used in reported speech. Consider (38):

(38) The teacher said that he would use 'the rod of love' to make us learn better.

In (38), the speaker is indirectly quoting the teacher's utterance, and at the same time, directly quoting some of the teacher's words. The analysis of (38) is not so simple as that of (37). For example, the teacher himself may have quoted the words, as in (39a); he may merely have used them, as in (39b):

(39) a. The teacher said, 'I will use "the rod of love" to make you learn better'.
b. The teacher said, 'I will use the rod of love to make you learn better'.

As far as I know, such examples have not been noticed in the literature.

Some of the oblique expressions we looked at in the last section might be analysed as cases of mixed quotation. Consider (40):

(40) a. John said that the evening star is an inferior planet.

b. John said that Venus is an inferior planet.

The *de dicto* reading (on which John used the words 'the evening star' in (40a) and 'Venus' in (40b)) might be seen as a case of mixed quotation. Thus, in (40), if the reporter thinks that John was talking about 'the evening star' without knowing that it is also called 'Venus', and this is critically important, she might mark 'the evening star' as directly quoted from John's utterance, as in 'John said that "the evening star" is an inferior planet'. If it is not so important, she may leave it to be inferred. The case of mixed quotation may therefore have more philosophical and semantic importance than has hitherto been realised.

There are some restrictions on the use of mixed quotation. Consider (41), repeated from (2) above:

(41) a. Socrates said, 'Know yourself!'

b. Socrates said that we should know ourselves.

(41a) is a case of direct quotation and (41b) of indirect quotation. With examples of this type, mixed quotation, as in (42), is not normally considered acceptable (the same indices indicate the same referent):

(42) ?Socrates said that we_i should know '$yourself_i$'.

Here, the directly quoted part 'yourself' cannot be coreferential with 'we'.

Such mismatches are sometimes more acceptable. Mittwoch (1985) gives examples (43a - b), taken from a newspaper and a linguistics journal, respectively:

(43) a. If Danny$_1$'s colleagues unanimously speak highly of him$_1$, without showing a tinge of jealousy at his, success, 'maybe it's because, I$_1$'m harmless...'

b. ...she$_1$ herself cautions that the observations 'are based on examples that readily occurred to me$_1$, and are therefore inevitably subjective'.

I will try to explain this in chapter 2, section 2.4.3.

Another similar restriction is that there should be no clashes in agreement between the quoted and non-quoted parts of the sentence. For lack of agreement in number (and maybe in personal pronoun), (44) is not acceptable:

(44) ?He 'love my country'.

Finally, mixed quotations should be distinguished from both reported speech and thought on the one hand, and mention on the other. Consider another example, from Wilson (1997: 6):

(45) The outcome is 'a consummation devoutly to be wished'.

In (45), the speaker asserts that a certain outcome is desirable, and also alludes to a Shakespeare play from which the quoted expression comes. Mixed quotation involves quotation of an attributed or attributable expression. This distinguishes it from mention (or pure quotation), where the original is an abstract expression rather than an attributed one. Mixed quotation is also distinguishable from reported speech and thought, in that only part of the original utterance is quoted, and the primary function is neither reporting nor representing the original. The expression is used, and the allusion to an original is secondary. So mixed quotations are not just a combination of direct and indirect speech, and an adequate analysis of quotation should take account not only of the similarities between these varieties of quotation, but also of their differences.

In this section, I have looked at various standard types of quotation: mention, reported speech and thought, and mixed quotation. The originals of these quotations may be mental representations (e.g. thoughts), public representations (e.g. utterances) or abstract representations (e.g. sentences and propositions); they may be linguistic or non-linguistic, and the properties singled out by the quotation may be either formal or logical. I have also tried to show that not all quotations are verbatim reproductions of the original, and that the degree of resemblance expected depends on the circumstances. Sometimes the presence of a quotation is overtly marked (e.g. by quote marks or a verb of saying), but at other times, it is left to the hearer to infer. This raises the question of how the hearer can recognise the presence of a quotation, the source and type of the original, and the degree and type of resemblance intended. In the following sections, I will survey some traditional theories of quotation, to see what light they can shed on these questions.

1.3 Traditional Analyses of Quotation

In this section, I will survey some traditional accounts of quotation, including philosophical analyses of the use-mention distinction, and analyses of reported speech and thought in traditional grammar, semantics and literary analysis. My main aim is to show that, whatever their intrinsic merits, none of these approaches offers an adequate account of how the hearer resolves the many indeterminacies left open when a communicator uses a quotation, and that a full account of how quotations are understood must make extensive appeal to pragmatics.

1.3.1 Definitions of mention *vs.* quotation

In the literature, three different positions have been taken on the relation between quotation and mention. On the first, mention is co-extensive with direct quotation. According to Davidson:

> 'The connection between quotation on the one hand and the use-mention distinction on the other hand is obvious, for an expression that would be used if one of its tokens appeared in a normal context is mentioned if one of its tokens appears in quotation marks (or some similar contrivance for quotation).' (Davidson 1984: 79)

That is, what is quoted (placed inside quote marks) is mentioned. On this definition, which is used by Davidson, mention and direct quotation contrast with indirect quotation. (For discussion, see section 1.3.2.2.)

There is a second, narrower, definition, on which mention is a subtype of quotation in which the original of the quoted material is an abstract linguistic expression. Other types of quotation involve attribution of an utterance or a thought to a source, as in reported speech and thought (Cappelen and Lepore 1997a). Another similar position is that only attributive quotation is called quotation, and non-attributive quotation is called mention. On these definitions, mention contrasts with reported speech and thought. (For discussion, see section 1.4.1.)

Finally, a third possible position is that mention and quotation are different: quotation is the use of quote marks or other devices such as finger dancing, which overtly indicates mention, but also performs other functions. Since not all mentions are explicitly indicated, it follows that not all quotation is mention, and not all mention is quotation. On this account, quotation and mention may, but need not, overlap (Saka 1998). (For discussion, see section 1.4.2.)

These three definitions are not so contradictory as they appear. The central issue is about the range of data that 'mention' is taken to cover. In using the terms in this thesis, I will take the second line, on which the whole category is quotation, and mention is a subtype of quotation. I will also use the term 'pure quotation' when it makes it easier to distinguish mention/pure quotation from attributive quotation. I should note, however, that it is no part of my aim to construct a theoretical definition of 'quotation' (or, indeed, of 'mention'), since the central claim of this thesis is that quotation falls together with a variety of other metarepresentational uses of language which should all be treated together. In my view, excessive concentration on these

two varieties of metarepresentation has led to a neglect of many further data which could shed useful light on the analysis of quotation.

1.3.2 Theories of the use-mention distinction

1.3.2.1 Quine (1965) and Garver (1965)

Quine is one of the philosophers responsible for drawing attention to the use-mention distinction. Consider his often-cited examples (Quine 1965: 23):

(46) a. 'Boston' is disyllabic.
b. 'Boston' has six letters.
c. 'Boston' is a noun.

Quine treats (46a) as a statement which ascribes to 'Boston' the phonetic property of being disyllabic, (46b) as ascribing to 'Boston' the property of having six letters, and (46c) as ascribing to 'Boston' the grammatical property of being a noun. According to Quine, each occurrence of 'Boston' in (46) is a name of the word 'Boston', just as 'John' is a name of a person.

Despite its important contribution to later accounts of the use-mention distinction, Quine's account has been widely criticised. For example, Garver (1965) claims that, while useful from a practical point of view, the use-mention distinction is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. In his view, to describe the use-mention distinction in Quine's terms is to suggest that there must be instances of *pure mention*, where the relation between name and referent is arbitrary. Consider (47) - (48):

(47) John is my friend.

(48) 'Cat' is a noun.

In (47), 'John' is the name of a person, but the relation between name and referent is not transparent: we cannot work out from the name who the referent is. Analogously, Garver argues, if 'cat' in (48) is an instance of pure mention, it must function in the same way, on Quine's account. However, it does not: we use the information contained within the quotation marks in determining the referent of 'cat' in (48): we cannot recognise it as denoting the word 'cat' unless we recognise 'cat' to be a word. Garver concludes that it is very doubtful that there is such a thing as pure mention, because the relationship between the alleged name and the thing it denotes is not arbitrary.

Garver, following Quine, assumes that to mention a linguistic expression is to name it, and therefore claims that there is no such thing as pure mention. Later analysts (e.g. Davidson 1979) have drawn the opposite conclusion: since the relation between mentioned expression and referent is not arbitrary, they conclude that mention is not naming. So they concede Garver's objection to proper-name theory, but draw a different conclusion.

Garver also argues that the use-mention distinction is not exhaustive. He tries to show that there is a third mode of occurrence, involving reference not to the form (as in standard mention), but to its meaning. Consider (49):

(49) The meaning of 'courage' is - steadfastness in the face of danger.

According to Garver, in (49) the expression 'steadfastness in the face of danger' is neither used nor mentioned. It is not used because (49) does not mean that the meaning of 'courage' has the virtue of steadfastness in the face of danger. It is not mentioned because (49) does not mean that the meaning of 'courage' is a certain linguistic expression, 'steadfastness in the face of danger'. Garver distinguishes this third mode of occurrence using double slanting lines, as in (50):

(50) The meaning of 'courage' is //'steadfastness in the face of danger'//.

In (50), '//'steadfastness in the face of danger'//' means 'the meaning of "steadfastness in the face of danger"'. He concludes:

> 'The moral to be drawn is that the distinction, considered generally, is neither exclusive nor exhaustive, and that there are varieties of mention just as there are varieties of use. These considerations do not, of course, call for abandoning the use-mention distinction, but rather for paying more attention to varieties of use and mention, so that use of the distinction can be more effective and its misuse eschewed.' (Garver 1965: 238)

Garver, like Quine, assumes that mention, as the name of a linguistic expression, denotes only linguistic form. He therefore needs another mode, denoting meaning. Later analysts (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1981) have argued that what is mentioned may be either an abstract linguistic expression (e.g. a word, a sentence) or an abstract logical representation (e.g. a concept, a proposition), and I will follow them on this. Later analysts have also taken seriously some of the problems with the view that mention is a type of naming. A particular problem for the name theory of mention, and more generally for the name theory of quotation, is raised by the fact that quotation does not always involve verbatim reproduction. Some alternative to the name theory must therefore be found.

1.3.2.2 Davidson (1979)

Davidson (1979) talks of quotation rather than mention. 'Quotation', on his account, involves the use of quote marks, or similar overt markers. These seem to include expressions such as 'in that order', or 'of the same name', which he calls quotation involving mixed use and mention. He also deals with mixed quotation involving overt quote marks. Although he does not explicitly mention direct quotation (or direct speech), it seems reasonable to conclude that he would also treat this as a case of quotation, at least where some overt indication is given.

Davidson starts by discussing the claims of Tarski (1956: 159) and Quine (1961: 140) that quotations are unstructured proper names of the quoted expressions (*the proper-name theory*). (We saw in the last section that Quine analyses a mention as a name of the mentioned word, where the relation between a name and its referent is arbitrary.) Davidson makes a similar objection to Garver's:

> 'On this view [the proper-name theory], there is no relation, beyond an accident of spelling, between an expression and the quotation-mark name of that expression. ... Nothing left, either, of the intuitively attractive notion that a quotation somehow pictures what it is about.' (Davidson 1984: 83)

That is, Davidson denies that there is an arbitrary relation between a quotation and the original. He also notes that on the proper-name account, quotational sentences do not have truth conditions, because what is contained within quotation marks, being name-like, has no significant semantic structure. So he rejects the proper-name analysis of quotation.[3]

According to Davidson, what is contained within quotation marks is not part of the semantic structure of the whole clause in which it occurs. This is the starting point of his *demonstrative theory*. The main claim of the demonstrative theory is that quotation marks are used to refer to a shape which lies outside the semantic structure of the containing sentence. The quotation marks should be read as 'the expression a token of which is here', or 'the expression with the shape here pictured'. What occurs inside the quotation marks is the token of the expression or shape in question. Thus, consider (51):

(51) a. 'Alice swooned' is a sentence

b. Alice swooned. The expression of which this is a token is a sentence.

[3] Davidson (1979) also discusses *the picture theory* and *the description theory*. Cappelen and Lepore (1997a) and Saka (1998) also have some discussion of these theories.

According to Davidson, (51a) should be understood as (51b), where the token of 'this' is supplemented by the speaker pointing to the token of 'Alice swooned'.

Davidson sees two advantages in the demonstrative theory: one is that it 'assigns a structure to sentences containing quotations': that is, in (51b), the second sentence can have truth conditions because the quotation is now removed from it. The other is that it explains 'the picturing feature of quotation': that is, the idea that a quotation is like a picture of the original, in that what is inside the quote marks is presented as having the same shape as the original.

Davidson also sees it as an advantage of the *demonstrative theory* that it deals with mixed cases of use and mention, as in (52), from Davidson (1984: 92):

(52) Quine says that quotation '... has a certain anomalous feature'.

According to Davidson, (52) is a case where the quoting sentence happens to contain a token with the shape needed for the purposes of quotation: 'Such tokens then do double duty, once as meaningful cogs in the machine of the sentence, once as semantically neutral objects with a useful form'. (Davidson 1984: 92) He analyses (52) as communicating something like (53):

(53) Quine says, using words of which these are a token, that quotation has a certain anomalous feature.

One problem with this account is that as long as the quotation marks are omitted in (53), it is not clear how 'these' can point at the words 'has a certain anomalous feature', rather than any of the other possible expressions. The scope of the quotation marks, which is clearly marked in (52), becomes indeterminate in (53), and the hearer has to infer the scope of the direct quotation. Davidson would no doubt claim that the speaker must do something to direct the hearer's attention to the appropriate expression, as in the analysis of (51). But this leads to a further objection, which is much more general. As is well known, pointing does not uniquely determine which of many possible objects the speaker intends to designate, and must be

supplemented by an inferential element of interpretation. By contrast, overt quotation marks **do** uniquely determine the scope of quotation. Thus, on Davidson's account, the distinction between overt quotation and inferred quotation becomes blurred.

Another problem is that Davidson's account of mixed quotation, as it stands, can be applied only to utterances of the type in (53), where the source of the quotation is overtly marked. It is not clear how it would apply to a case like (54), repeated from (37) above:

(54) The teacher used 'the rod of love' to make us learn better.

In (54), the quote marks can be seen as pointing at 'the rod of love', but there is no overt indication of whether the teacher used these words. As a result, no paraphrase of the form in (53) is available for (54), and it is not obvious how he would deal with these examples.

A further objection to the demonstrative theory hinges on Davidson's claim that quote marks are demonstrative. We have seen in section 1.2 that quotations are possible without the presence of overt quote marks. In the demonstrative theory, the role of pointing, which is essential on Davidson's account, is performed by the quote marks, and without them, it is not clear what does the role of pointing. Davidson might argue that, in any case, quotation marks need to be supplemented by a gesture from the speaker, and that in the absence of quotation marks, the speaker's gestures must bear the whole burden. But this again underlines the need for an adequate pragmatic account of how semantic indeterminacies are resolved.

Finally, Davidson (1979) does not discuss direct quotation, but I assume that, given his treatment of mixed quotation, he would be prepared to extend his analysis to this. If so, there is a further problem, in that this analysis can only deal with the case of verbatim reproduction. Because he analyses what is inside the quotation marks as picturing the shape of the original, he appears to exclude looser degrees of resemblances, e.g. translations of direct speech. Davidson's account of indirect quotation will be discussed in section 1.3.3.2.

In this section, I have surveyed two traditional accounts of the use-mention distinction, and raised some questions about them. Some of these questions have been tackled in more recent accounts, which in turn raise further questions. These will be discussed in section 1.4.

1.3.3 Theories of reported speech and thought

By definition, reported speech is a case in which a previous utterance is quoted in order to report it. Note that not all repeated utterances are quotations. Consider (55):

(55) *Peter*: I was with Mary last night. .... **I was with Mary last night.**
Mary: **Peter was with me last night.**

In (55), suppose Peter is being interrogated about his whereabouts last night. Peter's second utterance is not used to quote what he said before. He is making the same assertion twice. Similarly Mary's utterance may not be quoting what Peter said, but making the same assertion again. A quotation must be put forward as a representation of some previous utterance if it is to count as reported speech. Later, I will argue that representations of attributed utterances can be used for other purposes than reporting. Thus, the identification of reported speech (or thought) often involves a substantial element of inference. In this section, I will look at accounts of reported speech and thought from three different points of view: traditional grammar, semantics, and literary stylistics. I will argue that, while drawing attention to many interesting properties of reported speech and thought, they need to be supplemented by an adequate pragmatic theory.

1.3.3.1 Accounts of reported speech in traditional grammar

In traditional grammar, reported speech is divided into two subtypes: direct speech and indirect speech (see Onions 1905; Jespersen 1924, 1954; Kruisinga 1925; Curme 1931; Quirk 1972; etc.).[4] Here, I will look in more detail at Kruisinga (1925) and Jespersen (1954) as representative examples.

Kruisinga (1925: Part II, 3, 194 - 197) uses the terms *direct style* and *indirect style*, defining the former as a case where the original is repeated without change and the latter as a case where the thought expressed by the original is repeated in a subordinated clause. Notice that the examples in (55) above apparently qualify as reported speech by this definition.

Kruisinga deals with free indirect speech as *semi-indirect style,* defining it as a case of indirect speech without an introductory clause. He suggests that the tense of the verb or the presence of certain auxiliaries might act as diagnostics, as in (56) - (57) (p. 195):

(56) ...Vibart *was sure* that Jasmine was misjudging her. No one, *could have been* more auxious [*sic.* anxious] to help him find Jasmine...

[Mackenzie, Rich Relative ch. 6]

(57) And if Grandmamma should die? Why then in this great house she, Mary Flower, *should* be all alone.

[id. Seven Ages of Woman ch. 3.]

According to Kruisinga, the past tense of 'was sure' and 'could have been' in (56), and the auxiliary verb 'should' in (57), show that the utterances are indirect speech.

Finally, Kruisinga analyses echo questions as examples of free indirect speech. Let us look at his examples (p. 298):

[4] For further references to traditional grammar, see McHale (1978) or Coulmas (1986).

(58) 'I like you!' returned Aunt Bel, nodding at him. 'Where do you come from? A young man who'll let himself go for small coin's a jewel worth knowing'.
'Where do I come from?' drawled Laxley.
[Meredith, Harrington ch. 16]

(59) 'I have found you a gown after all.'
'Where is it?'
'Where is it?' her uncle repeated. 'Why, waiting upstairs in your bedroom, of course, for you to put it on ...'
[Mackenzie, Rich Relatives ch. 12, p. 298]

In (58) - (59), the second question in each example is an echo question, which Kruisinga includes in the category of free indirect speech. By contrast, Banfield (1982) does not. This issue will be discussed in more detail in section 1.3.3.3.

Jespersen (1954) also divides reported speech into two subtypes: direct and indirect. According to him, direct speech is used when the reporter 'gives, or purports to give, the exact words of the speaker (or writer)', and indirect speech is used when she 'adapts the words according to the circumstances in which they are now quoted' (p. 290). He treats free indirect speech as a subtype of indirect speech; he calls it *represented speech*, as opposed to *dependent speech*, i.e. ordinary indirect speech with an introductory clause.

Jespersen draws attention to several differences between direct and indirect speech. One is tense: direct speech maintains the original tense of a verb, but indirect speech backshifts it when the subordinating sentence is in the past. Another is person: direct speech preserves it, while indirect speech shifts it to the speaker's viewpoint. I have illustrated these aspects in more detail in section 1.2.2. A third difference is that direct speech does not change the form of the original sentence, while indirect speech does in cases where the original is a non-declarative. Consider (60) - (61):

(60) a. He said, 'Where do you come from?'
b. He asked me where I came from.

(61) a. He said, 'Leave at once.'

b. He told me to leave at once.

c. He told me I was to leave at once.

In (60), the indirect speech in (b) has a different word order from that of the direct quotation in (a): it has the word order of declarative, although the *wh*-word is fronted as is typical for an interrogative. The verb of saying is also changed, from 'say' to 'ask'. In (61), the imperative form in (a) becomes part of the main clause, as in (b), or an embedded declarative form, as in (c).

As Jespersen points out, in free indirect speech, only tense and person are shifted, so the sentence forms of questions and exclamations remain unchanged. The examples in (62) - (63) are from Jespersen (p. 298):

(62) How could he bear ... ? (from 'How can I bear ...?')

(63) What a nuisance it was ...! (from 'What a nuisance it is...!')

In (62), the original question and the free indirect speech have the same sentence form, but different person and tense. The same goes on in (63).

According to Jespersen, imperative forms are not often used as free indirect speech. Consider (61) again: the imperative form in (61a) can be indirectly reported either by (61b) or by (61c). Jespersen points out that the embedded clause in (61c) is generally used in free indirect speech. However, he also notes that the imperative form may occasionally be retained. Consider (64) - (65) ((64) from Jespersen (1954: 299)), and (65) from Jespersen (1924: 160)):

(64) Mr. Spenlow argued the matter with me. He said, *Look* at the world, there was good and evil in that; *look* at the ecclesiastical law, there was good and evil in that. It was all part of a system. Very good. There you were.

(65) she was growing a trifle impatient: [and thought:] if he wanted to sulk, let him, she didn't care.

In (64), both the imperatives with 'look' are used as free indirect speech, as can be seen from the backshifted tense 'was'. By the same token, in (65), 'let him' is a case of free indirect speech, as can be seen from the backshifted tense 'wanted' and 'didn't'.

In traditional grammar, most cases of free indirect speech are simply indirect speech of which the introductory clause is omitted. Especially when indirect speech is repeated, the same introductory clause tends to be omitted from the second occurrence (Jespersen 1924: 155; Curme 1931: 420). On this approach, free indirect speech is not regarded as a type of speech designed and specialised for a specific literary style. This contrasts with the view of Banfield (1982), which I will turn to in section 1.3.3.3.

In traditional grammar, direct speech is described as reporting the original sentence verbatim. This is also held to be true of indirect speech, with the exception of shifts in person, tense, or deictics; and these shifts must not lead to an alteration in content. However, as we have seen in section 1.2, quotations are not necessarily verbatim reproductions. Traditional theories of reported speech are too restrictive to allow for varying degrees of resemblance between quotation and original. They also give no adequate definition of reported speech. As we have seen above, not all repetitions of another utterance are reported speech; the speaker's intentions need to be taken into account. All this calls for an adequate pragmatic theory.

1.3.3.2 Semantic accounts of indirect speech

Semantic accounts are in general concerned with specifying the truth conditions of utterances and capturing inferential relations between them. Direct and indirect quotation have generally been separately dealt with. It is generally agreed that direct quotation has very restricted inferential power: even the substitution of synonyms in

the scope of a direct quotation is not normally truth-preserving: 'He said, "I saw a bachelor"' does not entail 'He said, "I saw an unmarried man"'. By contrast, in indirect quotation, we can draw some valid inferences, e.g. 'He said he saw a bachelor' would generally be taken to imply 'He said he saw an unmarried man.' In this section, I will explore some semantic accounts of indirect quotation,[5] the basic aims of which, as noted above, are to get the truth conditions of indirect quotations correct and to capture their inferential relations to other sentences.

The truth conditions of the embedded clause of indirect speech do not affect and are not affected by the truth conditions of the main clause. It follows that the truth conditions of the embedded clause should be treated as semantically independent of those in the main clause. The embedded clause has been variously treated as an independent proposition (e.g. Church 1950), an independent sentence (e.g. Carnap 1947, Quine 1956, 1960), an independent inscription (e.g. Scheffler 1954), or an independent utterance (e.g. Davidson 1968). I will comment briefly on these different approaches, and then discuss Davidson's account in more detail, since it is one of the most influential accounts, and also one of the closest to the metarepresentational approach, which I will take in chapter 2.

Some accounts of indirect quotation treat them as propositions which are the objects of propositional-attitude verbs like 'believe', 'know', 'say', etc. Consider (66):

(66) a. John said that Peter loved Mary.

b. John expressed the proposition that Peter loved Mary.

On these accounts, (66a) is analysed as roughly equivalent to (66b). This analysis was rejected by Carnap (1947), and many later philosophers, not only because propositions were held to be philosophically dubious, but also on empirical grounds.

[5] See, for example, Carnap 1947; Church 1950; Quine 1956, 1960: chapter 6; Scheffler 1954; Davidson 1968, 1975, 1976; Smith 1976; Reddam 1981; Baldwin 1982; Burge 1986; Schiffer 1987; Soames 1987, 1989; Bertolet 1990; Richard 1990; Seymour 1994.

The main empirical objection centred on *de re/de dicto* reading discussed in section 1.2 above. Consider (67), repeated from (22):

(67) Oedipus said that his mother was beautiful.

On a *de dicto* reading, the original utterance is understood to be 'My mother is beautiful', while on a *de re* reading, the original utterance is not reconstructable from the indirect quotation: Oedipus may have said 'My wife is beautiful' or 'Jocasta is beautiful'. The problem is that the propositions expressed by the complement clause of (67) and that of (68) are identical:

(68) Oedipus said that his wife is beautiful.

It follows that, on the propositional-attitude account above, they should be interchangeable without altering truth values. However, they are not. If Oedipus did not know that his wife was his mother, (and he actually did not), he might deny (67) while admitting (68). So the claim that the complement clause of an indirect quotation is a proposition is empirically inadequate.

An alternative approach is to treat the object of a propositional-attitude verb as a sentence, rather than a proposition. This is taken by Quine (1956, 1960). Consider (69):

(69) a. Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline.
b. Tom believes-true 'Cicero denounced Catiline'.
c. Tom believes the proposition meant by 'Cicero denounced Catiline'.

On Quine's analysis, the object of the propositional-attitude verb 'believe' is analysed as a sentence, as in (69b), which he takes to mean something like (69c). The embedded clause in indirect report speech is also analysed as a sentence. Reference to

a sentence makes the complement clause independent, thus achieving one of the goals of all semantic accounts.[6]

A central problem with this approach is that sentences are tied to specific languages. For example, in (69b), the quoted sentence 'Cicero denounced Catiline' is in English. Now if (69a) is translated into German, any German who is ignorant of English can understand what John said. By contrast, if (69b) is translated into German, he cannot understand the quoted sentence 'Cicero denounced Catiline' because it is in English. It follows that (69b) does not correctly give the meaning of (69a).[7] Various attempts have been made to solve the problem, either by modifying the notion of a sentence (Quine 1960: 214) or by combining sentential and propositional accounts, treating a propositional attitude as a three-place relation between an agent, a sentence and a proposition (see e.g. Salmon 1987; Soames 1989; Crimmins and Perry 1989; Crimmins 1992; Richard 1990; Larson and Ludlow 1993; Larson and Segal 1995: chapter 11). However, the most radical and interesting solution is the one proposed by Davidson, to which I now turn.

Davidson (1968) proposes to analyse the complement clause of an indirect quotation as a genuinely independent utterance, which is merely referred to by the matrix clause. For example, (70a) is analysed as composed of two independent utterances, as in (70b):

(70) a. Galileo said that the earth moves.

b. Galileo said that. The earth moves.

According to Davidson, when the speaker says (70a), she represents Galileo and herself as samesayers: the embedded clause of the speaker's utterance is presented as standing in a samesaying relation to the original utterance. The word 'that' in (70b) is treated as a demonstrative singular term referring to the second utterance, 'The earth moves.' This account is sometimes called *the paratactic account.*

[6] For another approach to indirect quotation as a quotation of a sentence, see Carnap (1947).

[7] This point was originally made by Church (1950) and generally accepted by others.

In section 1.3.2.2, I looked at Davidson's (1979) analysis of quotation (mention), in which quotation marks are analysed as demonstratives, referring to the linguistic type of which a token is given within the quotation marks. Though Davidson (1979) does not mention his earlier analysis of indirect speech, his analyses of direct and indirect quotation are very similar: both contain demonstratives which point at the original, of which the form or content is presented in the quotations.

Davidson (1968) presents his account as satisfying the requirements on semantic theories of indirect quotation: the content clause has its own semantic structure, which is independent of the semantic structure of the main clause. In (70b), 'The earth moves' is an independent utterance with its own truth conditions, so it satisfies those requirements. Davidson also claims that his account avoids the problem of the sentence-based accounts discussed above, since it contains no reference to sentences; and of proposition-based accounts, since it contains no reference to propositions (but only to samesaying).

Davidson's account of indirect quotation has been extensively discussed. (Semantic critiques are developed in Baldwin 1982; Burge 1986; Schiffer 1987; Lepore and Loewer 1989; Seymour 1994.) Here I would like to point out some additional problems of a linguistic or pragmatic nature, not considered in the semantic literature. One problem which may seem trivial is that indirect quotations need not contain the word 'that'. For example, instead of (70a), I can say 'Galileo said the earth moves'. Davidson would presumably argue that in this case, the demonstration is not encoded but pragmatically inferred, or linguistically ellipsed. In either case, a further stage of the analysis might be supplied.

Notice, next, that in free indirect speech, the whole of the matrix clause must be treated as either inferred or ellipsed. Consider (71):

(71) *Mary*: Did you ask Jane why she didn't come?
Peter: She had an exam on Wednesday.

In (71), Peter may be understood as reporting Jane's claim that she had an exam on Wednesday. On Davidson's account, the hearer would have to infer that the

utterance 'She had an exam on Wednesday' was being presented as a case of samesaying with Jane's original utterance. What this suggests is that the 'samesaying' part of Davidson's analysis is the crucial one, and that the overt presence of a demonstrative, or even a verb of saying, is optional: samesaying can apparently exist and be recognised even in their absence. For this, the hearer must have access to pragmatic inferential mechanisms which Davidson does not describe.

Another problem arises when the original utterance is non-declarative, as in (72):

(72) a. Peter told Mary to leave at once.

b. Peter asked Mary if she had met John before.

In these examples, the form of the reporting clause is very different from the original: for example, in (72a), it is an infinitival clause when the original was presumably an imperative. If these are not counterexamples to Davidson's account, they certainly show that a considerable amount of machinery is needed to produce the independent utterances required by his analysis.[8]

Another important point is how to deal with the case of reported thought. (This objection was first made by Quine to Scheffler's analysis of indirect speech clauses as involving utterances (inscriptions) (see Scheffler 1954), but it can also be applied to Davidson's.) For example, in 'Galileo believed that the earth moves', there is no samesaying relation, because Galileo did not say anything. What relation, analogous to samesaying, can be seen as linking the content of the speaker's utterance with the content of the thought it represents? The problem is that 'believing does not, like saying, produce utterances' (Quine 1960: 215).

Like many other philosophers and semanticists, Davidson also seems to consider that the original utterance and its representation must be semantically identical, as is clear from his use of the term 'samesaying'. He says:

[8] Rouchota (1994a) argues that a substantial element of inference is needed in the interpretation of infinitival clauses embedded under different types of matrix verb, e.g. 'hope', 'wish', 'tell', 'promise'; they are therefore best handled in partially pragmatic terms.

> 'If I merely *say* we are samesayers, Galileo and I, I have yet to *make* us so; and how am I to do this? Obviously, by saying what he said; not by using his words (necessarily), but by using words **the same in import** here and now as his then and there.' (my emphasis in bold type) (Davidson 1984: 104)

> 'The 'that' refers to the second utterance, and the first utterance is true if and only if an utterance of Galileo's was **the same in content** as ('translates') the utterance to which the 'that' refers.' (my emphasis in bold type) (ibid. 177)

Any analysis which treats the embedded clause as involving the very same proposition, sentence, or utterance (inscription) as that the original speaker produced is falsified by the many examples involving a weaker resemblance relation. If the embedded clause is analysed as a representation of the original, as in Davidson's account, there is room for a resemblance relation, but Davidson does not make use of it. As long as 'the same in import' entails semantic identity, Davidson, like other semanticists, does not escape the criticism that his account cannot deal with indirect quotation which only resembles the original.[9] As with indirect thought, the problem is the notion of the samesaying relation, which is central to Davidson's approach. With indirect thought, the problem was the **saying**; here, the problem is the **same**. This suggests that we need an account which allows for various degrees of resemblance between representation and original, and allows the original to be either an utterance or a thought.

Let us return to semantic accounts of indirect quotation in general. As I said at the beginning of this section, the main aim of semantic accounts of indirect speech is to give the truth conditions of indirect speech reports. To achieve this, they try to make the complement clause independent of the main clause, by analysing it as a sentence, proposition or independent utterance (inscription) with its own independent truth conditions. The assumption has been that the complement clause is semantically identical to the original utterance; hence if the complement clause is true, the original

[9] Cappelen and Lepore (1997b: 280 - 282) also understand that Davidson is committed to the semantic identity between indirect quotation and its original.

will also be true. (See Cappelen and Lepore 1997b for discussion.) Yet as we have seen in previous sections, and will see further below, quotations are not necessarily identical to the original, either syntactically or semantically. (This will be discussed in section 1.4 and chapter 2, section 1.3.) So if we are to get the truth conditions of indirect speech reports right, we need to acknowledge that the correct relation between complement clause and original is not semantic identity but resemblance. It follows that, in assigning truth conditions to indirect speech reports, we need to take account of pragmatically assigned resemblance relations. Indirect speech reports do not **encode** their own truth conditions: an element of linguistic indeterminacy is involved.

Quine himself notes that the degree of resemblance expected between the original utterance and the representation depends on the context. Under the heading 'Propositions as information', he comments (Quine 1986: 3) (my emphasis):

> 'It is commonplace to speak of sentences as alike or unlike in meaning. This is such everyday, unphilosophical usage that it is apt to seem clearer than it really is. In fact it is vague, and the force of it varies excessively with **the special needs of the moment**. Thus suppose we are reporting a man's remark in indirect quotation. We are supposed to supply a sentence that is like his in meaning. In such a case we may be counted guilty of distorting his meaning when we so much as substitute a derogatory word for a neutral word having the same reference. The substitution misrepresents his attitude and, therewith, his meaning. Yet on another occasion, where the interest is in relaying objective information without regard to attitudes, our substitution of the derogatory word for the neutral one will not be counted as distorting the man's meaning.'

As these remarks make clear, a full account of quotation even in philosophical terms, needs pragmatic supplementation. In the next section, I will look at accounts of reported speech from a literary point of view.

1.3.3.3 Reported speech as a literary style in fiction

Attention has also been paid to reported speech as a literary style in fiction.[10] Here, I will survey McHale (1978), Banfield (1982) and Leech and Short (1981: chapter 10). My aim is to evaluate their accounts of reported speech and thought, which, unlike those of philosophers, concentrate especially on free indirect speech and thought, rather than to evaluate their analyses of literary style.

Before looking at particular analyses, it is perhaps worth drawing attention to differences between reported speech in everyday conversation and in literary texts. Consider (73) - (75):

(73) *Peter*: What did Jane say?
Mary: a. Jane said 'Everybody is mad for soccer'.
b. Everybody was/is mad for soccer.

(74) Peter said to Mary, 'What did Jane say?'
Mary replied, (a) 'Jane said "Everybody is mad for soccer"'.
(b) 'Everybody was/is mad for soccer'.

(75) a. Jane said/thought, 'Everybody is mad for soccer. Nobody pays attention to me.' (She decided to visit her uncle.)
b. Everybody was mad for soccer. Nobody was paying attention to her. (Jane decided to visit her uncle.)

Suppose (73) is a real conversation, and (74) and (75) are from a novel. In each case, example (a) is a report in direct speech and example (b) is in free indirect speech. The direct speech and free indirect speech in (74) are very similar to those in (73), except that they are used in an imaginary situation described in the novel. That is, both of them are discourse: (73) is discourse which has taken place in the real world, and

[10] See McHale 1978; Leech and Short 1981: chapter 10; Banfield 1982; Sternberg 1982, 1991; Sell (ed.) 1991; Fludernik 1993.

(74) in an imaginary world. The reported speech in (75) is very different. It is a case of so-called narration.

Let us look briefly at some individual accounts of reported speech. Banfield (1982: chapter 1) strictly distinguishes direct and indirect speech in formal terms: direct speech has many distinguishing formal properties, such as expressive elements or constructions, subjectless imperatives, direct address, different dialects or languages in introductory and quoted clauses, etc. By contrast, indirect speech occurs embedded under an introductory clause, has shifted person, tense and deictics, does not have the formal properties of direct speech, etc. Banfield tries to account for these differences in syntactic terms, by assigning an E(xpression)-node to both the direct quotation and its introductory clause. The E-node is the initial node of the phrase structure rules, and is not recursive. Expressive elements and constructions, and many other properties of direct speech, are permitted under this E-node. For example, direct quotation can have an independent sentence form, as in (76a), expressive elements or constructions, as in (76b - c), direct address, as in (76d), and different languages in introductory and quoted clauses, as in (76e) (all examples are from Banfield (1982: chapter 1)):

(76) a. The consul asked himself, 'Why then should I be sitting in the bathroom?'
b. 'Oh, how extraordinarily nice workmen are', Laura exclaimed.
c. Miss Brill laughed out loud: 'No wonder!'
d. The private answered, 'Sir, I cannot carry out these orders'.
e. History shows that to be true, inquit Eglintonus Chronolologus.
(Joyce, *Ulysses,* p. 206)

By contrast, Banfield assigns an S'-node to the complement clause of indirect speech, which does not dominate an E-node (as this is not recursive, it cannot occur in an embedded clause). Banfield claims that these different syntactic nodes can explain the formal differences between indirect speech (the complement clause of indirect speech) and direct speech.

Banfield distinguishes free indirect speech from both direct and indirect speech (cf. the traditional grammarians' accounts in section 1.3.3.1). She says:

> 'The phenomenon presented in these passages is the exclusively literary style known as '*le style indirect libre*' in French and '*erlebte Rede*' in German and which I call 'represented speech and thought'. It has only in the last few years been recognized as a specifically grammatical phenomenon in Anglo-American criticism.' (Banfield 1982: 68)

Banfield's represented speech and thought is surely equivalent to free indirect speech as used in traditional grammar (as we can see the French translation '*le style indirect libre*'), but she characterises represented speech and thought as an exclusively literary style, that is, as the type in (75). She goes on:

> 'Represented speech and thought is recognized as a distinct style by its departures from the spoken forms of reported speech and thought. ... Its resemblance to both direct and indirect speech has led commentators to describe it as a combination of the two. **This vague and informal conception is not even observationally adequate**. But it is by comparing represented speech and thought with direct and indirect speech that we can isolate its characteristics and eventually incorporate an account of it into the grammar.' (my emphasis) (ibid. 70)

As we have seen in section 1.3.3.1, free indirect speech was recognised at the beginning of the century at least by Onions (1905, reprinted in 1965), Kruisinga (1925), Jespersen (1924, 1954), and Curme (1931). They not only recognised the existence of free indirect speech, but used examples which are not exclusive to fiction. For them, free indirect speech is a subtype of indirect speech. This difference in characterisation reflects different choices of data. As noted above, Banfield's represented speech and thought is only of the type in (75), while traditional grammatical accounts deal with all three cases in (73) - (75).

Banfield gives an E-node to cases of represented speech and thought in order to account for the properties it shares with direct speech. (See Banfield 1982: 71 - 75.) However, she also claims that represented speech and thought is not a report of communication: it does not contain subjectless imperatives, has no direct address, no *I-you* oriented adverbials, and it can be used only in literary text. Consider her example (77):

(77) *Fix his$_i$ dinner, he$_i$ ordered.

In (77), use of represented speech and thought in imperative form is not acceptable. Banfield also claims that a direct address form such as 'sir' cannot be used in free indirect speech, as in (78):

(78) No, (*sir), he could not obey his orders, he told the officer.

However, consider (79):

(79) A: Well, he said 'Fix my dinner'.
B: Fix his dinner! Who does he think he is?

In (79B), 'Fix his dinner' is a case of free indirect speech to represent another original imperative utterance, at least according to accounts in traditional grammar (see above). Direct address is also possible, as in (80):

(80) A: I could not obey your orders, sir.
B: You could not obey my orders, 'sir'?

The counterexamples in (79) and (80) are cases of discourse, parallel to (73b) and (74b) rather than the narrative style in (75b).

Banfield excludes the examples in (79) - (80) from represented speech and thought, because (79B) is not in the past tense, and (80B) contains direct address. It

seems to me that this is purely a matter of definition rather than an empirical claim: for her represented speech and thought is by definition a subtype of free indirect speech whose tense is past, and which has no addressee. Banfield also distinguishes literary text and discourse text, and claims that represented speech and thought occurs only in literary text. She does not include echo questions in her account of represented speech and thought, on the grounds that they occur in non-literary text, their tense is present and they have an addressee. Thus, her account of represented speech and thought cannot be extended to cover free indirect speech in present tense or in non-literary text.

McHale argues against Banfield's restrictive definition of free indirect speech. He refers to Onions (1905), who characterises free indirect speech as the typical mode of parliamentary reporting, and to Curme (1931), who claims free indirect speech is a typical usage of newspapermen. Though he uses the term 'free indirect discourse', McHale does not seem to exclude narration from free indirect discourse. He is thus aiming to deal with a wider range of data than Banfield, the idea being that there is no significant range of generalisations that applies only to Banfield's more restrictive set.

McHale also rejects Banfield's strict distinction between different types of reported speech and thought, on the ground that they cannot be precisely distinguished into three types. He argues that reported speech is on a continuum, from the purely 'digetic' (as in (81)) to the purely 'mimetic' (as in (82)). (83) is an example where indirect speech represents a purely phonological dialect trait of a character ((81) - (83) adapted from McHale (1978)):

(81) When Charley got a little gin inside of him he started telling war yarns for the first time in his life. *(Big Money, 295.)*

(82) Why the hell shouldn't they know, weren't they off'n her and out to see the goddam town and he'd better come along. *(1919,* 43 - 44)

(83) She shook her head but when he mentioned a thousand she began to brighten up and to admit that que voulez vous it was la vie. (*1919*, 382)

As a result, he does not give his own definition of each type of reported speech and thought, but continues to use the informal ones from in traditional grammar: the exact definitions are not important, because a continuum is involved.

Leech and Short (1981: chapter 10) also use the traditional definitions of direct and indirect speech:

> 'The essential semantic difference between direct and indirect speech is that when one uses direct speech to report what someone has said one quotes the words used verbatim, whereas in indirect report one expresses what was said in one's own words.' (p. 318)

That is, direct speech is a case of verbatim report, while indirect speech is the speaker's paraphrase of what was said. Their definition of free indirect speech is not as restrictive as Banfield's. They treat free indirect speech as having three main features: the absence of an introductory clause, the presence of past tense, and the presence of a third person narrator. However, they do not claim that free indirect speech should have all of these properties: one or two will do. The tense can be present, the narrator can be first person, and there may be an introductory clause. In other words, they treat free indirect speech as a 'family resemblance' term: they resemble one another in different aspects. As a result, they do not restrict free indirect speech and thought to narration, as Banfield does; and they deal with the full range of cases in (73) and (75).

Leech and Short agree with McHale that reported speech and thought involves a continuum, which they present as follows:

(84) a. indirect speech - free indirect speech - **direct speech** - free direct speech

b. **indirect thought** - free indirect thought - direct thought - free direct thought

As can be seen from the emphasis in (84), Leech and Short distinguish reported speech and reported thought, because they have different frequencies of use: in reported speech, direct speech is the norm, while in reported thought, indirect thought is the norm. In their view, direct speech is the norm in reporting speech, 'because it is the mode which represents speech in the form in which it is directly manifest to a listener' (p. 345). By contrast, other people's thought is not accessible to direct perception, 'so a mode which only commits the writer to the content of what was thought is much more acceptable as a norm' (p. 345). According to Leech and Short, other types of reported speech and reported thought produce some extra effects by departing from the norms. The further a report goes to the left of the norm, the more distance the speaker is seen as talking, and the further it goes to the right of the norm, the more sense of direct perception it conveys. Thus, free indirect speech, which is on the left of the norm gives some feeling of distance from the character's thought, and is often used to create an ironic feeling. By contrast, free indirect thought, which is located on the right of the norm, puts the reader 'directly inside the character's mind' (p. 344). I will not discuss these stylistic effects in detail, but merely note the connection between free indirect speech and irony (to be taken up below).

I have looked at some accounts of reported speech and thought from the point of view of literary theory. Those accounts do not consider whether reports of speech and thought have to be identical to the original either in form or in content, partly because their concerns are with the literary effects of reported speech and thought. The continuum from directness to indirectness is not related to the degrees of resemblance to the original in reported speech, but to the combination of shared properties between quotation and original. These notions overlap, but at least in the way they have been applied, are not identical

In section 1.3.3, I have looked at various accounts of reported speech and thought from traditional grammar, semantics and literary stylistics. None of them fully accommodates the resemblance relation between report and original, or offers any pragmatic account of how the various indeterminacies in quotation can be resolved. In addition, as noted at the beginning of this section, not all repetitions of a

prior utterance or thought qualify as reported speech. The accounts discussed in this section do not provide adequate definitions of reported speech, or discuss the use of attributive utterances for purposes other than reporting. In chapter 2, I will show that attributive utterances can be used for other purposes than reporting, and discuss how to distinguish them from cases of reported speech and thought.

To sum up section 1.3: I have surveyed some traditional theories of pure quotation and reported speech and thought. I have argued that they cannot be used as a general framework for an account of quotation: in the first place because they do not allow for loose attributions, and in the second place, because they are not backed by an adequate pragmatic theory. In the next section, I will discuss in detail three recent approaches to quotation, and argue that though improvements on earlier accounts, they are still at the stage of description rather than explanation.

1.4 Recent Analyses of Quotation

In this section, I will discuss some recent alternative analyses of quotation, which attempt to solve the problems presented by earlier theories, and make some moves in the direction of pragmatics. In 1.4.1, I will look at in more detail at mixed quotation and indirect quotation, in 1.4.2, at mention (pure quotation), and in 1.4.3, at direct quotation.

1.4.1 Cappelen and Lepore (1997a, b): The demonstrative theory[11]

Cappelen and Lepore (1997a) deal with various types of quotation: pure quotation, direct and indirect quotation and mixed quotation, concentrating especially on mixed quotation. Suppose Alice utters (85), which can be quoted using any of (86) - (88) (p. 429):

[11] In this section, all my examples are taken or adapted from Cappelen and Lepore (1997a, b). Their page numbers are given in parentheses.

(85) Life is difficult to understand.

(86) Alice said 'Life is difficult to understand'.

(87) Alice said that life is difficult to understand.

(88) Alice said that life 'is difficult to understand'.

According to Cappelen and Lepore, (86) is a case of direct quotation, which mentions Alice's utterance. (87) is a case of indirect quotation, which quotes the content of her utterance. (88) is a case of mixed quotation, which 'quotes Alice by reporting what she said, but attributes to her only an utterance of "is difficult to understand"' (p. 429). Cappelen and Lepore distinguish these from the case of *pure* quotation or mention, where the quotation is used not to report what another has said, but simply to talk about linguistic expressions. (89) is their example (p. 430):

(89) 'Life is difficult to understand' is a sentence.

Cappelen and Lepore show that the varieties of quotation interact with one another, and present certain constraints that any semantics of quotation should satisfy. Mixed quotation should receive overlapping semantic treatments with both indirect quotation and direct quotation. Consider (90) - (91) (p. 430):

(90) A: Alice said that life 'is difficult to understand'.
B: She did *not*; she said that death is difficult to understand.

(91) A: Alice said that life 'is difficult to understand'.
B: No! She said 'Life is not difficult to understand'.

According to Cappelen and Lepore, in (90), A and B disagree. As A uses mixed quotation and B uses indirect quotation, their disagreement indicates that mixed and

indirect quotation function in overlapping ways, and hence should receive overlapping semantic treatments. In a similar vein, in (91), A and B disagree. A uses mixed quotation while B uses direct quotation: hence mixed quotation and direct quotation should receive overlapping semantic treatments. In addition, mixed quotation and direct quotation should receive overlapping semantic treatments with pure quotation, in that pure quotations like 'A token of "Life is difficult to understand" was uttered' and 'A token of "is difficult to understand" was uttered' can be inferred from them. Thus they say 'it would seem that all that's needed to understand mixed quotation is a prior understanding of pure, direct, and indirect quotation' (p. 431).

Cappelen and Lepore argue that most existing accounts of quotation are inadequate by this criterion, since they do not yield satisfactory analyses of mixed quotation. They consider the possibility that the mixed quotation in (88) can be construed as in (92) (p. 436), combining features of propositional and sentential analyses (see section 1.3.3.2 for further discussion):

(92) Alice said that life is difficult to understand and she said it uttering, in part, the words 'is difficult to understand'.

According to Cappelen and Lepore, in (88), 'is difficult to understand' serves two functions: reporting what Alice said, i.e. that life is difficult to understand, and reporting that Alice uttered the words 'is difficult to understand'. The problem, in their view, is that while in (88) a single component serves these two functions, in (92) there are two parts, each serving a different function. Moreover, mixed quotation can be used when part of the original is unintelligible to the reporter himself. Consider (93):

(93) Nicola said that Alice is a 'philtosopher'.

Cappelen and Lepore claim that (93) can surely not be construed as (94) (p. 437), since the first conjunct of (94) does not report anything at all:

(94) *Nicola said that Alice is a philtosopher and she said it using, in part, 'philtosopher'.

They conclude that this account must be rejected.

Instead, Cappelen and Lepore propose to deal with quotation using a modification of Davidson's accounts of pure and indirect quotation. As we have seen in section 1.3.2.2, Davidson (1979) analyses a pure quotation as presenting a token of the quoted expression or shape. Cappelen and Lepore modify this account by claiming that pure quotation has a *sametokening* relation to the demonstrated token. So (95), repeated from (86), can be paraphrased as in (96) on Davidson's account, and construed as in (97) on Cappelen and Lepore's (p. 442):

(95) Alice said 'Life is difficult to understand.'

(96) Life is difficult to understand. Alice said the expression of which this is a token.

(97) $\exists u$(Says(a, u) and ST(u, these)). Life is difficult to understand.

(In (97), 'Says' means *says*, 'u' is an utterance, and 'ST' means *sametokens*.) (97) means that Alice said (i.e. uttered) a token that sametokens the demonstrated object, 'Life is difficult to understand'.

As we have seen in section 1.3.3.2, Davidson (1968) analyses indirect quotation as involving a *samesaying* relation (the samesaying relation involves content and the sametokening relation involves form). So (98), repeated from (87), is paraphrased as in (99), which Cappelen and Lepore construe as in (100) (p. 442):

(98) Alice said that life is difficult to understood.

(99) Life is difficult to understand. Alice said that.

(100) $\exists u$(Says(u, a)[*sic.*(a, u)] and SS(u, that). Life is difficult to understand.

(In (100), the use of 'that' demonstrates 'Life is difficult to understand', 'Says' means *says*, and 'SS' means *samesays*.) (100) means something like 'Alice said (uttered) a token that samesays the demonstrated object "Life is difficult to understand"'.

To account for mixed quotation, Cappelen and Lepore merge Davidson's demonstrative accounts of indirect quotation and pure (and direct) quotation. (101), repeated from (88), is construed as in (102) (p. 443):

(101) Alice said that life 'is difficult to understand'.

(102) $\exists u$(Says(a, u) and SS(u, that) and ST (u, these)). Life is difficult to understand.

In (102), the utterance of 'that' demonstrates the entire utterance 'Life is difficult to understand', and the utterance of 'these' demonstrates (only) the (sub)utterance of 'is difficult to understand'. In Cappelen and Lepore's view, (102) shows that mixed cases like (101) can be used 'both to attribute the sametokening relationship between one of Alice's utterances and the demonstrated (sub)utterance and to attribute a samesaying relationship between Alice's utterance and the demonstrated utterance' (p. 444).

Cappelen and Lepore analyse the mixed quotation in (103) (repeated from (93)), along similar lines, as in (104):

(103) Nicola said that Alice is a 'philtosopher'.

(104) $\exists u$(Says(n, u) and SS(u, that) and ST (u, these)). Alice is a philtosopher.

In (104), roughly speaking, 'that' demonstrates 'Alice is a philtosopher' and 'these' demonstrates 'philtosopher'. Again, (104) involves both the samesaying relation and the sametokening relation.

This account seems to me to inherit one of the problems I saw in Davidson's original version: (104) does not show what is samesaid and what is sametokened. Without some extra information, we have no idea what 'that' and 'these' are pointing at. The situation is different in (103), where we get a clear idea of what is indirectly quoted and what is directly quoted. If there were only one relation, whether samesaying or sametokening, it would be clearer what is being pointed at. But this is not true when two relations are simultaneously involved, each with a different scope. In this sense, Cappelen and Lepore's account of mixed quotation runs into the same problem as other accounts: it cannot deal with both relations simultaneously.

A further problem is raised by (104), which is paraphrased as (105):

(105) Nicola said that Alice is a philtosopher, and she said 'philtosopher'.

In (105), the indirect quotation has a samesaying relation and the direct quotation a sametokening relation to the original utterance. I find no essential difference between (105) and (94), which Cappelen and Lepore reject, as we have seen above.

Cappelen and Lepore's contribution seems to me to lie not so much in the formal representations they propose as in their definition of the samesaying relation, which does not involve semantic identity, unlike Davidson's account. In their view, it is 'the actual practice of making indirect reports of others' (p. 446) that fixes the extension of *samesaying*. Accordingly they reject the assumption that the complement clause in an indirect quotation must be identical in content to the original utterance being quoted. In many cases, the resemblance in content is only partial. Consider (106) - (107) (Cappelen and Lepore 1997b: 282 - 283):

(106) a. A: I own a very expensive pair of brown Bruno Magli shoes.

b. B: A said that he owns a pair of Bruno Magli shoes.

(107) [After Clinton's speech about his new economic program, a journalist reports:]
Clinton says he'll cut taxes.

In (106), B reports A's utterance, while eliminating adjectival modifiers, like 'very expensive'; and in (107), the journalist quotes Clinton by summarising his speech.

Another case involves changing the wording while preserving reference. Consider (108), where 'Smith's murderer' refers to Stanley, and (109) (Cappelen and Lepore 1997b: 284, 292 - 293):

(108) a. A: **Smith's murderer** didn't comb his hair today.
b. B: A said that **Stanley** didn't comb his hair today.

(109) a. A: I want to visit **mom and dad** during the holidays.
b. B: A said that he would visit **his family** during the holidays.

In (108), the expression in bold type is not a verbatim reproduction, but preserves reference; and in (109), it shares some of the referents of the original. [12]

Cappelen and Lepore also discusses cases of verbal irony. Consider (110) (1997b: 284):

[12] Such uses have widely discussed in the relevance-theoretic literature for the last 15 years: see e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: chapter 4, section 7; Blakemore 1993, 1994. I will introduce Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory in chapter 2. Their cognitive account should be able to answer Cappelen and Lepore's (1997a: 446) problems with (103) above:

> 'What about the question *how* it is possible for a demonstrated utterance of "Alice is a philtosopher" to samesay Nicola's utterance? If this question is asking how samesaying can have this sort of extension, we do not know how to answer it. It has the extension it has and we can understand why that is useful and important in our linguistic practice'.

(110) [After a particular awful philosophy talk]

a. A: (in a heavily sarcastic tone) That was, like, really good.

b. B: A said that the talk was really good.

c. B: A said that he didn't like the talk much.

According to Cappelen and Lepore (1997b), A's utterance cannot be reported by (b), but can be by (c). In other words, they treat 'saying' as equivalent to assertion. On a weaker notion of 'saying', of course, (b) is possible, and B can add 'but in fact, he didn't (like the talk)' or 'but he seemed not to mean it'. The treatment of verbal irony will be taken up below.

In the context of previous discussions within semantics and philosophy of language, Cappelen and Lepore make some important points. In particular, their notion of 'samesaying' allows for something less than full identity in semantic content. The problem is, though, they do not give any positive account of what qualifies as samesaying:

> 'Whether two utterances samesay each other often depends on non-semantic considerations. Competent speakers of English, those who competently use the 'says that' locution, are able to render such judgements. ... Therefore, the task of characterising our competence with 'says that' locutions will be no simpler than, say, accounting for how we can make judgements of similarity or how we can classify objects as being of the same color'. (Cappelen and Lepore 1997b: 291)

Though this observation is correct, we need a pragmatic account of the principles underlying these judgements. In chapter 2, I will argue that relevance theory can provide an explanation. On the other hand, Cappelen and Lepore (1997a) continue to treat direct quotation as involving a sametokening relation to the original. This suggests that they are still treating direct speech as verbatim reproduction. So while they allow for degrees of resemblance in indirect speech, they do not recognise it as part of the nature of quotation in general. Finally, on their account, the recognition of

quotation still seems to hinge on explicit marks, such as quote marks in direct quotation and 'that' in indirect quotation. Without them, it is not clear how their analysis can work. Again, their account is insufficiently pragmatic, and need to be supplemented with a pragmatic framework for the resolution of indeterminacies.

1.4.2 Saka (1998): The disambiguated ostension theory[13]

Saka (1998) deals only with the case of mention (pure quotation), but his account of this is very comprehensive and quite pragmatic, and surely worth discussing. Saka distinguishes quotation from mention: mention is the use of language to refer to itself (its linguistic properties), while quotation is something else:

> 'Quotation is one mechanism by which we can *mention*; as such it is used for attributing exact words and thought to others; for distancing oneself from a given word choice (as in scare quotes); for indicating titles; for expressing irony (Sperber and Wilson 1981, Jorgensen et al. 1984, Groening 1996); and for explaining truth (the disquotation theory), meaning (truth-theoretic semantics), external negation (Horn 1989), and indirect discourse (Cappelen and Lepore 1997 [1997b], Seymour 1994), and the inscriptional theory of Carnap 1937 and others.' (Saka 1998:113)

It is not entirely clear from this what he means by 'quotation'. It seems to mean the use of quotation marks, though Sperber and Wilson's (1981) irony, Horn's (1989) external negation, and Cappelen and Lepore's (1997b) indirect speech do not use necessarily quote marks. His definition of quotation will be discussed in more detail once his account of mention has been introduced.

Saka's aim is to show how a mentioned word can refer to one of the properties of the word. His analysis is based on the notion of deferred ostension.

[13] All my examples are taken or adapted from Saka (1998). Their page numbers are given in parentheses.

'*Direct* ostension associates a term with its referent via immediate experience, for instance by deictic demonstration or by the simple exhibition of an item. *Deferred* ostension to an absent object *X* may be secured by pointing at or describing something present that is saliently related to *X*'(p. 125). For example, by pointing at a newspaper we can refer to a newspaper company, as in 'The newspaper was sold to a foreigner'.

Saka claims that every use of language is an act of multiple ostension, partly direct and partly deferred, where the referents may include the following kind of items:[14]

(111) a. orthographic form: *cat*
b. phonic form: /kæt/
c. lexical entry: <*cat*, /kæt/, count noun, CAT>
d. intension: CAT
e. extension: {*x*: *x* a cat}

According to Saka, if we utter the phonic form '/kæt/' (b), it ostends the corresponding lexeme (c) in every competent speaker of English. The lexeme consists of orthographic form, phonic form, syntactic category, meaning, register, etc. This lexeme specifies the intension CAT, which determines the extension {*x*: *x* a cat}. These ostended items form a package deal, he adds.

Saka proposes that use and mention can be understood as follows (p.126) (my emphases):

(112) (u) Speaker *S* **uses** an expression *X* iff:
(i) *S* exhibits a token of *X*;
(ii) *S* thereby ostends the multiple items associated with *X* (including *X*'s extension);

[14] In this section, following Saka, I use italics for orthographic forms, slashes for pronunciation, and capital letters for concepts, so *cat*, /kæt/, and CAT, respectively.

(iii) ***S* intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to the extension of *X*.**

(m) Speaker *S* **mentions** an expression *X* iff:

(i) *S* exhibits a token of *X*;

(ii) *S* thereby ostends the multiple items associated with *X*;

(iii) ***S* intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to some item associated with *X* other than its extension.**

(Though he does not say so in (m, ii), the extension of *X* is presumably also included in the package of multiple items, as in (u, ii).) In short, use and mention share the property that the speaker exhibits a token of *X*, and thereby ostends the multiple items associated with *X*. They are distinguished only in which kind of item the speaker intends the hearer to direct his attention to: in use, the extension is intended to be picked out, and in mention, some other of the multiple items ostended. On Saka's analysis, mention can occur without quote marks. Every expression *X* that can be used can in principle be mentioned. In addition, on his account, though use and mention are distinct, they are compatible, since the speaker can intend to direct the thoughts of the audience to the customary reference (the extension) and at the same time to other things as well. So he argues that his account opens a path for treating simultaneous use and mention (i.e. mixed quotation).

As we have seen above, Saka's notion of quotation seems to be different from Cappelen and Lepore's (see section 1.3.1) and mine. Here is what he says:

> '... we are now prepared to consider the definition of quotation. Syntactically, a pair of quote marks is a discontinuous determiner (a complex symbol which, applied to an argument expression, produces a noun phrase). Semantically, a pair of quote marks is a concept or intension, QUOT, which ambiguously or indeterminately maps its argument expression *X* into some linguistic item saliently associated with *X* other than the extension of *X*. Although quote marks generally do not specify among token, type, form, and concept, they

> still serve to partially disambiguate, for they rule out customary reference as the intended interpretation.' (p.127)

In other words, quote marks disambiguate the expression inside the quote marks as mentioned, though they do not specify which of the multiple items is intended to be picked out. Here it is clear that 'quotation' is used to mean 'the mode of presentation using quote marks'. So his distinction between mention and 'quotation' does not challenge my assumption that mention, reported speech and thought, and mixed quotation can all be treated as varieties of quotation. We are using the term 'quotation' differently: I use it for a certain type of metarepresentation, and he uses it for an overtly marked subtype containing quote marks (or equivalences). Indeed, his article supports my idea that mention can occur without quote marks, that is, be left to be inferred.

Saka's theory, which he calls 'the Disambiguated Ostension Theory of Quotation', is based on the assumption that 'the capacities for both use and mention come from the same source, namely from the fact that the human mind associates a multiplicity of deferred ostensions with any exhibited token, thus giving rise to pragmatic ambiguity' (p. 132). His analysis avoids some of the problems of other theories, by yielding to pragmatics some of what others have tried to do by purely semantic means, e.g. disambiguation of use versus mention, and disambiguation of the intended item from the multiple items associated with the expression. What he tries to show is how displaying an expression can succeed in mentioning (one of) the multiple items associated with that expression. Saka emphasises that the deferred ostension happens 'automatically and spontaneously as a result of human cognitive architecture' (p. 126), and it is not a matter of convention. He comments 'A fuller understanding of it now awaits further research in psychopragmatics' (p.133).

According to Saka, a linguistic expression *X* directly ostends the token displayed, and deferringly ostends its type, and then the associated lexeme (where all lexical information about the type is included), its intension and extension, etc. Unlike previous accounts of mention, his account makes it possible to focus on phonetic/orthographic form, type, and content (intension). One point worth

emphasising is that we need some principle to guide us from the mentioned form to the intended property. How can the hearer decide on the intended item from among the multiple items ostended? In order to account for this, a pragmatic approach is seriously needed. I propose a relevance-theoretic account in chapter 2.

A further question is whether Saka's account of mention can be extended to all cases of reported speech and thought. As we saw at the beginning of this subsection, Saka lists direct quotation as a case where we use the quotation mechanism for purposes of mention. Probably overtly marked and non-overtly marked cases should be seen as corresponding to mention with and without quote marks. However, it is not clear whether his account can deal with loose attributions, based on varying degrees of resemblance. This seems to depend on 'deferred ostension'.

To sum up: On Saka's account, disambiguation between use and mention is in many cases a purely pragmatic process. Quote marks may be used to indicate mention overtly, but which property is intended to be made salient in mention is also pragmatically determined. In chapter 2, I will analyse quotations within the framework of relevance theory, which I think can do what Saka expected an adequate 'psychopragmatics' to do.

1.4.3 Clark and Gerrig (1990): Quotations as demonstrations

The accounts discussed so far use very limited and idealised examples. By contrast, Clark and Gerrig (1990) consider the nature of the quoted material, looking at various uses and types of quotation. They take real examples from everyday conversations, novels, magazines, lectures, as well as from the linguistic literature. They also sketch a more theoretical account of quotation. In this section, I will discuss Clark and Gerrig's account of quotation, using many of their examples. (Page numbers are given in parentheses.)

Clark and Gerrig (1990) look only at direct quotation, which they also call 'pure quotation' (cf. section 1.4.1 above). For them, direct and indirect quotation

involve very different mechanisms: the former is a demonstration (in their sense), whereas the latter is a description. I will start by outlining what they mean by demonstration.

Clark and Gerrig claim that there are three fundamental methods of performing communicative acts: indicating, describing, and demonstrating. Indicating is pointing at some actual thing, so that the audience grasps what the communicator means by recognising her intention to locate the indicated thing and by perceiving it directly, that is, by direct experience. Describing involves using language, so that the audience grasps what the communicator means by recognising her intention in uttering the words. Demonstrating is performing certain actions that resemble the actions the communicator intends to demonstrate, so that the audience grasps what the communicator means by recognising her intention to depict certain aspects of what is demonstrated. For example, when you have a seriously ill friend, you can point at a doctor (if there is one near), you can demonstrate a doctor's examination, or you can say 'You have to see a doctor'. In this case, you are indicating, demonstrating, and describing, respectively. According to Clark and Gerrig (p. 765), 'Some communicative acts rely on just one of these methods, and others, on a combination'.

Clark and Gerrig concentrate on demonstrations. A fundamental claim they make is that demonstrations are non-serious actions:

> 'When Alice demonstrates George's limp, she isn't "really or actually or literally" limping. Her actions are "patterned on" a real limp but are "seen by the participants to be something quite else", a demonstration of a limp. Demonstrations belong to a family of non-serious actions that includes practicing, playing, acting, and pretending.' (p. 766)

They also claim that demonstrations are selective depictions. Depictions are intended to resemble their referents; selective depictions are intended to resemble their referents only in certain respects, with other aspects of the depiction being supportive, annotative, or just incidental.

In Clark and Gerrig's view, quotations are demonstrations that belong to language use. As demonstrations, they should be non-serious actions. Consider (113), said by Matt of a customer talking to a shopkeeper selling ants (p. 764):

(113) She says 'well I'd like to buy an ant'.

In (113), Matt is quoting the customer's utterance. He is not asserting that he wants to buy an ant; rather, he is depicting someone else's assertion. Accordingly, Clark and Gerrig claim that quotations are not serious actions.

As demonstrations, quotations should also be selective depictions. Clark and Gerrig claim that any of the following aspects of a speech event can be depicted in quotation (p. 775):[15]

(114) (i) DELIVERY: voice pitch (male, female, child), voice age (adult, child, oldster), voice quality (raspy, nasal, slurred), speech defects (lisp, stutter), emotional state (anger, sarcasm, excitement), accompanying gestures (pointing, smiling, frowning)

(ii) LANGUAGE: language proper (English, Dutch, Japanese), dialect (British English, Bostonian English), register (formal, informal)

(iii) LINGUISTIC ACTS: illocutionary act (question, request, promise), propositional expression (the proposition expressed), locutionary act (the sentence uttered), utterance act (the utterance issued with repairs, etc.)

Thus, consider (115) (p. 777):

[15] Clark and Gerrig (1990) claim that written quotations also selectively depict aspects of the quoted material. As in the case of spoken quotations, aspects of delivery, language, and linguistic acts, and even of nonlinguistic events, may be depicted, though the range of possibilities is limited compared to spoken quotations.

(115) a. Wolfgang asked 'Are you hungry?' and I answered 'Yes, I am'.
b. Wolfgang asked 'Hast du hunger?' and I answered 'Ja'.
c. Wolfgang asked in German 'Are you hungry?' and I answered in German 'Yes, I am'.

In (115a), according to Clark and Gerrig, the language is incidental, and only the content is depicted. By contrast, in (115b), the German language is depicted, and in (115c), the reporter describes the source language, but it is not depicted. Or consider another example (p. 780):

(116) Ralph and Greg are . talking about something and uh Ralph says 'is that the idea that you get? blah blah blah' and . Greg says 'ah well . another idea's you get multiple traces'.

In (116), the reporter quotes Ralph, depicting not the illocutionary act, but merely the fact that Ralph has uttered some words. Here, the aspect of utterance act is depicted.

We have seen in earlier sections that direct quotations are traditionally seen as verbatim reproductions of the original utterance. Clark and Gerrig's treatment of quotations as selective depictions explicitly rejects this assumption. First, they point out that it is difficult to define a verbatim reproduction. Consider (117) - (118) (p.795):

(117) I - I've only been - we've only been to like . four of his I - five of his lectures, right?

(118) a. Sidney says 'I - I've only been - we've only been to like . four of his I - five of his lectures, right?'
b. Sidney says 'We've only been to, like, five of his lectures, right?'
c. Sidney says 'We have only been to five of his lectures'.

The actual utterance in (117) can be directly reported in three ways, illustrated in (118). In (118a), the utterance itself is reproduced; in (118b), what is reproduced is the sentence uttered, and in (118c) what is reproduced is the sentence uttered, but in a more formal register. Which of these counts as a verbatim reproduction? If the criterion is 'the actual words spoken', it will be (118a). If it is 'the surface structure of the quoted sentence', it is (118b). By newspaper reporting conventions, it is (118c). As earlier accounts generally dealt only with idealised sentences, the verbatim reproduction assumption could be maintained. To deal with the full range of actual examples, it needs to be revised.

Clark and Gerrig go on to argue that it is not necessary to reproduce a particular language. Consider (119), repeated from (115):

(119) a. Wolfgang asked 'Are you hungry?' and I answered 'Yes, I am'.
b. Wolfgang asked 'Hast du hunger?' and I answered 'Ja'.
c. Wolfgang asked in German 'Are you hungry?' and I answered in German 'Yes, I am'.

An utterance originally in German can be quoted in three ways, illustrated in (119). All these examples involve quotations, which differ only according to which aspects of the original are depicted. This is another argument against the verbatim reproduction assumption.

There is a more serious counterexample to the verbatim reproduction assumption. Consider (120), repeated from (116):

(120) Ralph and Greg are . talking about something and uh Ralph says 'is that the idea that you get? blah blah blah' and . Greg says 'nah well . another idea's you get multiple traces'.

In (120), 'blah blah blah' is used in quoting Ralph's utterance, but it is clearly not a verbatim reproduction.[16]

I agree with Clark and Gerrig on this point. In section 1.2, we have seen that a quotation need not be identical to the original. Unlike other accounts discussed so far, Clark and Gerrig explicitly acknowledge degrees of resemblance in quotation. In chapter 2, I will introduce the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation, a type of representation based on resemblance relations which fits well with Clark and Gerrig's claims. But there are still a few comments to be made on their analysis. First, although they correctly reject the verbatim reproduction assumption, they do not present any principle we can use to constrain non-verbatim repetition. Even if the intended degree of resemblance ranges from verbatim reproduction to loose attribution, as in 'blah blah blah', it is not unconstrained. For example, a spokesman is very unlikely to reply, 'Well, he said blah blah blah', to the question 'So, what is the minister's comment on the situation?' Clark and Gerrig do not provide a pragmatic account of this constraint: their treatment is therefore more a description than an explanation. Moreover, they do not provide an account of how the hearer resolves the indeterminacies in utterances involving quotation (e.g. the presence of quotation, source and type of the original, degrees of resemblance, etc.). At the very least, their approach need some supplementation.

Let us now consider their account itself. As we have seen, Clark and Gerrig distinguish direct from indirect quotation: direct quotation is a demonstration, indirect quotation is a description; direct quotation is a non-serious action, indirect quotation is a serious action, and so forth. I would like to question these claims. Notice, first, that both types of quoted clause are reports of an attributed utterance, rather than assertions by the current speaker. Consider (121) - (122):

(121) a. He said, 'The earth is flat'.

b. He said that the earth was flat.

[16] Clark and Gerrig also give more general arguments against the verbatim assumption, based on limitations of human memory and some experimental results.

In (121), suppose Mary utters (a) and (b) on different occasions. In neither case does Mary assert that the earth is flat. Whether it is a direct or an indirect quotation, the quoted clause itself does not express Mary's own views. So there is no difference between direct and indirect quotation as regards their status as serious/non-serious actions. What Clark and Gerrig seem to mean is that the whole utterance in (b) is seriously asserted, and that the quoted clause in this case does not amount to any independent action in its own right. But of course the whole utterance in (a) is also seriously asserted. The difference between (a) and (b) does not lie there.

I now want to argue against their claim that demonstrations are non-serious actions, and hence that direct quotations (and what they call 'specialized quotations') are non-serious actions. It is easy to find arguments to show that many demonstrations are serious actions. For example, Peter can show Mary how to cook a lasagne by actually cooking it. In fact, it is easier to demonstrate how to cook a lasagne by actually doing it than by pretending to do it. There are many similar cases: demonstrating how to embroider, how to type, how to swim, how to wash dishes, how to kick a ball, etc. All these are easier to demonstrate by actually doing them, rather than just imitating them. Any action, whether serious or non-serious, makes manifest a variety of assumptions, any of which can be exploited in communication.[17] We need to know how the intended assumptions can be recognised, and for this, a pragmatic account is needed. (See chapter 2, section 2.2.)

If demonstrations are not necessarily non-serious, it should follow that direct quotations are not necessarily non-serious either:

(122) a. My advice is 'Buy now'.

b. I say, 'I didn't do that'.

In (122), (a) is a clear case of direct quotation, where the speaker seriously wants the hearer to buy something at that time. By the same token, in (b), the speaker is also

[17] For the notion of manifestness as used in relevance theory, see Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: chapter 1, section 8) or Wilson (forthcoming a). To make an assumption manifest to someone is to make it either perceivable or inferrable; the more salient the assumption, the greater the degree of manifestness.

seriously asserting that she didn't do that. It follows that the analysis of quotations as demonstrations in Clark and Gerrig's sense (of non-serious action) excludes some examples we would want to deal with in a full account.

Clark and Gerrig (1990: 786) also analyse a range of what they call 'specialized quotations' as non-serious actions. This term is used for quotations not embedded under a verb of saying, and applies to free indirect quotation, conventional sound quotation, and incorporated quotation. I will discuss each of these in turn. First, free indirect quotations. Clark and Gerrig analyse these, like direct quotations, as demonstrations.[18] However, as we have seen, they are formally more similar to indirect quotations. The shifted tense and person are similar to those in indirect quotation, and many cases of free indirect quotation can be obtained by omitting the introductory clause from indirect speech. In any case, not all free indirect speech is non-serious. Consider (123):

(123) A: The World Cup makes people mad.
B: The World Cup makes people mad, indeed.

In (123), B may be quoting A's utterance, while simultaneously endorsing it. It would therefore be wrong to say that he is not serious in remarking that the World Cup makes people mad.

There is also a gradient of cases like (124), which are more or less similar to free indirect speech:

(124) a. He asked, was she leaving now.
b. Was she leaving now, he asked.
c. Was she leaving now?

[18] Clark and Gerrig argue that free indirect quotations are close relatives to direct quotation, and are sometimes difficult to distinguish: 'go' accepts both types of quotation as a complement clause, but not indirect quotations, and neither direct nor free indirect quotation can be embedded. See Clark and Gerrig (1990: 787 - 788) for details.

In (124), the parenthetical clause is at the front of the quotation in (a); it is at the end of it in (b), and it is omitted in (c). Are these direct or indirect quotations? Are they demonstrations or descriptions? For Clark and Gerrig, the answer makes a major theoretical difference. By contrast, as we have seen in 1.3.3.3, McHale and Leech & Short claim that the three different types of reported speech and thought are points on a continuum, rather than distinct categories with distinct properties. Apart from its descriptive inadequacies, Clark and Gerrig's clear-cut distinction between direct and indirect quotation makes it difficult to deal with this continuum of cases.

Mixed quotations (which Clark and Gerrig call incorporated quotations) present a similar problem. Consider (125) (p. 789):

(125) a. You seem to forget the old saw 'Haste makes waste.'
b. You seem to forget how 'haste makes waste'.

In (125a), 'Haste makes waste' is an embedded quotation, and in (125b), it is a mixed quotation. According to Clark and Gerrig, in (125a), the speaker merely depicts the proverb. By contrast, in (125b), the speaker depicts the proverb, and, at the same time, appropriates the words as part of the assertion she is making. However, it is not clear how depicting and describing can take place simultaneously. How can a non-serious action be serious at the same time?

A third type of 'specialised quotation' is 'sound quotation'. Consider (126) (pp. 788 - 789):

(126) a. And while she gazed her heart went pitapat. [James Joyce, *Ulysses*]
b. And we all went 'whisper whisper [whispering]' when he came into the room.

In (126a), the onomatopoeic word 'pitapat' is used to depict the sound that the heart makes. In (126b), according to Clark and Gerrig, the speaker is depicting selected aspects of a sound or action, using a verb that also describes the action. If non-linguistic sounds are included under quotation, as Clark and Gerrig suggest, the range

of quotation become enormously wide. In their view, non-linguistic demonstrations are quotations so long as they belong to a discourse. Consider (127) (p. 782):

(127) So I walked softly up to the door. [Demonstration of three gentle taps at the door], 'Who is it?' 'It's me.' 'Well, then, please come in.'

According to Clark and Gerrig, in (127), the demonstration of taps belongs to the discourse. Hence, it is a quotation. Certainly, what we have here is a case of metarepresentation (i.e. representation based on exploitation of resemblance between representation and original). But it is not clear why such metarepresentations should be called 'quotations' when they occur within a discourse, and not otherwise. It may turn out, in fact, that 'quotation', unlike 'metarepresentation', is not a theoretically useful category. I will discuss this further in chapter 2.

A point worth emphasising about Clark and Gerrig's account, and one which distinguishes it from more semantic or philosophical accounts, is brought out by the above example. Three taps on a door are not a sentence or a linguistic expression. They are an action, part of an utterance, i.e. a public representation, with physical as well as abstract properties. More generally, quotations proper are part of a public representation, with both linguistic and non-linguistic properties, any of which may be exploited by the speaker. Even where what is represented by the quotation is a sentence, word or other abstract linguistic expression, the quotation itself is a concrete action rather than an abstract linguistic representation.

To sum up: Clark and Gerrig use a wider range of examples than previous writers, and make the important point that direct quotations are not verbatim reproductions. I have argued that we still need to provide a pragmatic principle to constrain the degrees of reformulation permitted. I have also argued against their claim that direct quotations are non-serious actions, and the more general claim that demonstrations are, by definition, non-serious. This raises the question of how direct quotations do succeed in representing their originals. Clark and Gerrig also analyse free indirect and incorporated quotation as demonstrations, but I have shown that there are cases of serious free indirect quotation. In fact, whether with direct,

indirect, or free indirect quotation, there is no point in claiming that quotations are non-serious. What is crucial is whether the speaker intended her utterance to be understood as metarepresenting some other representation.

In section 1.4, I have discussed three alternative approaches to quotation. Unlike most traditional theories, they recognise that mention is closely connected to reported speech and thought. They also note that quotation is not necessarily a verbatim reproduction of the original: Cappelen and Lepore argue that indirect quotations are not necessarily semantic reproductions of the original, and Clark and Gerrig argue that direct quotations are not necessarily verbatim reproductions. Saka argues that mention involves deferred ostension, which may refer not only to an expression type, but also to many things associated with this type. However, none of them seems to recognise that less-than-literal reformulation is in the very nature of quotation. In the next chapter, I will argue that this is so.

Another problem with these recent accounts is that they do not attempt to explain why the speaker sometimes uses a loose quotation, and how the hearer can assess its degree of literalness or looseness. We need some principle to constrain the degree of resemblance between quotation and original.

1.5 Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I have looked at various types and uses of quotation and examined some traditional and more recent alternative accounts of quotation.

In section 1.2, I drew the following conclusions: Quotations are possible with or without overt quote marks. They may represent either the form or the content of the original. The original may be a possible or actual utterance, a possible or actual thought, or an abstract representation. If a possible or actual utterance or thought, it may be attributed to a specific person, or not. If an abstract representation, it may be linguistic, or conceptual, or mathematical. A quotation may be an identical reproduction of the original, but may not: the expected degree of looseness depends on the circumstances. There may be more or less overt clues to the intended

interpretation of these indeterminacies; an adequate pragmatic theory should provide a framework in which all these aspects of the interpretation of quotations can be described and explained.

In section 1.3, I surveyed traditional accounts of mention and of reported speech and thought. These treat quotation as verbatim reproduction, and provide no pragmatic account of how the hearer can resolve the various indeterminacies listed above. In section 1.4, I discussed three more recent approaches to quotation: Cappelen and Lepore (1997a, b), Saka (1998) and Clark and Gerrig (1990). These improve on earlier accounts, but I have argued that they still raise some problems, and also need to be supplemented by an adequate pragmatic theory.

In the next chapter, I will introduce relevance theory, and argue that it can provide a more adequate treatment of quotation than those discussed so far. I will also try to show that it deals with a much wider range of data than earlier accounts of quotation, which fail to draw some theoretically significant generalisations.

Chapter 2

Relevance Theory and Metarepresentational Use

2.1 Introduction

In chapter 1, I looked at various types of quotation, ranging from pure quotation (mention) to mixed quotation, and drew attention to a variety of indeterminacies that the hearer may have to resolve in interpreting them. I argued that an adequate account of quotation should not only deal with all these types of quotation, but should also provide a pragmatic framework capable of explaining how hearers resolve the indeterminacies. I showed that both traditional accounts and more recent alternative accounts failed to meet these requirements fully, despite the contributions they have made.

In this chapter, I will outline Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) relevance theory and show how it provides a general pragmatic framework in which the resolution of semantic indeterminacies can be explained. I will then introduce the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation, and show how a general comprehension strategy provided by the framework applies to the resolution of indeterminacies in utterances involving metarepresentations. I will also argue that the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation can be applied not only to a range of paradigmatic cases of quotation, but also to some further cases which would not generally be treated as quotations in either the ordinary sense of the term or the theoretical sense developed in many existing accounts of quotation, where quotation involves either mention or some variety of reported speech or thought.

This chapter is organised as follows: section 2 outlines relevance theory and explains the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy. Section 3 introduces the notion of metarepresentation as defined in relevance theory, and shows how the comprehension strategy applies to utterances involving metarepresentations. Section

4 analyses quotation as a subtype of metarepresentation. Section 5 analyses other cases of metarepresentation not generally considered in the literature on quotations. Section 6 is a summary and conclusion.

2.2 Relevance Theory

In this section, I will give a brief outline of relevance theory.[1] I will also show how relevance theory provides a general comprehension strategy which can be used in resolving indeterminacies in the interpretation of any utterance.

2.2.1 Outline of relevance theory

Let us start with a definition of relevance. Information derived from any source (perception, inference, communication) may be relevant to an individual. It is relevant when it interacts with some context of assumptions accessible to the individual to yield *cognitive effects*. Cognitive effects are of three main types: strengthening an existing assumption, combining with an existing assumption to yield a contextual implication, or contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption. To illustrate, suppose I go to a shop to buy a dress for my baby, assuming that they have dresses for baby girls. In the shop, an assistant says they have baby-dresses. The information is relevant to me in that it strengthens my assumption that they will have baby-dresses. If I had already decided to buy two dresses if they sell them, the information would give rise to a contextual implication, that I will buy two baby-dresses, and would be relevant to me for this reason. On the other hand, suppose that before I get

[1] For detailed exposition, see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Blakemore 1992; for updated versions, see Sperber and Wilson 1995: postface; Wilson 1998b; Wilson and Sperber 1998; for critical discussion, see *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 10.4 (1987); Seuren 1987; Mey and Talbot 1988; Levinson 1989; Chametzky 1992; Giora 1997. For recent bibliographical sources, see Sperber and Wilson 1995: Notes to Postface; Yus Ramos 1998.

to the shop, I meet a friend who went to the shop this morning and tells me that they do not have any baby-dresses. This information contradicts and eliminates my assumption that they will have baby-dresses, and achieves relevance thereby. These cases illustrate how new information can achieve relevance by interacting with a context of existing assumptions to yield cognitive effects. Other things being equal, the greater the cognitive effects a newly presented piece of information has for an individual, the more relevant it will be to him.

There is another factor to be taken into account in assessing degrees of relevance. Cognitive effects are achieved by mental processes, and hence require processing effort. The greater the effort needed to derive them, the lower the relevance will be. In this thesis, I will be mainly concerned with the processing effort required to understand an utterance. This depends on two main factors: the form in which the information is presented (e.g. the audibility, legibility, dialect, register, syntactic complexity, and familiarity of construction), and the effort of memory and imagination needed to construct a suitable context. These will be discussed further below.

In short, degrees of relevance depend on two factors: (a) cognitive effects and (b) processing effort. This suggests the following comparative definition of relevance:

(1) Relevance

(a) Other things being equal, the greater the cognitive effects achieved in an individual by processing some information, the greater the relevance of that information to that individual.

(b) Other things being equal, the smaller the processing effort required to achieve those cognitive effects, the greater the relevance of that information to that individual.

Relevance theory claims that every aspect of cognition and communication is governed by the search for relevance. These claims are expressed in two principles of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260):

(2) Cognitive Principle of Relevance

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.

(3) Communicative Principle of Relevance

Every act of overt communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

What the Cognitive Principle of Relevance says is that human cognition **tends** to be geared towards the allocation of attention and processing resources to the most relevant information. That is, humans tend to pay attention to the most relevant phenomena available; they tend to construct the most relevant representation of a given phenomenon, and to process this representation in a context which maximises its relevance.

What the Communicative Principle of Relevance says is that utterances create an expectation of a certain level of relevance in the addressee. This expectation is not of maximal relevance, but of optimal relevance. Communicators cannot always be relied on to give the most relevant possible information, or to present it in the least effort-demanding way. In the first place, the speaker may not have the information that the hearer would find the most relevant; she may be unable to think of it; or she may be unwilling to give it. In the second place, the speaker may not have enough time to think of the best possible formulation of her utterance; she may not be competent to express herself in the most economical (or least effort-demanding) way; or she may have stylistic preferences which prevent her from choosing the best possible formulation. Nonetheless, from the very fact that the speaker is offering him information, which requires some expenditure of processing effort, the hearer is entitled to expect the utterance to be **at least** relevant enough to be worth his attention. This sets a lower limit on the expected degree of relevance. Beyond that point, Sperber and Wilson argue, it is in the speaker's interest to achieve a greater degree of relevance as long as she is capable of achieving it and has no specific preferences which would prevent her achieving it. In this way, she will have the

greatest chance of holding the hearer's attention and hence of achieving her goals and avoiding misunderstanding.

In relevance theory, taking these factors into account, the presumption of optimal relevance is given as follows:

(4) Presumption of Optimal Relevance[2]

(a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it.

(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.

Clause (a) states that the ostensive stimulus (e.g. the utterance) should achieve at least enough cognitive effects to justify the processing effort required. Clause (b) takes into account the fact that the speaker may be unable/unwilling to make her utterance more relevant than this, but notes that she will be expected to do so to the extent that she is willing and able to.

Here are some illustrations of the arguments underlying this definition. First, speakers are not always **able** to be as relevant as the hearer would want. Consider (5):

(5) [Mary says to Peter that she met Jane on her way home and that Jane has an exam. Peter suggests inviting her to dinner after the exam.]

Peter: When does her exam end?

Mary: Sometime next week.

Mary's utterance is interpreted as expressing the proposition 'Jane's exam ends sometime next week'. This information is not exactly what Peter wants: It would have been more relevant to give the exact date. In the circumstances in (5), it would generally be obvious to both participants that Mary is expected and willing to co-

[2] This is the revised version of the presumption of optimal relevance which is included in the second edition of Sperber and Wilson's *Relevance* (1995: 275).

operate with Peter by giving him the information he wants. From this assumption, together with the fact that her reply is not relevant enough to answer Peter's question, it follows that Mary's utterance may be understood as implicating (6):

(6) Mary does not know exactly when Jane's exam ends.

In other circumstances, it may be clear that Mary is not willing to co-operate with Peter by giving him the information he wants. Suppose that Mary has already told Peter that she is meeting Jane on the day her exam ends, in such a way that it is obvious to both participants that she already knows when that is. In these circumstances, given clause (b) of the presumption of optimal relevance, her answer would implicate (7):

(7) Mary is reluctant to say exactly when Jane's exam ends.

This is where maximal relevance and optimal relevance come apart. Achieving optimal relevance involves producing the most relevant utterance **compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences**. Only to the extent that the speaker is able and willing to provide the most relevant utterance is the hearer entitled to look for maximal relevance.[3]

It is worth noting here that although the hearer is entitled to look for optimal relevance, he may be capable of understanding and finding fully acceptable certain utterances that fall short of optimal relevance in some way. There are at least two cases which illustrate this point. One is the case of accidental irrelevance. The speaker may have thought that certain information would be relevant to the hearer, but in fact the hearer already knows it from an equally reliable source. For example, in the situation in (5), when Mary tells Peter that Jane has an exam, Peter may already have heard this from Jane. Then Mary's utterance 'Jane has an exam' would not yield

[3] Notice, too, that even if the hearer were expecting a maximally relevant **utterance,** it would not follow that he is entitled to choose the maximally relevant **interpretation.** This would require him to consider all possible interpretations, which hearers do not do. For further discussion, see below.

any cognitive effects for Peter and would hence be irrelevant to him. But he would not regard it as unacceptable or incomprehensible. He will be capable of correctly understanding it as long as he is capable of recognising how she might reasonably have **intended** it to be optimally relevant. Adult speakers' expectations of relevance are sophisticated enough to allow for this.

The other case which illustrates this point is the case of accidental relevance. An utterance is accidentally relevant when the hearer finds an interpretation that is optimally relevant to him in a way the speaker manifestly did not foresee. Suppose your teacher says (8) during a conversation with you:

(8) These days students do not respect their teachers.

You might understand it as referring to you, and be embarrassed. In fact, she said it thinking about a student who misbehaved to her yesterday, and had no intention of criticising you. This might lead to misunderstanding; on the other hand, it might be correctly understood if you were capable of recognising that the teacher is a kind and polite person who could manifestly not have intended the interpretation that had occurred to you. To arrive at the intended interpretation, you have to realise that she could not have thought her utterance would be optimally relevant to you on that reading. Adult speakers' expectations of relevance are generally sophisticated enough to allow for this.

The reference to 'the speaker's abilities and preferences' in the definition of the presumption of optimal relevance takes into account the fact that the speaker may be unable or unwilling to produce the most relevant possible utterance, even when she knows what that would be. By contrast, the cases of accidental relevance and irrelevance take into account the fact that the speaker may not know what would be optimally relevant to the hearer. In early work, Sperber and Wilson proposed a criterion to deal with these cases:

(9) Criterion of Consistency with the Principle of Relevance

An utterance, on a given interpretation, is consistent with the principle of relevance if and only if the speaker might rationally have expected it to be optimally relevant to the hearer on that interpretation.

This criterion is helpful in the case where the speaker is incompetent in a way that leads to accidental relevance or irrelevance. However, it still assumes that the speaker is benevolent enough not to deceive the hearer into thinking something is relevant when it is not. It does not cover the case where the speaker says something she knows to be irrelevant, thinking that it will seem optimally relevant to the hearer and therefore deceive him. Sperber (1994a) proposes three strategies of utterance interpretation, of which the third, *Sophisticated Understanding,* takes this case into account. It shows how the hearer may still understand an utterance even though he realises that it was only intended to **seem** optimally relevant to him. In what follows, I will therefore adopt the more recent relevance-theoretic practice of talking simply of the hearer's 'expectation of relevance', which, depending on the circumstances, may amount to an expectation of *actual* relevance, *attempted* relevance or *purported* relevance.[4]

In understanding an utterance, it follows from the above definitions and arguments that the hearer should use the following comprehension strategy (Sperber, Cara and Girotto 1995):

(10) Relevance-Theoretic Comprehensive Strategy

(a) Start deriving cognitive effects in order of accessibility (follow a path of least effort);

(b) Stop when the expected level of relevance is achieved.

Clause (a) is justified by the presumption of optimal relevance, from which it follows that the hearer will not be expected to waste any effort in arriving at the intended reading. Clause (b) allows for more or less specific expectations of relevance, e.g. of

[4] See Sperber 1994a; Sperber and Wilson 1998b; Wilson forthcoming a, b.

more or less specific types and degrees of cognitive effects (*actual, attempted* or *purported*), which may be adjusted upward or downward as the utterance proceeds. How this strategy applies to utterance comprehension will be illustrated in detail in the next section.

2.2.2 Understanding utterances

Grice (1975, 1989) assumes that the explicit truth-conditional content of an utterance (*what is said*) is recovered by decoding the conventional meaning of the words, together with the processes of disambiguation and reference assignment. He also assumes that all inferences derived pragmatically, that is, through his Co-operative Principle and maxims, are implicatures, which do not affect the truth-conditional content of the utterance.

In relevance theory, this way of conceiving the distinction between the explicit and the implicit is rejected on the ground that pragmatic inference is required in recovering the explicit truth-conditional content too. (Wilson and Sperber 1981; Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Carston 1988; Blakemore 1992; Wilson and Sperber 1998). In this section, I will illustrate how the speaker identifies the intended truth-conditional content via processes of disambiguation, reference assignment, recovery of ellipsed material, and pragmatic enrichment.

Identifying the intended truth-conditional content is part of a more general process of identifying the intended interpretation, i.e. the intended package of context, explicit content and cognitive effects (i.e. implicated conclusions). This is achieved by selecting one of the linguistically encoded semantic representations and fleshing it out using the available contextual and inferential resources. According to the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy, at each point where a choice arises, the hearer should follow a path of least effort, until he has obtained enough cognitive effects to satisfy his expectation of relevance. Let us look in more detail at how this fleshing-out process might go.

First,[5] the hearer needs to select the intended context (i.e. the set of assumptions which will be brought to bear in interpreting the utterance). Different choices of context will lead to different choices of explicit content and cognitive effects. Consider (11):

(11) [At a ball for fund-raising for the Civil War, Scarlett, as a war widow, donates her wedding ring. Rhett Butler says to Scarlett:]
I know how valuable it is to you.
(adapted from the film *Gone with the Wind*)

This utterance will be interpreted differently depending on the choice of context. Given ordinary assumptions, it is very likely to be interpreted as an expression of gratitude for her donation, meaning 'I know it is very valuable to you'. Given more detailed knowledge, it may be differently understood. The situation is this: Before Scarlett got married, she confessed her love to Ashley Wilkes, but was rejected by him, and burst into tears. Butler happened to be in the same room without Scarlett and Ashley's knowledge, and watched the whole scene. Scarlett came to know this, and Butler knows that she knows it. Later she married another young man, whom she had never been in love with, and who died on the battlefield. In this context, Butler's utterance would be understood as meaning that he knows that the ring is of no value to her. Depending on the context selected, different propositions will be expressed and hence different cognitive effects achieved.

Context selection is relevance-governed. In the situation described above, it was obvious to both participants that Scarlett did not love her late husband and that the wedding ring had no value to her. This may be part of the first context accessible to Scarlett in which the utterance yields enough cognitive effects to satisfy her expectation of relevance. If so, it should be chosen according to the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy in (10) above.

[5] I do not mean to imply that the hearer has to complete context selection before moving on to other stages in the interpretation process. 'First' refers only to order of exposition.

Consider now the cases of disambiguation and reference assignment, as illustrated in (12):

(12) [Mary and Peter are talking about a movie which Peter and Jane saw last night. Peter says to Mary:]
She was very upset by the last scene, and we went to the bank near the cinema.

In order to recover the truth-conditional content of (12), Mary needs to disambiguate 'bank' and assign referents to 'she' and 'we', and also to 'the last scene' and 'the cinema', which are referentially used (see Rouchota 1994a). In (12), as they were talking about a movie which Peter and Jane saw last night, the first accessible referent of 'she' would normally be Jane, and those of 'we' would be 'Peter and Jane'. 'Bank' might be understood as 'river bank', on the ground that her being upset might provide a reason for their going to look at the view; or it might be understood as 'financial institution', on the ground that spending money would help to calm her. All these possible resolutions involve pragmatic inference, without which Mary will be unable to reach the intended interpretation.

We may also need to recover ellipsed material in order to determine the truth-conditional content of an utterance. Consider (13), repeated from (5):

(13) [Mary says to Peter that she met Jane on her way home and that Jane has an exam. Peter suggests inviting her to dinner after the exam.]
Peter: When does her exam end?
Mary: Sometime next week.

In (13), Mary's utterance needs to be supplied with a missing subject and predicate if it is to express a full proposition. In the circumstances, Peter can recover them easily, as in (14):

(14) Jane's exam ends sometime next week.

Since Peter and Mary were talking about Jane's exam, and Peter has just asked about Jane's exam, the first accessible interpretation would normally be (14). If Mary intended to communicate something else - for example, 'I will go on a picnic sometime next week' -, she should not have formulated her utterance as in (14) above: this would require gratuitous effort from the hearer, and may cause misunderstanding; it is ruled out by clause (b) of the presumption of optimal relevance.

A major claim of relevance theory is that not only reference assignment, disambiguation and recovery of ellipsed material, but also pragmatic enrichment are needed to determine the truth-conditional content of an utterance. Consider (15), taken from Wilson and Sperber (1998):

(15) a. I took out my key and opened the door.
b. John dropped the glass and it broke.
c. They planted an acorn and it grew.
d. Peter left and Mary got angry.

In (15a - d), the hearer generally treats the events described as temporally or causally related; the events described in the second clause are understood as taking place after those described in the first clause. Moreover in (15b - d), the two events are understood to stand in a cause-consequence relation, though they are separated by different intervals. Wilson and Sperber claim that both these aspects of interpretation are determined pragmatically, and that relevance theory can explain how the indeterminacies are resolved. As we have seen in 2.2.1, relevance theory claims that every utterance communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance (the Communicative Principle of Relevance), and that interpretation will depend on the comprehension strategy in (10). It follows that the hearer of (15) should follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects, and stop when his expectation of relevance is satisfied.

In (15b), for example, the hearer is given access to his encyclopaedic entry for glasses. This should contain a ready-made chunk or schema describing often-

encountered sequences of actions or events involving glasses, e.g. for someone dropping a glass, as a result of which it breaks; from which further consequences may be derived. Moreover, from frequent use, such a schema would be highly accessible. It follows that the hearer is likely to use it in understanding (15b), and as a result get access to adequate cognitive effects. This will then be treated as the intended interpretation, according to the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy. On this account, (15b) is understood as communicating not only that the glass broke after John dropped it, but also that the glass broke **because** John dropped it. It can be seen that these connotations contribute to truth conditions in (16):

(16) If John dropped the glass and it broke, he is the one who will have to replace it.

In (16), it is obvious that the speaker is claiming only that John will have to replace the glass if his dropping it is responsible for its breaking. Then this pragmatically determined cause-consequence relation must be contributing to the truth-conditional content of the utterance, since it remains within the scope of the logical connective 'if'. (See Carston 1993; Ifantidou 1994; Wilson and Sperber 1998.)

In relevance theory, the pragmatically determined aspects of truth-conditional content are seen as contributing to what is explicitly rather than implicitly communicated, i.e. to the **explicatures** of an utterance rather than to its implicatures:

(17) Explicature

A proposition communicated by an utterance is an **explicature** if it is either (a) the proposition expressed by the utterance (i.e. its truth-conditional content, what is said), or (b) the result of embedding this proposition under a speech-act or propositional-attitude description.

(Wilson 1993b, Lecture 4)

As will be seen from this definition, explicatures are taken to include not only the proposition expressed by the utterance, but also speech-act and propositional-attitude information concerning this proposition. Thus, consider (18a - c):

(18) a. Mary goes to church.
b. Does Mary go to church?
c. Go to church, Mary.

On a standard speech-act account, it is generally accepted that utterances such as (18a - c) communicate the speech-act information in (19a - c):

(19) a. Speaker is asserting that Mary goes to church.
b. Speaker is asking whether Mary goes to church.
c. Speaker is telling Mary to go to church.

By the above definition, (19a - c) would be explicatures of (18a - c); they are generally referred to as *higher-level* explicatures and contrasted with the 'basic' explicature, i.e. the proposition expressed. Also included under higher-level explicatures is propositional-attitude information. For example, in (18a), the speaker may communicate that she believes that the described state of affairs is true; in (18b), she may communicate that she wonders whether it is true, and in (18c), she may communicate that she wants it to be true. In that case, these would be higher-level explicatures of her utterance. (For further details of the analysis of interrogatives and imperatives, see section 2.5.2 ; Wilson and Sperber 1988a; Clark 1991, 1993a.)

As part of the process of identifying the explicatures of an utterance, the hearer will have to decide on the intended cognitive effects, which will themselves involve both propositions and attitudes. We have already looked at a case of inferring implicated propositions in section 2.2.1; we will look at some examples of implicated attitude in section 2.5.1. The overall interpretation process, on the relevance-theoretic account, thus involves a mutual adjustment of context, explicatures and

implicated conclusions (cognitive effects) until the expected level of relevance is reached.

2.3 Metarepresentational Use in Relevance Theory

In the last section, I outlined relevance theory and showed how it explains various aspects of utterance interpretation, and in particular the resolution of linguistic indeterminacies. In this section, I will introduce the notion of metarepresentation as used in relevance theory, and show how various indeterminacies in the understanding of metarepresentational utterances can be resolved by considerations of relevance. I will show that the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation is broad enough to cover direct and indirect quotation, pure quotation, mixed quotation, and a wide range of other cases not normally considered in the literature on quotation, which will be discussed in more detail in the remainder of the thesis.

2.3.1 Interpretive use[6]

It is well known (though little discussed in Gricean pragmatics) that we can use one object to represent another object which it resembles. For example, a pen can be used to represent a sword in describing single combat; our palms held out can be used to represent an open book. Into this general category of representation by resemblance come diagrams, portraits, mimes, photographs, photocopies, caricatures, translations, blueprints, maps, etc. The degree of resemblance between the original object and its representation may vary. The more properties they share, the greater the resemblance between them. It is the audience's task to decide what the shared properties were intended to be.

[6] For details of interpretive use, see Sperber and Wilson 1985/1995, chapter 4, sections 7 - 9, Wilson and Sperber 1988b, 1992. Wilson and Sperber 1988b has been particularly helpful to me in preparing this section.

Utterances and thoughts can also be used to represent something. It is generally accepted that they can be used to represent state of affairs. When John loves Mary, we can think about that state of affairs by constructing a thought (i.e. a mental representation) which describes it. This mental representation can be represented publicly by means of an utterance. In this sense, as Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) point out, every utterance is a representation of a thought of the speaker's. This kind of metarepresentation, based on resemblances in logical or propositional form, is called *interpretation* or *interpretive representation* in relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, chapter 4, sections 7 - 9; Wilson and Sperber 1988b, 1992; Blakemore 1992, chapter 6, section 4).

On Sperber and Wilson's account, interpretive resemblance is resemblance in content: that is, in logical or propositional form. Two logical forms resemble each other in a given context to the extent that they share analytic and contextual implications in that context. The analytical implications of a propositional form *P* are non-trivial logical implications derivable from *P* by application of inference rules using only *P* as input. That is, they are implications derived by analysing the propositional form without any interaction with the context. The contextual implications of *P*, by contrast, are propositions logically implied by the union of the context and *P*, but not by the context alone or by *P* alone. Utterances, as we have seen, are interpretations of the speaker's thoughts. If the two share all their implications, both analytic and contextual, the utterance is a *literal* interpretation of the thought. If they share only some implications, then the utterance is a *less-than-literal*, or *loose*, interpretation of the speaker's thought.

If an utterance is a literal interpretation of the speaker's thought, it will be true as long as the original thought is a true description of the state of affairs it represents. If it is not a literal interpretation of the speaker's thought, it may not be put forward as true. Consider (20) - (21):

(20) I worked at the computer for 10 hours.

(21) This computer is my wife.

The speaker of (20) may have worked at the computer for exactly 10 hours, or she may have worked at it for 9 and a half hours, or 10 and a quarter. We usually understand (20) loosely, as in the second case, and do not treat it as a violation of any norm or maxim of conversation. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 231 - 237) have also argued that metaphor, as in (21), can be analysed as a loose interpretation of the speaker's thought, which shares only some implications with the original, e.g. 'I spend much time with it', 'I like this computer' or 'This computer helps me a lot with my work.' The only difference between (20) and (21) is in the degree of resemblance involved between utterance and thought. Neither is a literal interpretation of the speaker's thought; both are less-than-literal interpretations. Consequently, there is no need to analyse loose talk and metaphor as violations of any pragmatic norm or maxim. Loose talk and metaphor may be optimally relevant without being true.[7] (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: chapter 4, section 8; Wilson 1995)

Though every utterance is an interpretation of a thought of the speaker's, such first-order interpretation does not amount to what Sperber and Wilson call *interpretive use*. Interpretive use involves second-order interpretation, where the speaker's thought is itself used to metarepresent another thought or utterance which it resembles in content: for example, a thought or utterance attributed to someone other than the speaker, or to the speaker herself at some other time.

There are three subtypes of interpretive use, depending on the type of original being interpreted: metacommunicative, metalogical and metacognitive.[8] The metacommunicative type is the case where the original is a public representation (e.g. an utterance). The metalogical type is the case where the original is an abstract representation (e.g. a proposition). The metacognitive type is the case where the original is a mental representation (e.g. a belief). In the literature on

[7] Loose interpretations of the speaker's thought can be found in people speaking a foreign language, too. If the speaker does not command the foreign language, her utterance may only loosely interpret what she thinks, even though a fully literal utterance might have achieved greater relevance. Here, clause (b) of the presumption of optimal relevance applies.

[8] For further discussion of these three types, see Sperber (1997), Papafragou (1998a, section 2.4.1), and Wilson forthcoming a.

metarepresentation, the metacognitive subtype of interpretive use has been extensively discussed, under the heading *theory of mind,* and there is evidence that it constitutes a separate ability, with its own developmental principles and disorders, distinct from those of the metacommunicative and metalogical subtypes.[9]

Sperber and Wilson (1981, 1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 1988b) also discuss a more general type of metarepresentational use of utterances or other acts of communication, in which formal linguistic resemblances (as in mention), perceptual resemblances (as in mimicry) or abstract resemblances (as in diagrams) are exploited. In the next section, I will introduce a general notion of metarepresentational use, which will have all these varieties of metarepresentation, and in particular interpretive use (based on resemblance in content) and metalinguistic use (based on resemblance in linguistic form), as subtypes.

2.3.2 Metarepresentational use

As we have seen, interpretive use involves resemblance in logical or propositional form between two representations. Sperber and Wilson (1986: chapter 4, section 7 - 9; Wilson and Sperber 1988b) also note that communicators may exploit resemblances in linguistic form. Direct quotation is an obvious example in which resemblances in linguistic form are exploited. I will call such examples cases of *metalinguistic use.* The notion of metarepresentational use as I understand it is intended to cover these two main subtypes: interpretive use and metalinguistic use. In each case, I will talk of literal or less-than-literal (loose) representation, depending on the degree of resemblance involved. There are many varieties of metarepresentational use. In the rest of this section, I will discuss some of the general semantic and pragmatic properties of metarepresentations; in later sections, I will consider the various types of metarepresentation in more detail.

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[9] See *Mind and Language* (1998) vol. 13, for a representative collection. For earlier discussion, see Wellman 1990; Gopnik 1993; Leslie and Roth 1993; Baron-Cohen *et al.* 1993; Leslie 1994; Carruthers and Smith (eds.) 1996. For a relevance-theoretic approach to *theory of mind,* see Happé 1993.

First, the presence of metarepresentational use can be overtly indicated by linguistic means or left to the hearer to infer. Consider (22):

(22) *Mary*: So what did Jane say about the party?
Peter: a. She said that it was fantastic.
b. It was fantastic.

In (22a), Peter overtly indicates that he is reporting Jane's utterance, using 'she said'. This is a case of overt metarepresentational use. By contrast, there is no such indication in (22b), which can be understood in at least two ways: Peter may be expressing his own thought about the party or reporting Jane's reaction. Here, in normal circumstances, the utterance would surely be intended as a metarepresentation of Jane's utterance. This is a case of inferred metarepresentation. In inferring the presence of a metarepresentation, considerations of relevance play a role. In this case, the most accessible reading would no doubt be the metarepresentational one, which provides an answer to Mary's question and would achieve the expected degree of relevance thereby. Accordingly, it is selected by the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy as the one the hearer should choose. In producing the utterance, Peter may also imitate Jane's voice or accent. Then the resemblance between Jane's utterance and Peter's metarepresentation would involve not only content but formal, linguistic properties. These would again make the intended reading more salient.

The two main subtypes of metarepresentational use are interpretive use and metalinguistic use. Both may be accompanied by expressions of the speaker's attitude to the original thought or utterance being metarepresented. Consider (23) - (24):

(23) A: He is very kind.
B: (happily) He IS very kind, indeed.

(24) A: Do sit [si:t] down.
B: (critically) Do sit [si:t] down.

In (23), B metarepresents A's utterance in order to express an attitude of approval or endorsement. Here, what is metarepresented is surely the content of the utterance, because this is what the speaker approves or endorses. By contrast, in (24), B metarepresents A's utterance in order to comment on an aspect of its form (it should be '[sit]' not '[si:t]').

The hearer interprets these utterances according to the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy. For example, in (23), since A has just said that he is very kind, the proposition expressed by B's utterance will have little relevance in its own right, and the first acceptable reading is likely to be a metarepresentational one involving an expression of attitude to the previous utterance. Given the speaker's tone of voice and facial expression, plus further contextual assumptions, the most natural hypothesis will be that this attitude is one of approval/endorsement of the content. By the same token, (24) is likely to be understood as metarepresenting the previous utterance and expressing an attitude to it. If the content contains nothing obviously questionable, or if the pronunciation of '[si:t]' is exaggerated or emphasised, the formal resemblance will be highly salient, and the speaker's dissociative attitude to the pronunciation can be easily inferred.

The type of metarepresentation involved may also be inferred via considerations of relevance. Consider (25):

(25) a. A: The germs 0 [zi:rou] -157 cause food poisoning.

b. B1: A said the germs O [ou] -157 cause food poisoning.

B2: A said the germs 0 [zi:rou] -157 cause food poisoning.

In (25), though it is overtly indicated that B's utterance is used as a metarepresentation, there remains another indeterminacy for the hearer to resolve: whether it is intended as interpretive use or metalinguistic use. Suppose B knows that 'O-175' should be correctly pronounced with an '[ou]', which stands for the letter 'O'. In that case, B1 must be interpretive, while B2 must be metalinguistic, at least as regards '0': B1 metarepresents the content of A's utterance, and B2 metarepresents not only the content of the utterance, but also the form '0[zi:rou]'. If the hearer

knows that the germs are called 'O [ou]-157', and he also knows that B knows this, he may infer that '0 [zero]-157' is used metalinguistically. Using a wrong name puts the hearer to more processing effort, which will be offset by extra or different cognitive effects based on the use of the wrong name. Thus, the ambiguity can be resolved by considerations of optimal relevance.

There are other possible indeterminacies which can be pragmatically resolved. First, as I noted in section 2.3.1, there are three possible types of original and the hearer may be left to infer which type is intended. Consider (26), from Wilson (1997: (25)):

(26) a. It's true that Jane can't spell.
b. Is it true that no English word starts with four consonants?
c. It's not true that all Bank Holidays fall on a Monday.

According to Wilson, the examples in (26) are plausibly three ways ambiguous as regards the type of the original. For example, in (a), the that-clause may be used to represent another utterance, another thought, or simply a proposition. All three cases involve interpretive use, based on resemblances in content, but in the first two cases, an utterance or thought is attributed to someone, while in the third case no attribution is involved. This makes a difference to how utterance (a) is understood: if it is a case of attributive interpretive use, there will be an implication that the speaker agrees with whoever produced the metarepresented utterance or thought, which may in turn have implications about the social or personal relations between them. By contrast, if the original is merely an abstract proposition, an item of information, there will be no implication that anyone actually holds the view represented, and no social or inter-personal consequences. In a similar vein, (b) and (c) are also three ways ambiguous as regards the type of the original.

When the type of the original is not overtly marked, as in (26), it may need to be pragmatically inferred. This pragmatic inference is also governed by considerations of relevance. For example, in (26a), if someone had just asserted that Jane can't spell, the attributive interpretation (attributing either an utterance or a thought) will be

more accessible and produce greater cognitive effects than non-attributive interpretation. (Whether or not the hearer goes on to resolve the difference between an attributed utterance and an attributed thought should again depend on considerations of relevance: if nothing hinges on it, the inference will involve wasted effort, and should not be undertaken.) In other circumstances, (26a) may be understood as an interpretation of an abstract proposition. All these inferences are governed by considerations of optimal relevance, via the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy.

In cases of attributive interpretive use, the source of the original (i.e. who said or thought it) may also have to be inferred. This will be done when necessary for optimal relevance; we will see a case in section 2.5.1. Here again, the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy can be used: the hearer follows a path of least effort, and stops when the expected level of relevance is reached. If the source does not contribute to relevance in the circumstances, it will be left vague or indeterminate. All this follows from considerations of optimal relevance.

Finally, the intended degree of resemblance between representation and original is also pragmatically determined. Consider (27):

(27) A: How long did they say it will take to get from London to Seoul?
B: They said it will take 12 and a half hours.

In (27), if A is asking about the flying time from London to Seoul, B would normally give an approximate answer rather than a fully literal one, because it will satisfy A's expectation of optimal relevance without requiring unjustifiable effort from either the hearer A or the speaker B. Sometimes a more precise answer may be needed, e.g. if A and B are planning a military operation. Again, the expected degree of literalness or looseness should follow from considerations of optimal relevance, governed by the twin factors of easy accessibility, on the one hand, and expected effects, on the other. I will return to this point in section 2.4.2.

So far, I have introduced the notions of interpretation and metarepresentation, and looked at various types of metarepresentational use. I have also argued that

relevance theory explains how the hearer resolves various indeterminacies in metarepresentational utterances, using the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy. In the next section, I will look at pragmatic enrichment of metarepresentational utterances in more detail, paying particular attention to the question of truth-conditional content.

2.3.3 Pragmatic enrichment of metarepresentations

What is the truth-conditional content of a metarepresentational utterance? Under what circumstances will it be accepted as true? Consider (28), repeated from (22):

(28) *Mary*: So what did Jane say about the party?
Peter: a. She said that it was fantastic.
b. It was fantastic.

As we have seen in section 2.3.1, (a) is a case of overt metarepresentation. Here the proposition expressed is that Jane said that the party was fantastic. On the relevance-theoretic account, this should be accepted as true if and only if the complement clause is a faithful enough representation of Jane's utterance. How faithful that is will depend on considerations of optimal relevance, as we have seen. In the same way, (b), on a metarepresentational understanding, should be accepted as true if and only if it is a faithful enough representation of what Jane said. Thus, the truth-conditional content of (b) is different from what it would be if it were descriptively used to represent a state of affairs. I assume that the utterance in (b), understood as a metarepresentation of Jane's utterance, needs to be pragmatically enriched to express the proposition 'Jane said that it was fantastic' (or, equivalently, 'It was fantastic, Jane said').[10] Then (b) will express the proposition in (29a) and communicate the higher-level explicature in (29b):

For a discussion of the relation between main-clause and parenthetical attributions of utterances or thoughts, see Ifantidou (1994). I shall not go into the details of the

(29) a. Jane said that it was fantastic.

b. I say/believe that Jane said that it was fantastic.

Now consider (30), which involves a case of attributive metalinguistic use:

(30) A: Oh, she's a pretty girl.

B: Well, I saw the 'pretty girl' yesterday looking really awful.

In (30), B uses 'pretty girl' metalinguistically, attributing it to A. Here what matters is not whether B thinks the girl is pretty or not, but whether it is a faithful enough representation of A's utterance. So the truth conditions of B's utterance should be something like 'I saw **the one you call a pretty girl** yesterday', not 'I saw the pretty girl yesterday'. Metalinguistic use affects truth-conditional content, even when it is not overtly marked. In fact, (30) is a case of mixed quotation in the sense that the speaker uses 'the pretty girl' to refer to a specific girl (referential use), and at the same time attributes the form (i.e. expression) to the hearer. A similar example is given in (47) below.

Here is another example of metalinguistic use, this time involving an abstract linguistic form:

(31) a. You should say compu[r]er, not compu[t]er in the United States.

b. You should say computer, not computer in the United States.

In (31a), the representation of the different pronunciations in British and American English of 't' in an unstressed syllable should contribute to truth-conditional content. Otherwise, the result would be contradictory, as in (31b). In order to satisfy his expectation of relevance, the hearer must therefore assume that what is being metarepresented is two different possible pronunciations, and this must be marked somehow (e.g. by using a phonetic instead of a conceptual representation) in the

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two alternative accounts, and will talk simply of the main-clause attribution being the proposition expressed.

proposition expressed by (31a). The pragmatic enrichment of metalinguistic utterances of this type will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

In this section, I have introduced the relevance-theoretic notions of interpretation and metarepresentation and shown how relevance theory applies to the comprehension of metarepresentational elements in utterances. I have also argued that these metarepresentational elements may need pragmatic enrichment, which contributes to the propositional form (hence, truth-conditional content) of the utterance which contains them; and I have used the framework of relevance theory to explain how this is done. In the remainder of the chapter, I will show how this account applies in more detail to a range of metarepresentational utterances.

2.4 Varieties of Linguistic Metarepresentation I: Quotations

In this section, I will apply the notion of metarepresentation to the range of paradigmatic quotations surveyed in chapter 1, and show how they would fit into the metarepresentational approach. In the course of the analysis, I will also continue to develop my claim that (i) any indeterminacies are resolved on the basis of the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy; (ii) choice of more or less overt formulations is governed by considerations of relevance.

2.4.1 Pure quotation:

Metarepresentation of abstract linguistic expressions and propositions

Consider the pure quotations in (32):

(32) a. 'Life' is monosyllabic.

b. 'Life' has four letters.

c. 'Life' is a noun.

In (32), part of each utterance is used to metarepresent an abstract linguistic expression - the word 'life'. The utterances in (32) should thus be understood as expressing the propositions in (33), in which this fact is overtly indicated:

(33) a. The word 'life' is monosyllabic.
b. The word 'life' has four letters.
c. The word 'life' is a noun.

In this case, no thought or utterance is being attributed to anyone: the speaker is metarepresenting a word without attributing its utterance to anyone. Any linguistic property of an abstract linguistic expression may be singled out in this way. This is a case of non-attributive metalinguistic use.

Another type of abstract representation that may be metarepresented is logical, or conceptual, rather than linguistic. Here, it is purely the content that is singled out. Consider (34), for example:

(34) 'John is a bachelor' entails 'John is a man'.

Entailment is a relation that holds between propositions, not sentences, utterances or thoughts. As a result, (34) is a case of non-attributive interpretative use, which represents a pair of abstract propositions, rather than attributed utterances or thoughts.

As we have seen in chapter 1, overt quotation markers, (e.g. double or single apostrophe, finger dancing, the words 'quote... unquote') are not necessary in quotation. In spoken utterances, e.g. the spoken versions of (32) above, we do not normally mark the presence of the quotation, but the hearer can understand these utterances as metarepresentations nonetheless, using the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy. Even in writing, quotation marks may be systematically omitted, e.g. in (35):

(35) a. They called their son Bobby.

b. My name is Susan.

In (35), the words 'Bobby' and 'Susan' must be understood as representing not people but names, although the fact is not overtly indicated.

In fact, the function of quotation marks is at least partly to single out a part of an utterance for special attention. In other circumstances, other devices function equally well: for example, a change in intonation or typography. Thus, consider (36), written on the Kellogg's box, or (37), on an instant national lottery ticket:

(36) If you don't see ***Kellogg's*** on the box, it isn't ***Kellogg's*** in the box.

(37) Match 3 to win or match 2 and 'DOUBLE' to double your win or match 2 and 'TRIPLE' to triple your win.

In (36), the reader is encouraged to assume that the original word '***Kellogg's***' on the box will have the same shape as in the slogan, and in (37), the originals of 'DOUBLE' and 'TRIPLE' are expected to be in capital letters, too. All this fits with the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy of following a path of least effort in the search for expected relevance, where the function of overt marking is to alter the saliencies of interpretations.

2.4.2 Reported speech and thought:

Metarepresentation of attributed utterances and thoughts

In this subsection, I will look at three main types of reported speech and thought - direct, indirect, and free indirect, as in (38) - (40):

(38) a. She said, 'Where are they all gone?'

b. She thought, 'Where are they all gone?'

(39) a. She asked where they were all gone.

b. She wondered where they were all gone.

(40) a. She asked, where were they all gone.

b. Where were they all gone, she wondered.

(38) involves direct quotation, (39) indirect quotation, and (40) free indirect quotation. All three types of quotation are used to represent an attributed utterance or thought on the basis of shared properties. They differ in what these shared properties are. Direct quotations are metalinguistic: they metarepresent an utterance or thought in virtue of shared formal properties. Indirect quotations are interpretive: they metarepresent an utterance or thought in virtue of shared content, i.e. shared logical or conceptual properties. Free indirect quotations are both metalinguistic and interpretive: they metarepresent their originals in both content and form. In all the metarepresentations in (38) - (40), the type and source of the original are overtly encoded. What distinguishes them from pure quotations is the element of attribution involved.

As we have seen in chapter 1, some quotations are not overtly indicated at all. Consider (41) - (42):

(41) [A mother is reading a story book to her son.]

The woodcutter approached the princess in the dark. Who are you? Stay away from me.

(42) A: What did Jane say?

B: She was going to resign.

The free direct quotations in (41), and the free indirect quotation in (42B), are not overtly marked as such. In (41), the hearer is left to infer that someone's words are being quoted. He should be able to do this, because the mother is unlikely to have asked her son who he is out of the blue. Having identified the utterances as

quotations, he then has to infer who said them: the woodcutter, the princess, or maybe someone else. Similarly, in (42B), there is no overt indication that the utterance is a quotation; this has to be pragmatically inferred.

Subtitles on a teletext TV screen are good examples of free direct quotation. It is assumed that they are all direct quotations, even though there are no overt quote marks, and they are not embedded under a verb of saying. Given that the subtitles are designed for the deaf, it would be interesting to study how they resolve any indeterminacies as to the source of the original without the aid of a voice, and that so quickly. Clearly a substantial element of relevance-oriented pragmatic inference is involved.

Finally, as with any metarepresentation, the intended degree of resemblance between quotation and original must be inferred. Consider (43):

(43) A: What did Peter say?
B: Well, he said 'There's no way'.

In (43), B may not report Peter's utterance verbatim and A may not expect him to, either. Suppose Peter said 'I cannot help you with this matter. It seems to be impossible. Try some other way'. If A merely wanted to know whether he could help B or not, all this would take considerable processing effort (from the speaker as well as the hearer) without substantially increasing cognitive effects. So verbatim reports are sometimes less relevant than loose ones. The degree of resemblance attempted and understood is governed by considerations of optimal relevance.

Sometimes, the speaker is unable or unwilling to reproduce the original verbatim. In the detective series titled *Colombo*, the detective Colombo is talking with a woman about a dog:

(44) *Woman*: Kiss! [Dogs around her attack the target violently.]
Colombo: You said 'K[key]-I[ay]-S[es]-S[es]'. Why don't they kiss?
Woman: It's an attack word.

In (44), Colombo's direct quotation of the woman's utterance may be used to verify that he has heard her correctly. It is a case of attributive metalinguistic use. He does not repeat the woman's utterance exactly as he heard it, because it may cause the dogs to attack him or someone else. So he uses a lesser degree of resemblance, which clearly picks out the original, but by means of different pronunciation. This case is explained by clause (b) of the presumption of optimal relevance, which takes into consideration the speaker's inability or unwillingness to provide a particular content or form.

In fact, as noted in chapter 1, we expect very different degrees of looseness in reported speech and thought, depending on the circumstances. For example, in academic writing, quotations are expected to give the exact words that the original writer used. Here, the smallest variations in form might make a difference to cognitive effects, and in general this should encourage literalness rather than looseness. Often, even incorrect spellings are reproduced. By contrast, in informal reports, the exact words may not be necessary for optimal relevance. In spontaneous speech, moreover, we may be unable to remember the exact words, even if they would have increased the relevance of our report. This is allowed for by clause (b) of the presumption of optimal relevance. The choice of the metarepresentational form, and more generally, the intended degree of resemblance, may be dependent on the speaker's abilities or preferences, as the presumption of optimal relevance predicts.

So far, I have shown that reported speech and thought can be fitted into the relevance-theoretic account using the notion of metarepresentation, and that indeterminacies as to intended degree of resemblance, and type and source of the original, can be resolved using the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy, as relevance theory claims. I would now like to illustrate the relevance-theoretic approach to the case of mixed quotation.

2.4.3 Mixed quotation: Metarepresentation of attributed expressions

Mixed quotation has presented a problem for traditional accounts of quotation, in that both use and mention are simultaneously involved. (See chapter 1, sections 1.2.3 and 1.4.1.) Consider (45):

(45) The teacher used 'the rod of love' to make us learn better.

In (45), the speaker simultaneously asserts that the teacher used a rod and alludes to the words the teacher used. In a sense, the speaker borrows the original expression for her own use: that is why the same part of the utterance both metarepresents another representation and contributes to a truth-conditional description of the speaker's. Even if quote marks are used (in the case of written forms), it may still be indeterminate whose words are being quoted. Recognising the allusion costs the hearer a certain amount of extra effort, which must be offset by some additional cognitive effects: for example, reminding the hearer of the teacher's love for his students, or, more likely his violence without good cause. If the hearer cannot recognise the original source, the cognitive effects would be considerably reduced.

One way of reducing the indeterminacies would be to use direct and indirect quotations such as those in (46):

(46) a. The teacher said that he used 'the rod of love' to make us learn better.

b. The teacher used what he called 'the rod of love' to make us learn better.

Generally, the direct quotation in (46a) would be regarded as representing the teacher's words, though the teacher himself might have quoted it from others. (46b) makes this more explicit. The directly quoted phrase 'the rod of love' in (45) may contribute to the proposition expressed in a different way from a descriptively used one. I think the proposition expressed by (45) would be something like (46a) or (46b).

Although this has been rarely noted in the literature on mixed quotation, formal properties like pronunciation can also be exploited in mixed quotation. Consider (47):

(47) A: He went to New York [yew york].
B: New York [yew york] is too big for us to find him there.

In (47), 'New York [yew york]' in B's utterance may be descriptively used to refer to the city, and at the same time metalinguistically used to allude to A's mispronunciation of 'New York'. If 'New York [yew york]' was A's habitual pronunciation of 'New York', and B had pointed it out before, A would have easy access to the fact that 'New York [yew york]' was being metalinguistically used.

As an attributive metarepresentation, the quoted part of a mixed quotation may merely resemble the original, rather than reproducing it. This is true of the phonetic case in (47B), and also of conceptual cases such as (48B):

(48) A: This is a matter of life and death.
.....
B: Now, shall we talk about the deadly important matter?

The phrase 'the deadly important matter' is used by B to refer to a specific matter that A wants to discuss, and also alludes to A's phrase 'a matter of life and death'. In that case, (48B) would express a proposition something like 'We shall talk about the "deadly important matter", as you described it', and the function of the metarepresentation might be to dissociate B slightly from A's description. The relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation, together with the presumption of optimal relevance, can explain this less-than-literal metarepresentation.

The main pragmatic problem raised by mixed quotations is how the audience recognises that, although a direct quotation is present, it has been chosen not only for its form but also for its content, which the hearer is expected to identify and use. In other direct quotations, the quoted expression may be a nonsense word, or a phrase

from another language, which the hearer may not be expected to understand. The solution to this problem follows from the notion of optimal relevance and the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy. When an utterance is directly quoted, as we have seen, the intended degree of resemblance between quotation and original has to be inferred. Sometimes, as with nonsense words and some foreign-language words, formal resemblance, i.e. resemblance in phonetic or syntactic properties, is enough. In other cases, though, in order to achieve optimal relevance, both form and content must be considered. This is true not only in mixed quotation but in many cases of free indirect speech. The general rule is that the hearer should infer intended resemblance in enough respects to satisfy his expectation of relevance, and no more.

Cappelen and Lepore's (1997a) example of mixed quotation might seem problematic for the relevance-theoretic account as it is for other accounts:

(49) Nicola said that Alice is a 'philtosopher'.

In (49), 'philtosopher' is directly quoted, while the rest of the embedded clause is indirectly quoted. Here the directly quoted part is a nonsense word, which raises the question of what propositional content the embedded clause might be taken to express. Cappelen and Lepore see this as a serious problem for accounts which treat mixed quotations as simultaneously expressing a proposition and directly quoting a linguistic expression. Relevance theory suggests an answer. Utterances can be seen as expressing not only full propositions but also incomplete, or 'semi-propositional' representations, which can be partially, though not fully, understood. The main source of 'semi-propositional' utterances is the occurrence of words that are not fully understood, or concepts that are only partially analysed, and are used to metarepresent fuller understandings, perhaps attributed to someone other than the speaker. (49) might be seen as an example. The speaker metarepresents not only Alice's word 'philtosopher' but also a concept attributed to Alice: perhaps the concept 'philosopher', obscured by Alice's slip of the tongue, or perhaps a genuinely exotic concept. (See Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Sperber 1996, 1997.) On this account, even in (49), 'philtosopher' is both used and mentioned; the speaker uses it

as a noun, even though she does not know what it is or thinks it is an incorrect word, and express an interpretive concept. This is different from '?Nicola said that Alice "philtosopher very here"', where the directly quoted part is real nonsense. Along these lines, a solution to the problem raised by Cappelen and Lepore might be developed.

Finally, relevance theory can explain why the mixed quotations in (50) differ in acceptability:

(50) a. Socrates said that we$_i$ should know 'yourself$_i$'.

b. ... she$_i$ herself cautions that the observations 'are based on examples that readily occurred to me$_i$, and are therefore inevitably subjective'.[11]

As mixed quotations, (50a) sounds bad, while (50b) sounds acceptable. I think the difference can be straightforwardly explained. In (50a), there is no good reason to quote the original form 'yourself' directly while the rest of the utterance is indirectly quoted. This surely takes more processing effort from the hearer, especially because different personal pronouns are used to refer to the same people. Moreover, the switch to direct quotation does not increase cognitive effects for the hearer. By contrast, in (50b), 'me' is a part of a long direct quotation, whose exact form is presented as contributing to an increase in cognitive effects. In the circumstances, the processing effort caused by 'me' should be offset by the extra effects gained by directly quoting the larger quotation (a switch back to indirect quotation in the middle of the passage would increase, rather than reduce, processing effort).

Before moving on to less central cases, it will be worthwhile to review from the perspective developed in this chapter the alternative approaches to quotation which I discussed in chapter 1.

This example is taken from Mittwoch (1985: 140), originally quoted from a linguistics journal.

2.4.4 A review of alternative approaches to quotations

In chapter 1, I discussed some recent alternative approaches to quotation, and pointed out a few problems with them. Here, I will apply the relevance-theoretic approach developed in this chapter to the examples used in those accounts: in particular Cappelen and Lepore (1997a, b) and Clark and Gerrig (1990).

Cappelen and Lepore (1997a) deal with mixed quotations such as (51) - (52) ((51) repeated from (49)):

(51) Nicola said that Alice is a 'philtosopher'.

(52) Alice said that life 'is difficult to understand'.

In (51) - (52), part of the complement clause is directly quoted. Cappelen and Lepore argue that neither previous nor existing theories of quotation can deal with such cases, though they might be able to handle either direct or indirect quotations on their own. As we have seen in chapter 1, section 1.4.1, Cappelen and Lepore analyse (51) - (52) as involving both a sametokening relation and a samesaying relation (the first for direct quotation, and the second for indirect quotation), as in (53) - (54):

(53) $\exists u$(Says(n, u) and SS(u, that) and ST (u, these)). Alice is a philtosopher.

(54) $\exists u$(Says(a, u) and SS(u, that) and ST (u, these)). Life is difficult to understand.

In (53) and (54), 'SS' means *samesaying relation,* 'ST' *sametokening relation,* 'that' points to the indirectly quoted part, and 'these' to the directly quoted part. (For details, see chapter 1, section 1.4.1.) In chapter 1, I argued that these analyses are at most translations or descriptions of the examples; and perhaps even less than that, because they do not show what is sametokened and what is samesaid, although we are clearly shown what is indirectly quoted and what is directly quoted in (51) - (52).

Moreover, this approach does not explain how quotations are actually understood, and in particular how the various indeterminacies are pragmatically resolved.

On the relevance-theoretic account, as I have tried to show in the last section, mixed quotations are metarepresentations of attributed utterances, based on resemblances in both content and form. In (51), the speaker no doubt intended to suggest that Alice used a wrong or incomprehensible word, 'philtosopher'. She could not easily show this without some form of metalinguistic use. By the same token, the speaker in (52) metalinguistically represents part of the reported speech, because she wants to highlight it for her hearer. In each case, we have an indirect quotation with a stretch of direct quotation embedded inside it, indicating that the hearer should at this point be prepared to pay additional attention to the form.

Cappelen and Lepore (1997b) show that the complement clause in indirect quotation need not be either semantically or syntactically identical to the original utterance. Here are some of their examples (pp. 282 - 284):

(55) a. A: I own a very expensive pair of brown Bruno Magli shoes.
b. B: A said that he owns a pair of Bruno Magli shoes.

(56) [After Clinton's speech about his new economic program, a journalist reports:]
Clinton says he'll cut taxes.

(57) a. A: **Smith's murderer** didn't comb his hair today.
b. B: A said that **Stanley** didn't comb his hair today.

In (55), B reports A's utterance without the adjectival modifiers 'very expensive' and 'brown'; in (56), the journalist quotes Clinton by summarising his speech; in (57), where 'Smith's murderer' refers to Stanley, the expressions only share a referent. Similar cases have been dealt with in relevance theory from the start.[12] For example,

[12] See Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, chapter 4, section 7 for arguments that both direct and indirect speech and thought are correctly characterised as based on formal

in (55), B paraphrases A's utterance, eliminating some adjectives as making an insufficient contribution to relevance. What he intends to convey is that A said that he owns shoes from Bruno Magli. Repeating the adjectives would not only require more processing effort from the hearer, but might put him on the track of the wrong cognitive effects. The same account can be applied to (56), with the most relevant aspects of Clinton's speech highlighted. Along the same lines, in (57), the name 'Stanley', rather than the description 'Smith's murderer', may help the hearer to pick out the referent more easily, or avoid unwanted cognitive effects, e.g. if the speaker or hearer does not think Stanley is Smith's murderer. All these reformulations are governed by considerations of optimal relevance, and are to be expected within the relevance-theoretic approach.

Now consider some examples used by Clark and Gerrig (1990):

(58) a. Wolfgang asked 'Are you hungry?' and I answered 'Yes, I am'.
b. Wolfgang asked 'Hast du hunger?' and I answered 'Ja'.
c. Wolfgang asked in German 'Are you hungry?' and I answered in German 'Yes, I am'. (p. 777)

(59) Ralph and Greg are . talking about something and uh Ralph says 'is that the idea that you get? blah blah blah' and . Greg says 'nah well . another idea's you get multiple traces'. (p.780)

In (58), suppose the original utterance was produced in German and the reader is English. If it is not relevant what language was used, the speaker should metarepresent it in English, as in (a), because it reduces the hearer's processing effort without decreasing cognitive effects. By contrast, in (b), the form of the original is presented as relevant, and in (c), though the form is presented as relevant, the speaker does not use it, presumably because it would take too much processing effort from the hearer, but describes it instead. By the same token, in (59), what is

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or logical resemblance, rather than identity. Blakemore (1993, 1994) also claims that reformulations are constrained by considerations of optimal relevance.

presented as relevant is that he said something, whose content is not important. In this situation, the implication is that reproduction of the original utterance would put the hearer to unjustifiable effort, even if the speaker was willing and able to reproduce it. All this follows from the presumption of optimal relevance and the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy.

To sum up: In this section, I have looked at some paradigmatic cases of quotation: pure quotation, reported speech and thought, and mixed quotation. I have analysed them as metarepresentations and shown how they fit into the relevance-theoretic account. Pure quotations are used to metarepresent abstract representations of linguistic expressions or propositions. Reported speech and thought is used to attribute utterances and thoughts and highlight various aspects of the originals, linguistic or conceptual. Mixed quotations are again attributive, and chosen both for their content and their form. In addition, I have shown that the indeterminacies in all these types of quotation can be resolved on the basis of the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy, and choice of more or less explicit formulation is governed by considerations of optimal relevance.

In the next section, I will look at some other types of metarepresentation, and argue that the metarepresentational approach can deal with a very rich and diverse range of examples, which cannot be dealt with on standard quotational accounts.

2.5 Varieties of Linguistic Metarepresentation II: Non-Quotations

The notion of metarepresentation applies not only to utterances standardly treated as quotations, but also to other cases where an utterance or part of an utterance is used to metarepresent another representation, public, mental or abstract. One major category of examples is provided by echoic utterances, in which the speaker expresses an attitude to an attributed representation. In this section, I will be mainly concerned with such examples, but toward the end, I will look at some other cases, too.

2.5.1 Echoic metarepresentation of utterances and thoughts

2.5.1.1 Echoic Use

When a metarepresentation is used to express the speaker's attitude to the original representation, this is a case of *echoic use* in relevance-theoretic terms (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: chapter 4, sections 7 - 9; Wilson and Sperber 1992). Echoic use is similar to reported speech and thought in that it involves the metarepresentation of attributed utterances or thoughts, but differs in that it is used not to inform the hearer of the form or content of the original, but to convey the speaker's attitude to it. In other words, echoic utterances are not reportative.

Consider (60) - (61):

(60) A: She is beautiful.
B: She is beautiful, I agree.

(61) A: She performed the concert very well.
B: She did very well.

In (60), B echoes A's utterance, and overtly expresses an endorsing attitude. In (61), B echoes A's utterance, but his attitude is left to the hearer to infer. The point of these utterances is not to inform the hearer of what has just been said, but to show the hearer that the speaker has this utterance in mind, and (in these cases) agrees with it. The relevance of an echoic utterance depends largely on the identification of the speaker's attitude to the original thought or utterance being metarepresented. Here, facial expression, tone of voice and implicated contextual assumptions may all provide clues.

What is metarepresented may be the whole or only a part of the original utterance or thought. Let us look at example (62), repeated from (45), which involves only a phrase:

(62) The teacher used 'the rod of love' to make us learn better.

In (62), as we have seen, the speaker uses the expression 'the rod of love' and also alludes to the teacher's expression, in order to express her attitude to it, which is left to the hearer to infer.

The attitudes that can be expressed in an echoic utterance are very rich and varied. However, they can be classified into three broad types: endorsing, questioning and dissociative, as in (63), from Wilson (forthcoming a):

(63) *Peter*: That was a fantastic film.
Mary: a. [happily] Fantastic.
b. [puzzled] Fantastic?
c. [scornfully] Fantastic!

Wilson suggests that the echoically used utterances in (63a - c) may be understood as conveying to Peter the information in (64a - c), respectively:

(64) a. She believes I was right to say/think P.
b. She is wondering whether I was right to say/think P.
c. She believes I was wrong to say/think P.

These analyses show clearly that the speaker's attitude in echoic use is to the attributed utterance or thought, not to the abstract proposition itself. In other words, it is the fact that someone said or believed P that the speaker regards as relevant.

Not only public representations such as utterances, but also private representations such as unspoken thoughts, assumptions, hopes, etc. can be echoically metarepresented. Suppose Peter makes a mistake in driving, and Mary looks at him reproachfully. He might say:

(65) I agree, I was wrong.

Here, he is attributing to Mary the thought that he was wrong, and overtly endorsing her opinion. The attitude to an attributed thought can also be left to the hearer to infer:

(66) [A couple is quarrelling.]
Wife: You are judging me!
Husband: (sarcastically) You are not judging me!
(in a TV drama)

In (66), the husband's utterance is not intended to be understood as asserting that his wife is not judging him. He is rather attributing to his wife the thought (implied by her utterance) that she is not judging him, and dissociating himself from that thought. (For further discussion of this sort of case, see 2.5.1.2.)

Echoic use is not limited to attributed contents, however. Metalinguistic utterances can also be used to express the speaker's attitude to the form of an attributed utterance, as in (67):

(67) [after staying in the United States for one week]
Peter: Well, I need some tom[eiDouz].
Mary: Oh, you need some tom[eiDouz].

In (67), Mary may echo Peter's utterance in order to make fun of his American pronunciation of 'tomatoes'. The relevance of the utterance will depend on his recognition of this fact.

Even higher-level explicatures involving speech-act and propositional-attitude descriptions can be echoed. Consider (68):

(68) A: Pass me the salt.
B: (critically) Pass you the salt!

In (68), B may echo A's utterance in order to express disapproval of its abruptness or lack of politeness, suggesting that he would prefer something like 'Would you pass me the salt?' or 'Can you pass me the salt?' Such utterances would not normally be analysed as quotations, but they clearly contain an echoic attributive element.

2.5.1.2 Irony as implicit echoic use

On the traditional account, irony is seen as a figure of speech which communicates the opposite of what was literally said (see Muecke 1969; Booth 1974). Sperber and Wilson (1981) take issue with this account, which they criticise on three main counts: it lacks, first, a definition of figurative meaning, second, a mechanism for deriving the figurative meaning of an utterance, and third, an explanation of why the speaker uses a figurative utterance rather than an ordinary literal one.

Sperber and Wilson also discuss the Gricean analysis of irony. According to Grice (1975: 53), who shares many assumptions of the traditional account, irony is a case where the speaker deliberately flouts the maxim of truthfulness, implicating some obviously related proposition, here the contradictory of what was literally said. That is, the speaker says something patently false, so the hearer, assuming that the speaker is being co-operative, infers that she means something else. By analysing irony in terms of a conversational implicature, which is derived pragmatically, the Gricean account avoids the problem of defining figurative speech. However, Sperber and Wilson argue that the Gricean approach shares the other two defects of the traditional account: it does not show how figurative interpretations can be systemically derived, and it does not explain why irony exists.

Sperber and Wilson (1981) analyse irony as involving mention of a proposition as opposed to mention of a linguistic expression.[13] Mentioning a proposition expressed by an attributed utterance or thought is a variety of indirect

[13] For details of Sperber and Wilson's account of irony, see Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1986/1995 chapter 4, sections 7 and 9, 1998a; Wilson and Sperber 1992; for objections, see Clark and Gerrig 1984; Martin 1992.

speech. Irony is a variety of free indirect speech, used not to report the attributed utterance or thought, but to express a dissociative attitude - of mockery, ridicule, etc. - to the opinion expressed. In irony, this attitude is not linguistically encoded, but left to the hearer to infer.

This idea is further developed in Sperber and Wilson 1986 (chapter 4, sections 7 and 9; see also Wilson and Sperber 1992). The main development is that the notion of mention is replaced by the notion of interpretive use. As standardly used, mention involves identity in form or content between metarepresentation and original (see in particular Sperber and Wilson 1985/1996: footnote 25, p. 289). As we have seen, interpretive use involves **resemblance** in content (and metalinguistic use involves resemblance in form). Mention is therefore only a special case of interpretive use, or more generally metarepresentational use. So the revised account can deal with ironical utterances which echo attributed thoughts they more or less closely resemble.

Let us look at an example:

(69) a. *Peter*: It's a lovely day for a picnic.
[They go for a picnic and it rains.]
b. *Mary*: (sarcastically) It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed.
c. *Mary*: (sarcastically) It's a fabulous day for a picnic.
(adapted from Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 239)

In (69, b - c), Mary echoes Peter's utterance in order to express a dissociative attitude to the opinion he expressed. In (69b), this opinion is mentioned (literally reproduced); in (69c), it is exaggerated or caricatured, in order to make the dissociation more salient. In either case, the echoic use and the attitude are left for the hearer to infer. These are typical examples of verbal irony, according to Sperber and Wilson.

Sperber and Wilson's analysis of irony can be illustrated by comparing it with other accounts. First, on both traditional and Gricean accounts, irony is a deviation from a norm of literal truthfulness. By contrast, on Sperber and Wilson's analysis, it

is merely a variety of echoic utterance. Since echoic utterances are not normally treated as departures from a norm, there is no reason to treat ironical utterances any differently. In fact, the existence of echoic utterances, and the ease with which they are understood, strongly suggest that irony is not a deviation from a norm, but a natural use of language.

There are some cases where an utterance satisfying all the Gricean conditions for irony does not seem to be ironical. Consider (70):

(70) [In a very cold room, Jane says:]
It is very hot here.

Given that the room is obviously cold, Jane's utterance looks like a flouting of the maxim of truthfulness. Then can we say that she ironically implicated the opposite of what she said? Certainly not. Sperber and Wilson's analysis of irony as echoic use can account for this, because (70) is not easily understood as a metarepresentation of an attributed thought. On the other hand, in a different situation, (70) could be ironical:

(70') [Mary says to Jane that her room is too hot these days. Jane, after spending a few hours in the room when it is obviously cold, comments:]
It is very hot here.

Here, Jane's utterance could certainly be understood as a case of verbal irony. What is essential in verbal irony is that it is echoic: that is, it metarepresents an attributed opinion with a dissociative attitude not overtly marked.

Third, Sperber and Wilson's analysis can deal with many more cases than the traditional or Gricean account. The definition of irony as saying something and meaning the opposite picks out only a subset of cases, where the speaker dissociates herself from the attributed opinion because it is false. This fits the example in (70'), where Jane says that it is very hot, but her attitude is dissociative because it is not hot. However, there are many cases where the reason for the speaker's dissociative attitude is that the echoed opinion is too weak, or inappropriate in the circumstances,

though it does not seem to be patently false. Consider (71) and (72), from Wilson and Sperber (1992: 55):

(71) Oh to be in England
Now that April's there. (Browning, *Home thoughts from abroad*)

(72) When a man is tired of London, he is tired of life.
(Boswell, *Life of Johnson*)

According to Sperber and Wilson, these examples could be ironically used. However, what they would communicate when ironically intended is not, as the traditional and Gricean accounts claim, the opposite of the literal meanings, i.e. that the speaker wants to be out of England in (71), and that when a man is tired of London, he is not tired of life in (72). Instead, they convey a dissociative attitude to what these utterances were originally used to convey. The traditional definition of irony is too restrictive to deal with these cases.

Finally, the analysis of irony as echoic use can cover ironies involving attribution of an unspoken thought, assumption, implication, hope or norm. Echoic use is a subtype of metarepresentational use; hence not only public representations such as utterances but also private representations such as thoughts can be the object of irony. For example, consider (73):

(73) It's a lovely day.

(73) can be used to echo an utterance made by an individual, or a statement made in the weather forecast. It can also ironically echo a thought, as, for example, when we wake up hoping for nice weather, look out and see the rain. More generally, it can echo the hopes endemic in a social group for lovely weather. Analysing irony as a variety of attributive metarepresentation can thus explain both why it is used, and how it works.

I have shown that Sperber and Wilson's analysis of irony has many advantages over the traditional and Gricean accounts. In the next subsection, I will show how echoic use and the speaker's attitude can be recognised and understood using the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy.

2.5.1.3 Understanding echoic use

In this section, I will argue that relevance theory can explain how echoic utterances are understood. This will be useful in later chapters, when I deal with metalinguistic negation and echo questions.

First, let us look at the echoic utterance in (74), repeated from (69):

(74) a. *Peter*: It's a lovely day for a picnic.
[They go for a picnic and it rains.]
b. *Mary*: (sarcastically) It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed.
c. *Mary*: (sarcastically) It's a fabulous day for a picnic.
(adapted from Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 239)

Mary's utterance in (74b) is a standard example of verbal irony: Mary echoes Peter's utterance, while implicitly expressing a dissociative attitude to the attributed content. In this case, as a similar utterance has been made very recently by Peter, the proposition expressed by Mary's utterance is not relevant in its own right. Then the first accessible reading satisfying the hearer's expectation of relevance will involve echoic use: Mary's utterance is intended to achieve relevance by expressing her attitude to the propositional content. In the circumstances, the attitude must be dissociative. (74c) can be dealt with along similar lines.

There are other cases where the intended attitude may not be clear to the hearer at the moment of utterance, or where it may not even be clear whether the utterance is used echoically or descriptively. To illustrate, consider the following scenario. Mary goes to Mexico for a holiday and phones Peter in London:

(75) *Peter*: What is the weather like there?

Mary: It is lovely for a holiday.

Given that there is a heavy downpour every afternoon, which should be spent sightseeing, and the rest of the day is very hot, Mary's utterance seems to be ironical. But Peter has no idea of the weather in Mexico. Her tone of voice may be a clue, but this is not always guaranteed.

Suppose that the descriptive reading 'I believe the weather is lovely for a holiday,' or the echoic reading with an endorsing attitude, is the first to occur to Peter, and thus the first to be tested. To satisfy Peter's expectation of relevance, the utterance must achieve at least adequate cognitive effects (or have been reasonably expected to do so). This reading surely has adequate cognitive effects as long as Peter believes it, since it is what he wants to know. If Peter had already thought 'If the weather is lovely for a holiday in Mexico, I will go there next summer', it would yield the contextual implication that he will go to Mexico next summer. If he had suspected that the weather would not be good for a holiday, it would contradict and eliminate this assumption. If he had suspected that the weather would be good for a holiday, it would strengthen it. On the assumption that he has no way of rejecting this reading, it will therefore be treated as satisfying his expectation of relevance. Then communication would fail.

However, the speaker may decide not to run this risk. In everyday conversation, such an ironical utterance tends to be followed by some further indication that it is ironically intended. In (75), Mary may continue by saying 'Every afternoon there are downpours. When there is no downpour, it is so hot that we cannot go out comfortably'. In this case, the first part of the utterance will garden-path the hearer, which may produce cognitive effects like making fool of whoever thinks 'The weather will be lovely in Mexico in that season'.

On the account developed in this section, echoic use is very similar to reported speech and thought, in that both of them metarepresent an attributed utterance or thought. The main difference between them is in their function: reported speech and thought are used to report on an attributed utterance or thought, while

echoic use is used to express the speaker's attitude to it. An adequate account of quotation or metarepresentation should surely deal with both types of case. From this point of view, the traditional and more recent alternative accounts I looked at in chapter 1 are too restrictive. In the next section, I will discuss another type of metarepresentation not normally considered in the literature on quotation.

2.5.2 Metarepresentation of desirable utterances and information

So far, I have looked at metarepresentations used in order to express the speaker's attitude to attributed utterances or thoughts. According to Sperber and Wilson, there is another type of metarepresentation involving public or mental representations: metarepresentation of desirable utterances and information (see e.g. Wilson forthcoming a). Obvious examples of metarepresentations of desirable utterances are the utterances of a prompter in the theatre, the utterances of lawyers prompting answers in their clients, the priest's utterances prompting the answers in the wedding service, those in foreign language or primary school classes, or during training in the army, a mother's utterances to a child learning a language, etc. In all these cases, the hearers are expected to produce utterances modelled on the metarepresentational utterances. I will consider some further cases in my chapter on conditionals.

A major claim of relevance theory is that interrogatives and exclamatives are also metarepresentational. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) and Wilson and Sperber (1988a) propose to analyse interrogatives as metarepresenting desirable information: i.e. information that would be relevant if true. Consider (76) - (77):

(76) Are you coming to the party?

(77) When is the party?

In (76), the speaker metarepresents the proposition that the hearer is coming to the party and indicates that it would be relevant if true. In (77), the speaker

metarepresents a proposition of the type 'The party is next Wednesday', which is a completion of the incomplete logical form encoded by the utterance, again indicates that it would be relevant if true.

In speech-act terms, standard interrogatives are generally analysed as requests for information. However, as is well known, not all interrogatives are requests for information. They may be offers of information, rhetorical questions, exam questions, idle speculations, and so on. On Sperber and Wilson's analysis, the various types of question are distinguished by pragmatic factors such as to whom the answer would be desirable, and whether the hearer is able to give the information concerned. For example, an interrogative should be understood as a request for information if it is assumed that the metarepresented information is desirable from the speaker's point of view and the hearer has the information to give. If the information is desirable from the hearer's point of view, and the speaker has it, it should be understood as an offer of information. This provides a much richer analysis of interrogatives than standard speech-act accounts. (For further discussion of interrogatives in relevance theory, see Clark 1991.) In chapter 4, I will show how it may be extended to deal with the analysis of various types of echo questions.

In this section, I have looked at some types of metarepresentation not generally considered in the literature on quotations. In the relevance-theoretic framework, they can be handled along the same general lines as quotations, which we dealt with in section 2.4. The notion of metarepresentation thus enables us to capture a range of generalisations that apply not only to quotations but to a variety of other cases. This is an important advantage of the relevance-theoretic approach.

2.6 Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined relevance theory and shown how the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy can be used to resolve semantic indeterminacies and arrive at the intended interpretation, i.e. the intended package of context, explicit content and cognitive effects. I have also introduced the relevance-theoretic notion of

metarepresentation, and shown how it applies to a variety of cases in which communication involves the exploitation of resemblances between representations.

I have analysed standard quotations as metarepresentations, and shown how various metarepresentational indeterminacies can be resolved by the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy. I have also looked at a variety of other types of metarepresentational utterance which would not standardly be considered as quotations: One is echoic use, which expresses the speaker's attitude to an attributed utterance or thought, and another involves metarepresentation of desirable utterances or information. Existing accounts of quotation, which I discussed in chapter 1, do not deal with these non-quotational cases; and therefore miss generalisations.

One generalisation is that in metarepresentations, faithfulness rather than truthfulness is important. The representation must be faithful enough to the original (i.e. resemble it closely enough). Metarepresentational utterances resist standard truth-conditional treatment. Embedded metarepresentations do not contribute their regular truth-conditional content to utterances in which they occur. As a result, when they occur in an utterance with truth-functional operators or non-declarative sentence type, those operators appear to be non-truth-functional, and the sentence-type looks extraordinary. In the remaining chapters, I will extend the relevance-theoretic approach to examples of this type: I will concentrate, in chapter 3, on metalinguistic negation, in chapter 4, on echo questions, and in chapter 5, on various types of conditionals. Again these are cases not standardly treated in the literature on quotation, which as a result misses further generalisations.

Appendix to Chapter 2:

A Pragmatic Analysis of the Korean Dialect Expression *kesiki* 'that thing'

My relevance-theoretic account of metarepresentation makes certain predictions: first, that the presence of metarepresentational uses should be universal, and, second, that languages may have a variety of linguistic devices for encoding the presence of metarepresentational use. It also predicts that we might expect to find not only metarepresentational devices like quote marks, standardly seen as markers of literal reproduction, but also metarepresentational markers of loose attribution, indicating that something less than strict identity between representation and original should be understood. In this appendix, I would like to discuss one such device in Korean.

Korean has several regional dialects. Here I shall be concerned with the dialect of the Cella-nam-to area. In this region, people use the expression *kesiki*[kəsiki], 'that thing', so often that it is said that they cannot produce an utterance without it. In some cases, the whole utterance consists only of *kesiki* and some functional words, as in '**Kesiki**-ka(NM) **kesiki**-ha(do/be)-yse(because) **kesiki**-ha(do/be)-yss(PST)-ta(DC)',[1] meaning literally 'As that one did that, [subject] did that way'. This can be interpreted in various ways: for example, as 'As he was rude, I disliked him' or 'As he insulted her, she ran away'. Here, I am to show that *kesiki* is a loose metarepresentation of an expression which the speaker is unwilling or unable to utter overtly for personal or cultural reasons. I will discuss the use of *kesiki* as a noun

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[1] In transcribing the Korean examples, the Yale Romanisation system is used with glosses based on Sohn's (1994) approach in general. The abbreviations mean as follows:

DC: declarative sentence-type suffix; GN: genitive case particle;
NM: nominative case particle; PST: past tense suffix

and *kesiki-ha* (do/be) as a predicate, e.g. a verb or adjective. The same account can be applied to the case of adverbial use.

First, let us look at some examples (from example (2) onwards, Korean examples are translated into English except for the relevant part, for easy understanding):

(1) kunye-nun ku pangaskkan cwuin-uy twulccay **kesiki**-i-ta.
she-NM that miller's second **that thing**-be-DC
'She is the second **that thing** of the miller.'
(I(ntended) M(eaning): She is the second daughter of the miller.)

(2) A: What about the second daughter of the miller?
B: She **kesiki-ha**(do/be)-**yss**(PST) with the baker's son seriously, but their parents **kesiki-ha-yss**, so they **kesiki-ha-yss** to Seoul.
(IM: She was seriously in love with the baker's son, but their parents objected to their love, so they ran away to Seoul.)

In (1), *kesiki* is used as a noun, and in (2), *kesiki-ha* 'do that thing/be in that state' as a predicate.

Let us consider when and why *kesiki* is used:

(i) It is used when a speaker is reluctant to say something explicitly. Suppose Mary does not like Peter's suggestion. She says:

(3) It is a little **kesiki-ha**. (IM: It is a little problematic.)

Here, the speaker is using *kesiki* instead of saying 'problematic' overtly, maybe because to say it overtly sounds impolite. Korean society belongs to the Confucian tradition, in which to say something unpleasant overtly is considered rude. Though the tradition has been weakened, the Cella-nam-to area, which is at the far end of the Korean territory and has not been affected by Western influence, still maintains the customs. The frequent use of *kesiki* can often be accounted for in this way. Indeed,

kesiki is used among people from other regions for sexual things, e.g. sexual intercourse, or sexual organs in colloquial or slightly vulgar speech.

(ii) It is used when a particular expression does not occur to the speaker on the spot. The examples in (3) can be used for this reason. The speaker wants to express an objection, but she does not know how to put it. It could be 'It entails a problem', 'It is not a good idea', 'It is too unrealistic', 'It is impossible', etc. In these circumstances, (3) is often used. Another example is in (4). The speaker wants to encourage someone, using the proverb 'Patience is bitter, but the fruit is sweet'. She might produce one of the utterances in (4):

(4) a. **kesiki** is **kesiki-ha**, but **kesiki** is **kesiki-ha**.
b. **kesiki** is bitter, but **kesiki** is sweet.
c. Patience is **kesiki-ha**, but the fruit is **kesiki-ha**.
d. Patience is **kesiki-ha**, but **kesiki** is **kesiki-ha**.
e. **Kesiki** is bitter, but the fruit is **kesiki-ha**.

This shows that *kesiki* can replace any expression that the speaker wants. The speaker wants to say 'Patience is bitter, but the fruit is sweet', but some of the expressions simply do not occur to her; so she fills the slots with *kesiki*.

(iii) It is used when a speaker assumes that the hearer can easily identify what it is used for. The examples in (3) and (4) can be used for this reason. Here, by using *kesiki*, the speaker saves herself and her hearer some linguistic effort, because the speaker does not express every word literally and the hearer does not have to decode them. As long as the expression represented by *kesiki* may be easily accessible, *kesiki* is an economical way of communicating something.

We have seen that *kesiki* is a device used to stand in for something that a speaker unwilling or unable to express. So *kesiki* denotes something in particular, rather than merely being an existential quantifier. Consider (5) - (6):

(5) I bought **kesiki.**

(6) He immediately **kesiki-ha**(do/be)-**yss**(PST).
(IM: He immediately left the place)

(5) means that the speaker bought some specific thing, rather than that she bought at least one thing; so the expression substitutes for some specific noun/noun phrase. Similarly, *kesiki-ha* is used instead of a specific predicate. In (6), the utterance means that he did something in particular, not that he did something or other. That is, *kesiki-ha* as a predicate does not have a conceptual meaning by itself, but is used as a substitute for another specific predicate. I analyse *kesiki* in the examples given above as a metarepresentational device, metarepresenting loosely the word for which it stands in. For example, in (5) (I bought **kesiki**), if what the speaker bought was a book, *kesiki* metarepresents the word 'book'. And in (6) *kesiki-ha* metarepresents the expression 'leave the place'.

Let us leave *kesiki* for the moment and turn to relevance theory. As we have seen, in relevance theory, metarepresentation is claimed to involve resemblance rather than identity, and the degree of resemblance is constrained by considerations of optimal relevance. (See section 2.3; Sperber and Wilson 1986/95, chapter 4, sections 7 - 9; Wilson and Sperber 1992; Blakemore 1993, 1994.). Literal reproduction is at one extreme. At the opposite are the following cases, given in Wilson (forthcoming a):

(7) And so the kid would say, 'Blah blah blah?' [tentative voice with rising intonation] and his father would say 'Blah blah blah' [in a strong blustery voice], and they would go on like that. (originally from Clark and Gerrig 1990: 780)

(8) And I said, 'Well, it seemed to me to be an example of this this this this this and this and this' which it was you know. (originally from Svartvik and Quirk 1980)

Wilson (forthcoming a) analyses 'blah blah blah' in (7) and 'this this this' in (8) as loose metarepresentations of the original. She (personal communication) also comments that English has an expression 'the wotsit [= what is it]', which is used when the speaker is unwilling or unable to use the real name. This seems to be close to *kesiki*, in that both of them may be used to metarepresent an abstract linguistic expression.

The effect that the speaker wants to achieve by using this loose form of utterance may be either (a) to implicate that she does not want to be more explicit for some reason, or (b) to implicate that she does not recall the more explicit expression.[2] According to the definition of optimal relevance (see section 2.1), the speaker is expected to produce the most relevant utterance compatible with her abilities and preferences. As my analysis shows, *kesiki* may be preferred to a more specific expression because the speaker is unable to think of it, or unwilling to use it.

What is interesting about *kesiki* is that it cannot be used anaphorically in discourse. Consider (9) - (10):

(9) ?I bought a book$_i$ and gave **kesiki$_i$** to Tom.

(10) A: I bought the history book$_i$ the teacher mentioned in the last class.
B: ?Why don't you lend me **kesiki$_i$**?

In (9) and (10), *kesiki* cannot be interpreted as referring back to the book and the history book, respectively. My account explains why: if *kesiki* metarepresents an expression the speaker is unwilling or unable to use, it is hard to see how either of these conditions could apply to a recently-used expression like a book. However, if

[2] In the same vein, the effect of using 'blah blah blah' in English may be to implicate that the speaker considers the more explicit expression less relevant. Deirdre Wilson (personal communication) points out that 'blah blah blah' is not the same as *kesiki*: *kesiki* seems clearly to metarepresent form (linguistic expressions), whereas 'blah blah blah' may represent content.

the expression is a taboo word, e.g. sexual organs, it can be metarepresented by *kesiki* by a different speaker.

A further point is that *kesiki* cannot be used as co-referent with a *wh*-word. Consider (11) - (12):

(11) Who$_i$ loves his$_i$ enemy?

(12) *Who$_i$ loves **kesiki-uy**(GN)$_i$ enemy?

In (11), *his* can be used as an anaphor of *who*, but *kesiki* in (12) cannot. It cannot be an anaphor of an indefinite pronoun either, as in (13) and (14):

(13) Whoever$_i$ purchases the house will be reminded of his$_i$/her$_i$/***kesiki-uy**(GN)$_i$ hometown.

(14) Someone$_i$ came into the room with a hat on his$_i$/her$_i$/***kesiki-uy**$_i$ head.

Again, my account explains why. In Korean, we may not use *kesiki* in any case where the referent has already been used. In the circumstances, there is no reason for using *kesiki*: on the one hand, it would cost more processing effort here, and on the other hand, it would not carry any additional cognitive effects. These examples are thus ruled out by considerations of optimal relevance.

Similarly, *kesiki* as a predicate cannot be interpreted as a pro-form for one previously used. Compare (15) - (16):

(15) ?John shouted at Mary and **kesiki-ha**(do)-**yss**(PST) at Jane.

(16) A: John raped Jane.
B: He **kesiki-ha**(do)-**yss**(PST) Jane?

In (15), *kesiki-ha-yss* cannot be interpreted as 'shouted'. By contrast, in (16), *kesiki-ha-yss* can be understood as 'raped'. My explanation in terms of optimal relevance holds here, too. In (15), there is no reason to use the loose metarepresentational form, because 'shout' has already been used by the speaker. It is not the case that the speaker is unwilling or unable to use it. By contrast, in (16), even though 'rape' was used by A, B is apparently unwilling to use it, so he uses the loose metarepresentational form *kesiki* instead.

None of these properties can be explained in strictly grammatical terms. As Ariel (1988) points out, not only pronouns but also names and definite descriptions can be used anaphorically. Consider (17) - (18) (my emphases):

(17) **Ronald Reagan** flew to Japan. **The president** is scheduled to meet with Japanese feminists. (Blakemore 1992: 67, originally from Ariel 1988)

(18) **Mrs. Thatcher** says she's not standing down. Honestly, **that woman** will never give up. (Blakemore 1992: 67, originally from Ariel 1988)

In (17), 'the president' refers to Ronald Reagan, and in (18), 'that woman' to Mrs. Thatcher. Blakemore (1992: chapter 5) argues that the difference between anaphoric and non-anaphoric referring expressions cannot be therefore explained in purely linguistic terms. In a similar vein, the fact that *kesiki* cannot be used anaphorically in some cases suggests a pragmatic rather than a grammatical approach. As we have seen above, *kesiki* is used when the speaker is unwilling/unable to express something overtly. If an expression has already appeared in the discourse, and it is obvious that the speaker is generally willing to use it, there is no point in replacing it with *kesiki*.

To sum up: Korean dialect *kesiki* should be analysed as a metarepresentational device used to metarepresent loosely an expression that the speaker is unwilling or unable to use. The fact that she is unwilling or unable to use it may itself give rise to additional pragmatic effects (e.g. humour or politeness). The relevance-theoretic framework thus sheds light on how this expression used.

Chapter 3

Metalinguistic Negation

3.1 Introduction

In chapter 1, I argued that traditional and more recent alternative accounts of quotation fail to provide an adequate pragmatic framework capable of explaining how the hearer resolves the indeterminacies in quotation. In the last chapter, I argued that relevance theory provides such a framework: considerations of optimal relevance enable the hearer to determine what should be inferred and how. I also argued that the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation enables us to capture some generalisations that apply to both quotational and non-quotational metarepresentation: in both cases, what makes an utterance acceptable is faithfulness to the original, rather than truthfulness of some state of affairs. In the chapters to follow, I will extend this account to some more controversial cases not generally considered in the literature on quotation. In this chapter, I will explore existing accounts of *metalinguistic negation,* and argue that a relevance-theoretic analysis based on the notion of metarepresentational use can bring some interesting insights.

It has been widely noticed that in certain cases negation appears to be used non-truth-functionally. Consider (1) - (3):

(1) I'm not happy: I'm ecstatic.

(2) I didn't paint two mouses: I painted two mice.

(3) I don't eat tom[eiDouz]: I eat tom[a:touz].

In (1), the speaker seems to be rejecting an assertion, not because it is false, but because the word 'happy' is too weak to do justice to her feelings. In (2), the speaker does not seem to be asserting , 'I did not paint two animals of a certain type'; rather, she is singling out the plural form 'mouses', and rejecting it. The same goes for (3); the speaker seems to be rejecting the pronunciation 'tom[eiDouz]', rather than the content.

The question of how to analyse such examples has been debated in the literature of both philosophy and linguistics. Horn (1985, 1989) discusses negation involving essential reference to aspects of linguistic form, e.g. morphology or pronunciation, as in (1) - (3). He analyses all of these marked cases as involving a metalinguistic use of negation, which operates on an utterance, and contrasts it with regular descriptive negation, which operates on a proposition.

Horn further claims that the difference between the two uses of negation merely amounts to a 'pragmatic ambiguity': truth-conditionally there is only one negative operator, which can be used metalinguistically as a device for objecting to a previous utterance. This claim about 'pragmatic ambiguity' has been much debated. Some people (e.g. Burton-Roberts 1989a, b) accept Horn's view that metalinguistic negation is not equivalent to truth-functional negation, and try to account for when and how we get the metalinguistic interpretation. Others (e.g. van der Sandt 1991, 1994 and Carston 1994/1996, 1998c/in press) reject Horn's analysis and treat his metalinguistic cases in truth-functional terms; metalinguistic negation is the case where the negated material is echoic. On this view, descriptive negation and metalinguistic negation are not distinct operators: it is just that the material which falls within their scope is of two distinct types.

Here I shall adopt the second view and try to show how metalinguistic negation can be reconciled with a unitary semantics for 'not'. I will argue that metalinguistic negation can be interestingly analysed in terms of the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation. This analysis supports Carston's (1994/1996) view that metalinguistic negation is as truth-functional as descriptive negation. However, it also departs from her analysis, in that on her account metalinguistic negation crucially involves an expression of the speaker's attitude, while on my

account, it does not. I claim that metalinguistic negation as generally discussed is a subtype of negation where (some part of) the negated material is metarepresented. I will show that previous claims that 'not' is metalinguistic miss a generalisation, by introducing a range of examples not normally considered in the literature on metalinguistic negation. This will provide further confirmation of the relevance-theoretic approach. For convenience's sake, I will follow common practice and use the term 'metalinguistic negation', though what is crucial is not the negative operator but the negated material.

The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 discusses previous accounts of metalinguistic negation, concentrating on Horn (1989), Burton-Roberts (1989a) and van der Sandt (1994). Section 3 introduces Carston's (1994/1996) relevance-theoretic account. Section 4 analyses metalinguistic negation in terms of the notion of metarepresentational use developed in the last chapter. I will argue that metalinguistic negations need pragmatic enrichment, which contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance. That is why metalinguistic negation differs in truth-conditional content from descriptive negation. Section 5 is a summary and conclusion.

3.2 Previous Accounts of Metalinguistic Negation

In this section, I will discuss previous accounts of metalinguistic negation, in particular Horn (1985, 1989), Burton-Roberts (1989a) and van der Sandt (1994). I will argue that their analyses are too restrictive to deal with a range of further data, and hence miss a generalisation.

3.2.1 Standard accounts of metalinguistic negation

Metalinguistic negation has been claimed in the literature to have the following main properties:

(4) a. Metalinguistic negation is non-truth-functional.

b. Metalinguistic negation is followed by a correction clause.

c. Metalinguistic negation occurs as a rejoinder to a corresponding affirmative utterance, which can be glossed as 'I object to U', or 'U is not assertable'.

d. Metalinguistic negation involves the 'contradiction' intonation contour (final-rise within the negated clause) and contrastive stress on the offending item and its replacement.

e. Metalinguistic negation quotes/mentions the previous utterance, and what is quoted is sealed off, so that;

(i) metalinguistic negation fails to be morphologically incorporated,

(ii) metalinguistic negation fails to trigger negative polarity items,

(iii) metalinguistic negation excludes the logical law of double negation.

Horn (1985, 1989: chapter 6) analyses metalinguistic negation as a device for objecting to a previous utterance on the grounds of its unassertability. Responding to this view, many alternative accounts have been put forward: Burton-Roberts (1989a, b); Foolen (1991); McCawley (1991); van der Sandt (1991, 1994); Dancygier (1992); Chapman (1993, 1996); Carston (1994/1996, 1998c/in press); and Carston and Noh (1996), etc. In this section, I will discuss these accounts, concentrating on Horn's, Burton-Roberts' and van der Sandt's. All of these treat metalinguistic negation as having the properties in (4) above, except that van der Sandt does not admit property (4a). Carston's relevance-theoretic approach will be discussed in section 3.3.

3.2.1.1 Horn (1985, 1989): Pragmatic ambiguity

Metalinguistic negation was brought to prominence by Horn (1985, 1989. chapter 6), who gives an excellent and comprehensive review of previous accounts of marked

uses of negation,[1] and claims that they run into a problem: they cannot handle negations involving linguistic form. Consider his examples in (5) - (6), from Horn (1989: chapter 6):

(5) (So you [mɪˀənɪdʒd] to solve the problem.)
No, I didn't [mɪˀənɪdʒ] to solve the problem - I [mænɪdʒd] to solve the problem.

(6) I didn't manage to trap two monGEESE - I managed to trap two monGOOSES.

According to Horn, the negation in (5) does not mean that the speaker failed to solve the problem. Rather, what is involved is the pronunciation '[mɪˀənɪdʒ]'. In a similar vein, the negation in (6) involves the plural morphological form 'mongeese' rather than its meaning.

According to Horn, metalinguistic negation may pick out the register or connotation of a linguistic expression, too. Consider (7) - (8), from Horn (1989: chapter 6):

(7) a. Grandpa isn't feeling lousy, Johnny, he's just a tad indisposed.
b. We didn't {have intercourse / make love} - we fucked.

(8) a. Ben Ward is not a black Police Commissioner but a Police Commissioner who is black. (*N.Y. Times* editorial, 8 January 1983)
b. For a pessimist like you, the glass isn't half full - it's half empty.

The negations in (7) are used to object to style or register, and the negations in (8) to a connotation and a focus, respectively.

[1] For earlier accounts of marked uses of negation, see Wilson (1975); Karttunen and Peters (1979); Grice (1981); and Kempson (1986).

Horn claims that these examples are 'devastating cases for any generalised semantic account of marked negation, which would presumably be driven to import phonetic representation and inflectional morphology into logical form, within the scope of negation'(Horn 1989: 371). (We will see in section 3.4 that this is not so devastating for a relevance-theoretic approach.)

Negations involving non-truth-conditional aspects of utterance meaning can be analysed in the same way. Let us consider some standardly cited examples involving implicatures:

(9) a. I didn't meet a woman last night; I met my wife.

b. I didn't manage to solve the problem; it was quite easy.

According to Horn, in (9a), if the negation were truth-functional, the sentence would come out as contradictory, because his wife is surely a woman. However, the negation does not mean that the corresponding affirmative is false. As Grice (1975) points out, 'a woman' conversationally implicates that she is not the speaker's wife.[2] The speaker in (9a) objects to this utterance on the ground that its conversational implicature is false. By the same token, in (9b), the negation operates on what Horn treats as a conventional implicature of 'manage', that it was difficult to solve the problem, leaving the proposition expressed (that I solved the problem) unaffected.

Horn also treats '*presupposition*-cancelling' cases as examples of metalinguistic negation. He comments:

> 'Of course the principal resemblance between the instances of marked negation introduced here and the classical examples of presupposition-canceling negation discussed earlier is that both types occur naturally only as responses to utterances by other speakers earlier in the same discourse contexts, or as mid-course corrections after earlier utterances by the same

[2] On a Gricean account, 'a woman' conversationally implicates that the woman in question is not a person close to the speaker or the hearer; if the woman is his wife, 'a woman' is not the proper expression to use, because it is not as informative as is required.

> speakers. It is for this reason that I seek to encompass all these examples under the general rubric of metalinguistic negation: they all involve the same extended use of negation as a way for speakers to announce their unwillingness to assert something in a given way, or to accept another's assertion of it in that way.' (Horn 1989: 374 - 375)

Thus, consider (10):

(10) The king of France is not bald; there is no king of France.

According to Horn, in (10), the first conjunct does not mean that 'The king of France is bald' is false. Rather the speaker is objecting to the utterance 'The king of France is bald' because its *presupposition* that there is a king of France is not fulfilled.

However, it is not clear that all '*presupposition*-cancelling' cases are metalinguistic. Carston (1998c/in press) argues that they can be descriptive or metalinguistic. I will not discuss these '*presupposition*-cancelling' negations in detail, because it is still controversial whether they are metalinguistic negations or not. See Carston (1998c/in press) for detailed discussion and relevance-theoretic analysis.

Horn defines metalinguistic negation as a device for objecting to a previous utterance on the ground that it is unassertable; the negation means 'I object to U', where U is a previous utterance. 'Assertable' in his terms means 'felicitously assertable' or 'appropriately assertable', where the adverbial hedge is broad enough to cover a wide range of examples involving not only non-propositional meanings such as *presuppositions* and implicatures, but also linguistic properties such as pronunciation and morphology. The properties of metalinguistic negation in (4a) - (4c) above follow from this characterisation.

Horn contrasts metalinguistic negation with descriptive negation: descriptive negation is the ordinary, truth-functional use of negation, which operates on a proposition, and negates it. In Horn's terms, metalinguistic negation is a marked, pragmatic, non-truth-functional use of negation, which operates on an utterance and rejects it. He claims that this distinction is pragmatic, and negation is semantically

unambiguous. This claim of 'pragmatic ambiguity' will be discussed further below. We will look at alternative views by van der Sandt (1994) in section 3.2.2, and by Carston (1994/1996) and Carston and Noh (1996) in section 3.3.1.

Horn gives some diagnostics for metalinguistic negation. First, metalinguistic negation fails to trigger negative polarity items. Consider (11) - (12):

(11) A: John managed to solve some problems.
B: John didn't manage to solve {some/*any} problems - they were quite easy.

(12) A: Mary is sometimes late.
B: Mary isn't {sometimes/*ever} late - she is always late.

In (11) - (12), the positive polarity items 'some' and 'sometimes' cannot be replaced with the negative polarity items 'any' and 'ever' under negation.

Another diagnostic is the inability of metalinguistic negation to incorporate lexically. Consider (13) - (14):

(13) She is {not happy/*unhappy}; she is ecstatic.

(14) It is {not possible/*impossible} that Brazil will win the match - it's necessary.

In (13) - (14), 'not' cannot be lexically incorporated, although this is possible in ordinary descriptive negations, as in (15) - (16):

(15) She is {not happy/unhappy}; she is miserable.

(16) It is {not possible/impossible} that Brazil will win the match. Ronaldo's injury is serious.

Horn claims that as 'not' operates on another level (i.e. the level of the utterance), it cannot interact with the proposition expressed by the negated part. I shall attempt to explain these properties in section 3.4.1.

Horn mentions contrastive stress and final-rise intonation as another diagnostic: 'a felicitous utterance involves contrastive intonation with a final rise within the negative clause' (Horn 1989: 374).[3] Consider (17):

(17) She's not HAPPY; she's ECSTATIC.

In (17), the offending item 'happy' and the correct item 'ecstatic' are accented for contrast, and the intonation rises at the end of the negative clause.

It is worth noting that the final rise, or what is called the contradiction contour by Karttunen and Peters (1979), is not an inherent property of metalinguistic negation itself, but a byproduct of the combination of two parallel clauses, that is, the metalinguistic negation and its correction clause. In fact, a metalinguistic negation does not have to be followed by a correction clause if it is clear that the descriptive negation reading is not intended. In that case, a final rise intonation is not only unnecessary but also unacceptable. Moreover, the following correction clause does not have to belong to the same sentence as the negation clause. As can be seen in (18) below, it can be an independent sentence. Then the contradiction contour is not necessary.

The same point applies to contrastive stress. Contrastive stress is a feature of contrastive negation.[4] Metalinguistic negation often takes the form of contrastive negation, e.g. 'not A but B'. However, stress does not have to be placed on the offending item A and the correct item B. Consider (18), from Carston (1994/1996) (originally from Horn (1992)), where the first line is the text on the front of a birthday card, the next two lines are inside:

[3] See Liberman and Sag (1974); Karttunen and Peters (1979), and Ladd (1980), for discussion.

[4] McCawley (1991) claims that contrastive negation is not inherently metalinguistic, but lends itself to metalinguistic negation.

(18) This Birthday Card is NOT from one of your admirers.

It's from TWO of your admirers.

Happy Birthday from both of us.

In (18), the writer of the birthday card deliberately misleads the receiver, in order to create an extra (e.g. mildly humorous) effect.[5] In garden-path cases like this, contrastive stress should be avoided. As Carston (1994/1996) also notes, relevance theory predicts that the extra processing effort required in (18) should yield extra cognitive effects.

Horn (1985, 1989: chapter 6) has made an important contribution by drawing attention to the properties of metalinguistic negation. However, there are still some points to be clarified. First, as we have seen, Horn claims that there is a 'pragmatic ambiguity' between descriptive and metalinguistic negation. Metalinguistic negation operates on another level (i.e. the level of the utterance, not the proposition), where formal linguistic properties and non-truth-conditional aspects of utterance meaning (e.g. implicatures) are available for negation. However, on his account, it also seems to have a different meaning from regular truth-functional negation: it expresses the speaker's objection to a previous utterance. Horn (1985: 145) comments 'It must not be overlooked that marked negation differs from descriptive negation not only phonologically, morphologically, and syntactically, but also in semantic function'. In other words, metalinguistic 'not' does not entail the falsity of a proposition as the descriptive negative operator 'not' does. Then what is the core meaning of these two uses of 'not'? Horn is far from clear on this issue. He says they are the same operators, operating on different levels. Then, if it is semantically unambiguous, regardless of whether it is used in descriptive negation or in metalinguistic negation, it should mean the same thing. But, as descriptive negation, it means that the proposition is false, while as metalinguistic negation, it means that the speaker is objecting to a previous utterance. It seems to follow that negation is semantically

[5] Chapman (1993) also develops this point. She argues that metalinguistic negation can be chosen because of its playful jokey effect, which is created by garden-pathing the hearer.

ambiguous. Carston (1996: 311) and van der Sandt (1994: 38) also point out the inconsistency in Horn's claim on the one hand that what we have is 'an extended metalinguistic use of a basically truth-functional operator' (Horn 1985: 122) and on the other hand his comment that this is a 'special or marked use of negation, irreducible to the ordinary internal truth-functional operator' (Horn 1985: 132).

Second, it turns out that metalinguistic negation is available even in the absence of a previous utterance. In fact, Horn himself is the source of one example. Consider (19), taken from a footnote in Horn (1985: 121):

(19) I would like to single out for special thanks Barbara Abbott, ..., and Deirdre Wilson. Their contributions were not important - they were invaluable.

The negation in (19) is metalinguistic: Like example (1) above, it rejects the term 'important' not because it is false, but because it is too weak. Thus, the claim that metalinguistic negation invariably objects to a prior utterance as unassertable seems to be too strong. I will propose an analysis of (19) in section 3.4.1.

Third, there is a similarity between standard cases of metalinguistic negation and other cases not generally considered in the literature. Consider (20), slightly modified from (19):

(20) A: Their contributions were important.
B: Right, but **your** contributions were not important, they were invaluable.

The utterance in (20B), which is similar to the one in (19B), is not a purely descriptive negation. However, although it is echoic or allusive in some sense, it is surely not an objection to a previous utterance. Horn's account of metalinguistic negation thus misses a generalisation. I will analyse (20) as belonging to the same general category as metalinguistic negation in section 3.4.1.

Fourth, Horn apparently does not consider the possibility that even the propositional content of a previous utterance can be the ground for objecting to it. Obviously, one of the reasons why we might object to a previous utterance is because

it expresses a false proposition. There is thus no obvious reason for excluding propositions from this echoic type of negation. Horn would probably claim that it is because in propositional denials the negation is truth-functional, while in other cases it is non-truth-functional; but if so, Horn's negation is clearly semantically ambiguous. I will return to this issue when discussing the accounts of van der Sandt (section 3.2.2) and Carston (section 3.3.1). In section 3.4.1, I will analyse negations involving the metarepresentation of a proposition as cases of interpretive use.

Finally, Horn criticises Carston's claim that the negation operator itself is the standard truth-functional operator even in metalinguistic negation:

> 'We are now back to the ultimately incoherent view that negation is invariably a truth function - even when it takes as an argument the 'echoic use of language'. If there is no category mistake here, there is at the very least a good deal of explaining to do, since Carston is forced by her neomonoguism to propositionalize every target of metalinguistic negation, from grammatical usage to phonology, from register to musical technique. Occam's razor cuts more ways than one; when we bear in mind what a truth function must be a function of, we recognize the implausibility in the view that negation is invariably truth-functional.' (Horn 1989: 434)

Consider Horn's example (1985: footnote 12):

(21) [Piano student plays passage in manner μ.]
Teacher: It's not {plays passage in manner μ} - It's {plays same passage in manner μ'}

Horn claims that the teacher's 'not' in (21) is clearly not analysable as truth-functional propositional negation, and that 'U' in 'I object to U' (what his metalinguistic negation expresses) should also be more than a specifically linguistic utterance. However, if the non-linguistic elements in a sentence should necessarily be

dealt with by different operators from ordinary truth-functional ones, then the examples in (22) should also be treated non-truth-functionally:

(22) a. It is {plays passage in manner μ}

b. If it is {plays passage in manner μ}, ...

c. Is it {plays passage in manner μ}?

d. Play this part like {plays passage in manner μ}!

In (22), all the examples have a non-linguistic element. Should we claim that the conditional in (b), the question in (c) and the imperative in (d) are all embedded in non-truth-functional operators? Then how can we deal with (a), which is a positive declarative sentence not embedded under any complete operator at all? Surely (a) can be true or false, in the same way as direct quotations or mentions can be true or false. The objection that it is impossible to 'propositionalise' non-linguistic representations by embedding them into conceptual representations (as in cases of direct quotation or mention) must itself be rejected. This point will be discussed further below.

Sometimes, the analysis of metalinguistic negation as expressing the proposition 'I object to U' is also not plausible. In a court, a lawyer is explaining that two shots were fired for ten seconds.

(23) It was not BANG-BANG. It was BANG (ten seconds' interval) BANG.

In (23), what falls within the scope of the negation is not 'specifically linguistic', but the negation does not mean 'I object to "It was BANG-BANG"', contrary to what Horn's analysis suggests. It is rather closer to the truth-functional interpretation 'It is not true that it was BANG-BANG'.

As I have shown in chapter 2, all these examples involve metarepresentations of non-linguistic sounds. Metarepresentations contribute to truth-conditional content, though differently from descriptions. It follows that we do not need to postulate special, metalinguistic or non-truth-functional operators including 'not', 'if' and non-declarative sentence-types. I will return to this point below.

Horn's account does not go into any great detail: there is no consideration of how the metalinguistic reading is triggered and what the truth-conditional content of the resulting utterance is like. On these matters, Burton-Roberts (1989a) and van der Sandt (1994) are worth discussing. Both attempt to give more detailed accounts of metalinguistic negation. I will turn now to a discussion of what they propose.

3.2.1.2 Burton-Roberts (1989a): Semantic contradiction and pragmatic reanalysis

Burton-Roberts (1989a) holds the view that negation is semantically unambiguous and metalinguistic negation is derived pragmatically. This is very similar to Horn's position, but Burton-Roberts also attempts to account for how we get to the reading involving metalinguistic negation, which is conspicuously missing from Horn's account. According to him, a metalinguistic negation and its following correction clause are semantically contradictory on a first pass. Consider his example (24):

(24) Maggie isn't either patriotic or quixotic, she's both.

According to Burton-Roberts, in (24), when the hearer interprets the negation as descriptive and truth-functional, a semantic contradiction is induced between the negative clause and its following correction clause; the first clause has the semantic form ~ (p v q) and the second clause (p & q) entails (p v q). Thus, ~ (p v q) and (p & q) is a contradiction. When a hearer is faced with this contradiction, assuming that the speaker is being co-operative, he performs 'a re-analysis in order to recover from the utterance of these literal contradictions an intention to convey another, non-contradictory idea' (Burton-Roberts 1989a: 117). The reanalysis involves interpreting the negation as mentioning a previous utterance and objecting to it. This is a case of metalinguistic negation. In (24), the hearer reanalyses the negation as mentioning something like 'Maggie is either patriotic or quixotic' and objecting to it. According to Burton-Roberts, as mention has a sealing-off effect which blocks normal rules of logical inference, no semantic contradiction is induced.

Burton-Roberts claims that the sealing-off effect of mention can explain the properties of metalinguistic negation given in (4e) above (i.e. Horn's diagnostics for metalinguistic negation): negation outside the seal cannot trigger a negative polarity item inside the seal, nor incorporate prefixally to a word inside the seal. That is why (24) is not equivalent to 'Maggie is neither patriotic nor quixotic'. Burton-Roberts claims that the sealing-off effect also explains why (25) (from Burton-Roberts 1989a) cannot undergo the double negation inference rule:

(25) Max isn't not very tall, he's a dwarf.

The negative clause in (25) does not mean that Max is very tall. According to Burton-Roberts, in (25), 'not very tall' is mentioned and sealed off from another 'not' outside the seal, so the double negation rule is not applicable.

This analysis runs into a problem, in that not all metalinguistic negations descriptively interpreted are contradictory with the following correction clause. First, there may be no follow-up correction clause, and hence no contradiction. Consider (26):

(26) [After proceeding just one mile in two hours, a driver sees a road sign which reads 'ROADWORKS AHEAD, DELAYS POSSIBLE' and says]
Delays are not POSSible.

In (26), the negation may not mean that delays are impossible in this situation: it can be interpreted metalinguistically, meaning that 'possible' is not strong enough to describe the terrible delay caused by the roadworks. Here, there is no correction clause; hence no semantic contradiction. In the absence of semantic contradiction, there should be no pragmatic reanalysis on Burton-Roberts' account. His account cannot deal with this case.

Moreover, not all correction clauses contradict the preceding negative clause. Consider (27):

(27) (during a wedding ceremony)

Bridegroom: I will take Miss Daisy as my awful wedded wife.

(adapted from film *Four Weddings and A Funeral*)

Audience member: No, she is not your awful wife, she is your lawful wife.

The negation in (27) can in principle be interpreted as either descriptive or metalinguistic. However, considering that it is the middle of a wedding ceremony, where 'awful wedded wife' is not supposed to be uttered, it is more likely that the bridegroom made a slip of the tongue and the negation was made to correct the linguistic form. This is a case of metalinguistic negation in the sense that the negation operates on the linguistic form, rather than on a proposition. However, on Burton-Roberts' account, it will not be reinterpreted as metalinguistic, since there is no semantic contradiction between the negative clause and the following correction clause. Then his account cannot deal with this type of negation.

Further evidence can be found in Carston (1996: 315), which gives some excellent arguments against Burton-Roberts' semantic contradiction. One involves pragmatic enrichment. Consider (28):

(28) a. They didn't fall in love and get married; they got married and fell in love.

b. *Semantics*: not [P and Q]; Q and P

c. *First pass pragmatic processing*: not [P and then Q]; Q and then P

In (28), (a) is a typical metalinguistic negation. According to Carston, it involves pragmatic enrichment at the level of the proposition expressed by the utterance. By the time the hearer reaches the end of the first clause, he will have enriched the conjunction to include a specification of temporal sequence, as in 'not [P and then Q]'. As a consequence, the subsequent processing of the follow-up clause will not induce a contradiction of the first clause, as can be seen in (c). Hence no semantic contradiction arises.

Another problem is that Burton-Roberts does not say anything about mentioning a form. He says:

> 'The use of negation described above [i.e. metalinguistic negation] involves a special case of mention, namely (semi-) quotation. In characterising quotation as a special case of mention, I mean that quotation involves the mention of a proposition but more specifically, mention of one that actually has been used in the discourse context.' (Square brackets mine) (1989a: 257, fn. 6)[6]

However, what is involved in metalinguistic negation is not a proposition, but a linguistic expression or form, at least in most cases. Consider (29):

(29) I didn't eat tom[eiDouz], I ate tom[a:touz].

According to Burton-Roberts, pronunciation is immaterial to semantics, hence (29) is contradictory on a first pass: 'not [I ate tomatoes]; [I ate tomatoes]'. The hearer then reanalyses the negated material as mentioned, as in (30):

(30) not ['I ate tomatoes'], [I ate tomatoes]

On Burton-Roberts' account, (30) should not be a contradiction, because the negated proposition is logically sealed off from its immediate (intra-sentential) linguistic context. I doubt that (30) adequately represents the propositional content of (29). I think that when a linguistic rather than conceptual representation is involved, it should be included in the propositional form of the negation. For this to be possible, mention of linguistic forms must be able to contribute to truth conditions. The fact is that by mentioning propositions as Burton-Robert understands them, we cannot object to any of non-propositional aspects of an utterance. In the terms developed in chapter 2, Burton-Roberts treats metalinguistic negation as a case of interpretive use, involving sharing of logical or propositional content. I maintain that a satisfactory

[6] Burton-Roberts (1989a) comments that Sperber and Wilson (1981) is relevant here: their analysis of irony involves mentioning a proposition with a dissociative attitude. See Chapter 2, section 2.5.1.

analysis of metalinguistic negation must involve my notion of metalinguistic use, i.e. sharing of linguistic (or more generally formal or perceptual) properties. I will take up this point in more detail in section 3.4.1.

3.2.1.3 Problems with standard accounts

I have looked in the previous sections at approaches which treat 'not' as a metalinguistic operator. Horn (1989: chapter 6) claims that this negative operator can be used metalinguistically when the utterance is used to object to non-truth-conditional aspects (e.g. implicatures) or linguistic properties of a previous utterance; Burton-Roberts claims that 'not' is pragmatically interpreted as metalinguistic when there is a semantic contradiction between the negative clause understood descriptively and its following correction clause. In this subsection, I would like to add two further points to the problems presented in these sections.[7]

First, all the functions ascribed to metalinguistic negation can be achieved without the use of 'not', as in (31):

(31) A: Would you like some tom[eiDouz]?
B1: I'd rather have some tom[a:touz].
B2: I'd prefer tom[a:touz].

On a non-metalinguistic reading, the proposition expressed by (B1), 'I'd rather have some tomatoes than have some tomatoes', is contradictory. But (B1) does not sound contradictory. It means something like 'I'd rather have something described as tom[a:touz] than have something described as tom[eiDouz]', where the different pronunciations seem to contribute to truth-conditional content. The same holds of (B2). We need the same analysis as in a metalinguistic negation such as 'I wouldn't

[7] I am indebted to Deirdre Wilson for these points and examples. See also Carston (1996, originally 1994: 320, 327) and Carston and Noh (1996: 491).

like some tom[eiDouz], I would like some tom[a:touz]'. Here are some more examples:

(32) A: Did you see the mongeese?
B1: I saw no mongeese, only mongooses.
B2: No, only mongooses.
B3: I didn't. I only saw mongooses.
B4: Not one. I only saw mongooses.

Horn may consider the cases of (B1) and (B2) as examples of metalinguistic negation, but 'no' is different from 'not'. In B3, there is no overt mention of 'mongeese', and the same goes for (B4). Yet it is evident that in all these examples the morphological difference between 'mongeese' and 'mongooses' plays a role in interpretation and contributes to truth-conditional content. Thus, the same metalinguistic interpretations can be achieved without the use of 'not'. It follows that what distinguishes metalinguistic from descriptive negation is not the operator 'not' itself, but the presence of metarepresented forms or contents. Further examples are given in (33):

(33) A: Have some tom[eiDouz].
B1: [mockingly] Thanks. I'd love some tom[eiDouz].
B2: Tom[eiDouz]? I'll think about it.
B3: Tom[eiDouz] sound great.
B4: Sorry, I only eat tom[a:touz].

It is therefore clear that the mocking imitation of someone else's pronunciation is not restricted to metalinguistic negation with 'not'.

Second, metalinguistic use can be combined with genuine descriptive statements, as in (34):

(34) A: Have some tom[eiDouz].

B1: I had tom[eiDouz] for lunch.

B2: I won't have those tom[eiDouz]. They look rotten.

In (34), (B1) means that he had tomatoes for lunch, and at the same time, he mentions A's pronunciation. In (B2), there is a negative morpheme and 'tom[eiDouz]' is mentioned, but this is not a case of metalinguistic negation in Horn's sense. In fact, it is a case of mixed quotation, where 'tomatoes' is used and at the same time metarepresented in form. For example, in (B2), the speaker does not want to have tomatoes, and she also alludes to A's pronunciation 'tom[eiDouz]'. (For mixed quotation, see chapter 1 and 2.)

To conclude: in metalinguistic negation, 'not' should not itself be analysed as metalinguistic, since the same functions can be achieved without the presence of 'not'. Rather, the 'not' contains within its scope a metarepresentation of content or form. I will argue in section 3.4 that the difference between ordinary descriptive negation and metalinguistic negation is precisely that metalinguistic negation has metarepresentational elements in its scope, and that 'not' is truth-functional even in metalinguistic negation.

3.2.2 Van der Sandt (1994): Denials and the echo-operator

In this section, I will discuss an alternative account of metalinguistic negation. Van der Sandt (1994) treats it as being just as truth-functional as descriptive use, and analyses the negated material as echoed from a previous utterance.

If Burton-Roberts' account takes the hearer's point of view, and pays more attention to what prompts the hearer to reanalyse a negation as metalinguistic, van der Sandt (1994) deals with metalinguistic negation from the speaker's point of view, and concentrates on what is negated and how. He draws an essential distinction between negation and denial: Negation operates on sentences, and denials apply to

utterances. This distinction is a pragmatic matter, and negation itself is truth-functional.

Denials are analysed as performing a correction operation on contextual information derived from a prior utterance: Negative denials operate on positive assertions, and positive denials on negative assertions, as in (35) - (36), from van der Sandt (1994: (4) - (5)):

(35) Mary is not happy. (as a reaction to the utterance 'Mary is happy')

(36) Mary is happy. (as a reaction to the utterance 'Mary is unhappy' or 'Mary is not happy')

As van der Sandt notes each example, (35) is a negative denial of a positive assertion, and (36) is a positive denial of a negative assertion. I will concentrate on negative denials, in which category van der Sandt places Horn's 'metalinguistic negation'.

Van der Sandt analyses denials as containing an 'echo-operator' which takes in its scope the whole informative content of a previous utterance. He comments:

> 'The obvious object to assign is the *full informative content* of the previous utterance. Since this comprises the contribution of presuppositions, implicatures and other non-truth-conditional inferences, negation may be taken to apply to the conjunction of the propositional content and all information which is conveyed by non-truth-conditional means.' (van der Sandt 1994: 6)

Depending on the grounds on which denials are made, van der Sandt classifies them into a variety of subcases: propositional denials, presuppositional denials, implicature denials, and various other kinds of denials (of conversational associations, style and register). Here are some examples from van der Sandt (1994: 4):

(37) Mary is not happy.

(38) John did not stop smoking, he never smoked.

(39) It is not possible, it is necessary that the church is right.

(40) Grandma did not kick the bucket - she passed away.

According to van der Sandt, (37), repeated from (35), is a propositional denial involving the proposition that Mary is happy. (38) is a presuppositional denial, where the presupposition that he had smoked before is denied. (39) denies the generalised conversational implicature of a previous utterance that it is not necessary that the church is right, and (40) denies the register connotations associated with 'kick the bucket'.

Let us look at his account of negative denials in more detail. Consider (41):

(41) A: It is possible that the church is right.
B: It is not possible, it is necessary that the church is right.

Van der Sandt claims that in (41), B's utterance, as a denial of A's utterance, denies the whole informative content of A's utterance, including the implicature that it is not necessary that the church is right. The denial becomes more specific given the following correction clause 'it is necessary that the church is right', which contradicts the implicature. This result accords with van der Sandt's claim that denials perform a correction operation on contextual information derived from a prior utterance. In fact, on van der Sandt's account, metalinguistic negation invariably start out by denying the whole informative content: only the following correction clause gives the clue to what it is intended to deny specifically. He does not give details of how to get to a denial of such specific information as a *presuppositional denial* or *implicature denial* without the following correction clause.

Van der Sandt argues that his account captures the fact that propositional and non-propositional denials form a natural class. Consider (42) - (44), from van der Sandt (1994: (69) - (71)):

(42) John did not eat SOME cookies (he ate them all).

(43) Mary does not STILL beat her husband (she has never beaten him).

(44) Clara does not feel UNHAPPY (she feels miserable).

Van der Sandt calls (42) - (44) propositional[8], presuppositional and implicature denial, respectively. Each contains a positive polarity item (indicated in large characters). He analyses all three cases as containing an echo-operator, which echoes the informative content of a previous utterance and blocks the triggering of negative polarity items.

On the other hand, Van der Sandt points out that propositional denials are semantically different from other denials; they allow lexical incorporation of negation and the double negation inference, as in (45) - (46):

(45) A: He is married.
B: He is not married (= He is unmarried). He is a bachelor.

(46) A: He is unmarried.
B: He is not unmarried (= He is married). He has been married for 10 years.

In (45B), lexical incorporation is possible, and in (46B), the double negation rule is applicable. Van der Sandt claims that his analysis explains why such incorporation is possible in propositional denials. On his view, in propositional denials, the informative content consists only of the propositional content of the previous

[8] (42) is generally considered as a denial of a scalar implicature (or conversational implicature) of 'some', not as a propositional denial. See Horn (1989: chapter 6).

utterance, so the content of such a denial is identical with the corresponding negative assertion. Here his echo-operator is inoperative, so rules of lexical incorporation and double negation can be applied to propositional denials as well as negative assertions. In this way, his account deals with the similarities and differences between negative assertions and propositional denials, he claims.

However, it is questionable whether the informative content of the previous utterance of a propositional denial consists only of the propositional content. Consider (47):

(47) A: The king of France is kind.
B: a. The king of France is not kind. He is ill-tempered.
b. The king of France is not kind, there is no king of France.

In (47), (a) is a propositional denial, which allows lexical incorporation as in 'The king of France is unkind', and (b) is a presuppositional denial, where the *presupposition* that there is a king of France is denied. In this presuppositional denial, lexical incorporation is not allowed. Here, it is unlikely that the single utterance (A) has different informative contents in the contexts of (a) and (b). In both cases, (A) should have a proposition, a presupposition and no doubt implicatures as its informative content. Then van der Sandt's claim that a propositional denial echoes a previous utterance whose informative content consists only of a proposition is not convincing. It follows that his account cannot explain why the echo operator is semantically inoperative in propositional denials. (I will return to this in section 3.4.1.)

Van der Sandt evaluates other theories of metalinguistic negation:

> 'none of them captures the generalisation that propositional and non-propositional denials form a natural class. Moreover none of these proposals gives any detailed information as to how the logical problems arising in the categories D (implicature denial) and E (conventional association, style, register) should be solved.' (my own parentheses) (van der Sandt 1994: 39)

However, his analysis does not appear to capture the observation that metalinguistic negation can (and typically does) involve linguistic properties such as morphology and pronunciation, as in (1) - (3) above. For van der Sandt, the informative content of an utterance consists of its propositional content and the contribution of its presuppositions, implicatures and a miscellaneous variety of connotations. No direct consideration is given to matters such as morphology and pronunciation. Moreover, these formal aspects of utterances do not generally **communicate** any informative content, even though they are available for later reference. The notion of 'informative content' is too restrictive to allow metalinguistic negations involving contents and those involving forms to be treated together.[9]

The idea that the function of metalinguistic negation is invariably to deny a previous utterance should also be questioned. Consider (48) - (49):

(48) (A: Did you find a girl to suit you at the party?)
B: No, they were all either beautiful or intelligent.
A: **Mary isn't either beautiful or intelligent, she is BOTH.** I will introduce you to her.

(49) Mary won first prize in the contest. Most contestants merely produced a series of sounds closely resembling the songs they wanted to sing. However, **Mary didn't produce sounds, she SANG.**

In (48) and (49), only part of the negative clause is taken from the previous utterance: for example, in (48A), 'either beautiful or intelligent' is taken from the previous speaker's utterance, but not 'she is'. Notice that if Mary wasn't at the party, A's utterance doesn't even implicate that Mary is either beautiful or intelligent, but not both. Similar points apply to (49). The negations in (48) and (49) are very similar

[9] In fact, various connotations of style and register or focus are inferred from the forms of a linguistic expression. For example, 'pass away' and 'kick the bucket' have the same truth-conditional contents, but the former is more polite. Van der Sandt does not show how register or focus can be included in the informative content.

to standard cases of metalinguistic negation: lexical incorporation of the negative operator 'not' is not allowed in (48), and what is negated is not the propositional content descriptively understood. These examples also present a problem for Horn's claim that metalinguistic negation is a device for objecting to a previous utterance. The negative sentences in (48) and (49) are not used to object to a previous utterance, and do not cast doubt on its assertability.

In fact, van der Sandt's analysis faces the problem that metalinguistic negation can be used even when the previous utterance is not declarative. Consider (50):

(50) A: Are you happy?
B: I'm not happy; I'm ecstatic.

In (50), B's negation is similar to standard cases of metalinguistic negation, but it is not a denial of A's utterance. In fact, it does not deny any part of the informative content of A's utterance. Thus, van der Sandt's analysis of metalinguistic negation as a denial of a previous utterance is too restrictive.

Finally, van der Sandt comments that the echo-operator has a few interesting linguistic properties, given in (51), from van der Sandt (1994: 31):

(51) A. It always requires scope over the full sentence echoed, thereby blocking lexical incorporation
B. It reverses the polarity of the sentence echoed, and
C. The echo exhibits a rising intonation contour pending further clarification, thereby stressing the offensive item or else triggering contrastive stress on the negative morpheme.

I will discuss these properties in turn.

First, van der Sandt claims that the echo-operator explains the lack of lexical incorporation in negative denials: lexical incorporation is blocked because the echo operator has scope over the full sentence (Property A). However, this account runs into a problem, in that lexical incorporation can be blocked even in non-denials.

Consider (48) again. In (48A), the negative clause is not a denial of the previous utterance, since only 'either beautiful or intelligent' is repeated from B's utterance. Assuming that Mary was not at the party, it does not deny any information entailed by (B), and the echo operator does not seem to scope over the full sentence. But negative incorporation, as in 'She is neither beautiful nor intelligent' is not possible. Van der Sandt's account does not cover this case and so misses a generalisation.

Property (B) as stated above seems to be wrongly presented, because it is claimed to explain the occurrences of positive polarity items in negative denials and negative polarity items in positive denials, as in (52) - (53), from van der Sandt (1994: (69) and (74)):

(52) John did not eat SOME cookies (he ate them all).

(53) Mary does MIND that her bunny has died (as a reaction to 'Mary doesn't mind that her bunny died').

In (52), (repeated from (42)), the negative denial contains a positive polarity item 'some', and in (53), the positive denial contains a negative polarity item 'mind'. Van der Sandt therefore claims that the echo operator reverses the polarity of the denying sentence: because of the echo-operator, (52) becomes positive, so it has a positive polarity item, and (53) becomes negative, so it has a negative polarity item. So the claim in (B) should be rewritten as 'it reverses the polarity of the echoing sentence'.

I will argue against van der Sandt's claim that the echo operator reverses the polarity of the echoing sentence. This claim appears to be correct as (52) has a positive polarity item 'some', and (53) a negative polarity item 'mind'. However, contra van der Sandt, it is obvious that the polarity of the echoing sentence throughout its entirety is not reversed. Consider (54):[10]

[10] Seuren (1990: 452) uses this example to show that negative polarity items can be used in metalinguistic negations. Chapman (1993, 1996) and Carston (1994/1996) point out that the negative polarity item 'at all' is not echoed, but is outside the echoed part.

(54) A: His car is old.

B: It isn't old **at all**. It's antique.

In (54), the negative polarity item 'at all' is used in a negative denial. If the polarity of (54B) is positive because of the echo operator, we cannot explain how the negative polarity item 'at all' is allowed in a positive polarity utterance.

Moreover, the previous utterance may be an interrogative. Consider (55):

(55) A: I heard that the king of Thailand has begun to lose his hair because of the public movement against the royal family. Has the king of France lost **any hair**?

B: The king of France has not lost **any hair**; there is no king of France.

In (55), B's negative utterance may well be considered as a presuppositional denial, but it has a negative polarity item which is echoed from A's utterance. So we cannot say the echo-operator reverses the polarity of the echoing sentence. Van der Sandt might argue that the negation in (55B) is not a denial. Then he needs another account to deal with this negation, which is presupposition-denying even if it is not a denial of a previous utterance. On his account, presupposition-cancelling cases are always negative denials, never negative assertions. Furthermore, since this property of the echo operator is applicable only to denials, van der Sandt's account misses the generalisation that not only denials but also other cases, e.g. ironies, are varieties of echo/mention in a more general sense.

Property (C) (that the rising intonation contour is a result of echoing) presents a problem in that not all denials have the rising intonation contour. In particular, propositional denials are not usually followed by a correction clause, and in those cases we do not use rising intonation. (See section 3.2.1.1 for details.) Furthermore, as noted above, rising intonation is not directly related to the echo itself but to the presence of a following parallel clause. Consider (56):

(56) a. Grandma didn't kick the bucket; she passed away.

b. Grandma didn't kick the bucket. She passed sway.

In (56b), where the follow-up clause occurs as a separate sentence, we do not use rising intonation, as we do in (56a).

To sum up: Van der Sandt analyses metalinguistic negation as denying the whole informative content of the previous utterance, which is echoed by use of the echo operator. This analysis presents a problem in that some metalinguistic negations involve linguistic properties, which do not usually belong to the informative content of an utterance, and some metalinguistic negations do not echo a previous utterance. Moreover, the alleged properties of the echo operator listed in (51) are limited either to denials or to some subset of denials. So this account misses a generalisation.

As we saw in chapter 2, the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation allows for the metarepresentation not only of public representations (e.g. utterances), but also of mental representations (e.g. unspoken thoughts) or abstract representations (e.g. sentences or propositions). Moreover, what is singled out by the metarepresentation may be formal as well as semantic or logical property. The term 'metarepresentation' thus encompasses not only the cases which previous accounts can deal with, but also those which they cannot. Carston (1994/1996) develops a relevance-theoretic approach to metalinguistic negation, suggesting that metalinguistic negation should be analysed as implicit echoic use, i.e. metarepresentation used in order to express the speaker's attitude to the original (see chapter 2, section 2.5.1). In the next section, I will introduce her account.

3.3 A Previous Relevance-Theoretic Account of Metalinguistic Negation

3.3.1. Carston (1994/1996): Implicit echoic use[11]

Carston (1994/1996) argues that Horn's alleged pragmatic ambiguity between descriptive and metalinguistic negation is in fact a semantic ambiguity between truth-functional (descriptive) and non-truth-functional (metalinguistic) negation (meaning 'I object to U'). She proposes an alternative account on which 'not' is unambiguously truth-functional, and the difference between descriptive and metalinguistic negation lies in the objects of negation; in descriptive negation, what is negated is descriptively used, while in metalinguistic negation, it is echoically used. Carston uses 'echoic use' in the sense defined in relevance theory. (See chapter 2, section 2.5.1, or Sperber and Wilson 1986/ 1995, chapter 4, sections 7 - 9; Wilson and Sperber 1992.) That is, it is a variety of interpretive or metalinguistic use crucially involving the expression of attitude to what is echoed.

Carston proposes to analyse metalinguistic negation as a case of echoic use with the speaker' attitude explicitly expressed by 'not'. Consider (57), from Carston (1996):

(57) We didn't see the hippopotamuses.
  a. We saw the rhinoceroses.
  b. We saw the hippopotami.

In (57), The negative clause followed by (a) is a standard truth-functional negation, which describes a state of affairs in the world where they didn't see a certain kind of animals. The negative clause followed by (b) is Horn's metalinguistic negation: what is focused on is the plural form 'hippopotamuses'. Carston proposes that (b) should be analysed as a case of echoic use, where 'hippopotamuses' is echoed from a previous utterance in order to communicate an objection to the plural morphology of the word. The speaker's dissociative attitude is expressed by 'not'.

[11] In this section 'implicit' is used to mean 'non-overtly indicated'.

This type of explicit dissociation is contrasted with irony, where the speaker's dissociative attitude is analysed as implicit. Consider (58):

(58) A: London is a very quiet city.
(After a few minutes, a few fire engines pass by with loud sirens.)
B: (sarcastically) London is a very quiet city.

In (58), B's utterance may be used to describe London, but more likely may be used echoically, to convey his attitude to the content. The implicitly conveyed attitude must be dissociative in (58). This is an ironical utterance. (For the relevance-theoretic account of irony, see chapter 2, section 2.5.1.2, or Wilson and Sperber 1992).

The possible targets of the echo, and so of an implicitly conveyed attitude, whether of endorsement or dissociation, are various. According to Carston,

> 'When it is a case of echoing an utterance there is a range of properties in addition to semantic or conceptual content that might be the target of the echo: linguistic factors such as phonetic, grammatical or lexical properties, aspects of dialect, register or style, and paralinguistic features such as tone of voice, pitch or other gestures, audible or visible.' (Carston 1996: 320)

This notion of echoic use allows forms as well as contents to be echoed. This contrasts with van der Sandt's account, where the 'echo-operator' takes in its scope just the informative content of a previous utterance, so that linguistic forms are not directly included.

On the other hand, as we have seen in section 3.2.1, Horn (1989) and Burton-Roberts (1989a) do not regard as metalinguistic the case of objecting to the propositional content of a previous utterance. By contrast, Carston's claim that metalinguistic negation is a type of echoic use implies that propositional contents can be negated in metalinguistic negation, since the concept of echoic use in relevance theory applies not only to non-truth-conditional properties but also to the truth-

conditional content of an utterance.[12] (As we have seen, van der Sandt (1994) also holds the view that propositions can be involved in metalinguistic negation.) In fact, anything can be echoed as long as it is a representation. Then can metalinguistic negation involve echoing of content? Consider (59), from Carston (1996: 322):

(59) X: Isn't it tiring for you to drive to work?
Y: I don't DRIVE to work; I JOG.

According to Carston, in (59), what is objected to may be the truth-conditional (conceptual) content of 'drive', or something more formal, like the use of a particular lexical item 'drive', which happens to make a truth-conditional difference. Carston adds that people are reluctant to take the first view because objecting to truth-conditional content is effectively indistinguishable from standard descriptive negation. She argues that there is a clue in (60), from Carston (1996):

(60) A: Mary is sometimes late.
B1: She isn't ever late; she is always punctual.
B2: She isn't sometimes late; she's always punctual.

According to Carston, in (60), the negative polarity item 'ever' in (B1) shows that the material in the scope of negation is descriptively used. By contrast, the positive polarity item 'sometimes' in (B2) indicates that A's utterance is being echoed, and as the correction clause shows, the truth-conditional content of the utterance is being objected to.[13] She claims that this is good evidence that metalinguistic negation may be used to object not only to non-truth-conditional aspects of a previous utterance

[12] For instance, in irony, the whole propositional content of the target utterance may be echoed. See chapter 2, section 2.5.1.

[13] I am not quite sure if, as Carston claims, (60B1) is a descriptive negation and (60B2) is a metalinguistic negation where the truth-conditional content of utterance (A) is echoed. Rather I would think that (60B1) is a denial of the propositional content of (A), and that (60B2) is a case where 'sometimes late' is metarepresented (echoed, on Carston's account) as a linguistic form. See section 3.4.1.

but also to truth-conditional contents. Carston concludes that the relevance-theoretic notion of 'echoic use' enables us to account for metalinguistic negation in a more comprehensive way.

Carston goes on to argue that in metalinguistic negation, the metarepresentation which falls in the scope of the negation operator is implicitly echoic, in the sense that it is not overtly marked as such. Consider (61), from Carston (1996):

(61) a. You didn't see two mongeese; you saw two mongooses.
b. It's not correct to say that you saw two 'mongeese', you should say 'mongooses'.

In (61b), where the verb 'say' is used, the fact of echoic use is overt, but in (61a), it needs to be inferred. Carston claims that this implicit echoic use is typical of metalinguistic negation.

As we have seen in section 3.2.1.1, Horn claims that there are two uses of the negation operator 'not': one is semantic, descriptive and truth-functional and the other is pragmatic, metalinguistic and non-truth-functional. He extends 'the duality of use' to other linguistic operators such as 'and', 'or', and 'if' (Horn 1989, 379 - 382). Carston and Noh (1996) and Carston (1998c/in press) argue against this pragmatic ambiguity of the linguistic operators. Consider (62), where the operators 'and', 'or' and 'if' appear to be non-truth-functional, because non-truth-conditional aspects such as pronunciation or connotations are involved:[14]

(62) a. Americans eat tom[eiDouz] and Brits eat tom[a:touz].
b. The army killed everyone in the village, or ethnically cleansed it.
c. If you eat tom[eiDouz], you must be from America.

Carston (1998c/in press) argues that cases such as these in (62) involve implicitly metarepresentational material. If we overtly indicate the presence of

[14] Examples in (62a, b) and (63a, b) are adapted from Carston (1998c/in press).

metarepresentational use, as in (63), it becomes clearer that these operators are truth-functional:

(63) a. Americans say they eat tom[eiDouz] and Brits say they eat tom[a:touz].
b. The army killed everyone in the village, or, according to them, 'ethnically cleansed' it.
c. If you say you eat tom[eiDouz], you must be from America.

Carston argues that in (63), it is clear that the operators 'and', 'or' and 'if' are truth-functional, but the material in their scope is metarepresentational. She concludes that there is no reason to say that in implicit metarepresentational use, the operators are non-truth-functional.

Carston (1994/1996) points out that though Horn asserts the contrary, the ambiguity he describes is really semantic. In fact, he also notes that metalinguistic negation is irreducible to the ordinary internal truth-functional operator, and does not offer any way of moving from the semantic to the pragmatic use. Carston goes on to claim that his account involves a two-fold ambiguity: (i) the negation operator is ambiguous between descriptive and metalinguistic use, and (ii) the negated material is ambiguous between a proposition and an utterance. I think that Horn finds this inevitable, because he thinks that linguistic properties and non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning cannot be truth-functionally negated and also cannot be included in the proposition expressed by an utterance. He needs a special use of negation (i.e. metalinguistic negation) on the one hand, and he needs it to apply to utterances, which can include linguistic properties and non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning on the other hand. This leads to a two-fold ambiguity. If we are to claim that negation is unambiguously truth-functional, we need to account for how those non-truth-conditional aspects and linguistic properties can be truth-functionally negated. Carston (1994/1996) and Carston and Noh (1996) give a rough idea of how it can be done by pragmatic enrichment. This idea is fully developed and illustrated in section 3.4.3.

To sum up: Carston claims that the negation operator in metalinguistic negation is itself not different from the ordinary descriptive negation operator. Both are truth-functional. What distinguishes them is the material that falls within their scope: in descriptive negation, this material is descriptively used, while in metalinguistic negation, it is echoically used. Echoic use as defined in relevance theory is a type of metarepresentation in which the speaker expresses her attitude to what is metarepresented. In metalinguistic negation, according to Carston, the speaker's attitude is explicitly expressed by 'not'.

I agree with Carston's claim that metalinguistic negation is as truth-functional as descriptive negation, and that the difference lies in the negated material. However, I do not agree that the negated part is **echoically used** in the sense defined in relevance theory. I want to argue that it is only a case of metarepresentation, without necessarily involving the speaker's attitude. I will turn to this in the next section.

3.3.2 Metalinguistic negation without echoic use

Carston's account seems to have no problem when what is echoed is a proposition and the speaker is dissociating herself because she believes it is false. But when only a part of the proposition, or an aspect of the linguistic form, is echoed, it is very difficult to claim that 'not' is truth-functional and at the same time expressive of the speaker's dissociative attitude to the echoed part. Consider (64), repeated from (48):

(64) (A: Did you find a girl to suit you at the party?)
B: No, they were all either beautiful or intelligent.
A: **Mary isn't either beautiful or intelligent; she is BOTH.** I will introduce you to her.

In (64), as we have seen above, A's utterance satisfies the diagnostics for metalinguistic negation. Here, what is taken from B's utterance is only 'either beautiful or intelligent', which may implicate 'not both'. Does this utterance express

the speaker's dissociative attitude to the phrase 'either beautiful or intelligent' in B's utterance? I think not.

Let us look at some more examples:

(65) A: The teacher used the rod of love to make us learn better.
B: He didn't use the rod of love, he simply used violence.

(66) A: The teacher used the rod of love to make us learn better.
B: But some teachers didn't use the rod of love; they simply used violence.

In (65), the utterance in (B) is a standard case of metalinguistic negation, in the sense that what is rejected is a connotation conveyed by the expression 'the rod of love', rather than the propositional content descriptively understood. Here the negation may be understood pragmatically as expressing the speaker's dissociative attitude to the attributed material. However, the same negation in (66B) does not seem to express the speaker's dissociative attitude to the attributed phrase 'the rod of love', as used by A. B may be granting that 'the rod of love' was an adequate description of the teacher referred to in A's utterance, but nonetheless denying that this description applies to other teachers. Carston might argue that 'not' semantically negates the proposition, but pragmatically expresses the speaker's attitude to the attributed material. However, there is no reason to think that the speaker is dissociating herself from the linguistic expression 'the rod of love' itself, as used by A.

In this section, I have discussed Carston's account of metalinguistic negation. I agree that metalinguistic negation involves metarepresentational use in the sense defined in relevance theory. I have, however, argued that this does not necessarily go along with an expression of the speaker's dissociative attitude to the metarepresented material. In the next section, I shall show that metalinguistic negation can be best analysed as a case where the negated material has a metarepresentational element. As metarepresentational elements need pragmatic enrichment in order to express a truth-conditional content, the truth-conditional content goes beyond the content literally expressed. This is why metalinguistic negation appears to be non-truth-functional.

3.4 Metarepresentational Use in Negation

In this section, I shall attempt to deal with metalinguistic negation using the notion of metarepresentation as defined in chapter 2. As we have seen, not only public representations (e.g. utterances), but also mental and abstract representations (e.g. thoughts and sentences or propositions) can be metarepresented. So metarepresentation is a wider notion than Burton-Roberts' 'mentioning' or van der Sandt's 'echoing'; these notions are seen as relating only **utterances**. There are two subtypes of metarepresentation: one involves resemblance in content, and is called interpretive/metaconceptual use; the other involves resemblance in form, which I am calling metalinguistic use (see chapter 2, section 2.3). Accordingly, I will call negations involving metarepresentation of form *metalinguistic negations*, and those involving metarepresentation of content *interpretive* or *metaconceptual negations*. Metalinguistic negation and interpretive negation can be collectively referred to as metarepresentational negation.

3.4.1 Varieties of metarepresentational use in negation

In previous sections, I have looked at many examples where linguistic properties of a previous utterance are metarepresented in metalinguistic negation. Recall the examples in (67) - (69), repeated from (1) - (3):

(67) I'm not happy: I'm ecstatic.

(68) I didn't paint two mouses: I painted two mice.

(69) I don't eat tom[eiDouz]: I eat tom[a:touz].

In (67) - (69), what falls within the scope of negation is a metarepresentational element singling out aspects of linguistic form: the linguistic expression 'happy', the

plural morphology 'mouses' and the pronunciation 'tom[eiDouz]'. In (67) - (69), the originals of the metarepresentations may have been used in a previous utterance, as standard accounts claim.

However, not all metalinguistic negations have a corresponding previous utterance. Consider (70) - (72):

(70) She was not a good student. **She was not sometimes late, she was always late.** I cannot write a reference for her.

(71) It is very important to teach your students to look on the bright side. See this bottle. **It is not half-empty, it is half-full.**

(72) I didn't become rich even after marrying an Englishman. The only change is that **I don't live in an apartment, I live in a flat.** Oh, where is my prince on a white horse?

The negation in (70) would generally be considered a case of metalinguistic negation, but it does not object to any previous utterance. By the same token, the negative utterances in (71) and (72) do not object to a previous affirmative utterance, but are similar in all other respects to metalinguistic negation. The notion of metarepresentation developed in chapter 2 can handle these cases. Not only an actual utterance but also a potential utterance, an assumption or an unspoken thought can be metarepresented, and their formal or semantic properties singled out. The examples in (70) - (72) are cases in point. In (70), for instance, the negative clause might be seen as metarepresenting and rejecting the potential admission that she was sometimes late, or the reader's suspicion that she was sometimes late. In (71) - (72), 'half-empty' and 'apartment' are used to metarepresent words or thoughts attributed to a group of people, which can also be metarepresented. These examples present a problem for Horn, Burton-Roberts, and van der Sandt, precisely because they do not metarepresent a previous utterance. This is one advantage of using the relevance-

theoretic notion of metarepresentation rather than Burton-Roberts' notion of mention or van der Sandt's notion of echo.

My analysis can also generalise to cases where only part of the negative clause is metarepresentationally used. Consider (73), repeated from (64) (originally (48)):

(73) (A: Did you find a girl to suit you at the party?)
B: No, they were all either beautiful or intelligent.
A: **Mary isn't either beautiful or intelligent; she is BOTH.** I will introduce you to her.

As we have seen above, A's negative clause in (73) satisfies Horn's diagnostics for metalinguistic negation. However, what is metarepresented is only 'either beautiful or intelligent'. Moreover, it is particularly clear in this case that the negation is not used to object to a previous utterance, that is, B's utterance. We have seen that this example presents a problem for other alternative accounts. On my analysis, it is a case of metalinguistic negation: metalinguistic negation as standardly understood is the case where the whole negated proposition is metarepresentationally used, while the negation in (73) is a case where only part of the negated material is metarepresentationally used.

The notion of metalinguistic metarepresentation (i.e. metarepresentation of formal linguistic properties) can explain the so-called diagnostics for metalinguistic negation. Consider (74) - (76), repeated or adapted from (12), (13) and (25):

(74) A: Mary is sometimes late.
B: Mary is not {sometimes/*ever} late; she is always late.

(75) She is {not happy/*unhappy}, she is ecstatic.

(76) Max isn't not very tall; he is a dwarf.
=\ *Max is very tall; he is a dwarf.

As we have seen above, in (74), the positive polarity item 'sometimes' cannot be replaced with the negative polarity item 'ever' under negation. In (75), metalinguistic negation is not able to incorporate lexically; and in (76), the double negation cannot be replaced by a positive sentence. I analyse all three as cases of metalinguistic metarepresentation, i.e. representation of form rather than content. This explains why they cannot be replaced by other semantically equivalent expressions: they have been chosen not for their semantic content but for their form.

There are also cases where negation involves interpretive use, that is, metarepresentation of content rather than form. Consider (77):

(77) A: She is happy.
B: She is not happy. She has a problem with her husband these days.

In (77B), the negative clause is used to metarepresent the propositional content expressed by A's utterance. If understood this way, i.e. as having the semantic content of an attributed utterance rather than an abstract proposition as the original, there will be implications of a social or interpersonal nature, as noted above. The logical content of an attributed thought can also be metarepresented in content, as in (78):

(78) A: No more whisky. You said you have an important meeting tomorrow morning.
B: I'm not drunk. Give me another glass.

B's utterance can be interpreted as a straightforward negative assertion that he is not drunk, but it is more likely to be understood as metarepresenting and denying a thought attributed to A (that he is drunk). If so, it is a case of attributive interpretive use, and I call such negations *attributive interpretive negations*. (For a detailed illustration of the notion of interpretation, see chapter 2, section 2.3.1.)

As I have shown in chapters 1 and 2, the original of a metarepresentation can be a public, private or abstract representation. As noted above, the negative

utterances in (77) and (78) are cases of attributive metarepresentational use, where a public representation (an utterance) and a private representation (a thought) is metarepresented and attributed to some source. Wilson (1998) and Sperber (personal communication) suggest that so-called descriptive negation is a case of non-attributive interpretive use: an abstract hypothesis or assumption is metarepresented and denied. This would lead to the following general picture: negation always operates on a metarepresentation; if the original is an abstract proposition, it is a case of so-called *descriptive negation*; if the original is an attributed representation (utterance or thought), it is a case of *metarepresentational negation* - metalinguistic if the exploited resemblances are formal, and interpretive if they are semantic or conceptual. This suggestion is very interesting in that it provides a general analysis of negation. However, I will not develop it any further, leaving it to future research.

Attributive interpretive negation does not meet the diagnostics for metalinguistic negation: Lexical incorporation of negative morpheme and the double negation inference rule are applicable; also, negative polarity items can be used. (79) - (81) are illustrations:

(79) A: She is happy.
B: She is not happy (= She is unhappy). She has a problem with her husband these days.

(80) A: She is unhappy.
B: She is not unhappy (= She is happy). She is too shy to express it.

(81) A: She will want some chocolate.
B: She won't want any chocolate. She is on a diet.

In (79), lexical incorporation can take place, and in (80) the double negation rule is applicable. In (81), the negative polarity item 'any' is used. Regarding 'negative polarity items', there has been some disagreement. Van der Sandt and Carston, as we have seen above, consider that positive polarity items are used even in negation

involving a propositional denial. However as far as I can see, when a proposition is metarepresented, there is no reason not to use negative polarity items. The diagnostics for metalinguistic negation do not apply to interpretive negation where an attributed proposition is metarepresented.

Metarepresentation as defined in relevance theory can not only deal with a wider range of metalinguistic negations than alternative accounts but also explains the diagnostics for metalinguistic negation. In the next section, I will look at the alleged property of metalinguistic negation that it can be used to object to a previous utterance on 'any grounds whatever'. I will argue that metalinguistic negation operates on its own clause, not on a (previous) utterance, though it may pragmatically give rise to cognitive effects involving that utterance.

3.4.2. The grounds for using metalinguistic negation

I have agreed with Carston (1994/1996) that metalinguistic negation is also truth-functional. It follows that metalinguistic negation negates a proposition expressed by the clause in which it is used. I shall argue in this section that metalinguistic negation applies only to the clause in which it occurs; in the next section, I shall argue that it negates the propositional content of that clause, which will support my claim that metalinguistic negation is truth-functional. The difference from ordinary descriptive negation is, as I mentioned above, that the negated clause has a metarepresentational element, which contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in a different way from descriptive negation.

Horn (1989) claims that the ground for using metalinguistic negation can be any aspect whatever of the previous utterance:

> 'While two distinct uses of sentential negation must indeed be admitted, the marked, nondescriptive variety is not a truth-functional or semantic operator on propositions, but rather an instance of the phenomenon of METALINGUISTIC NEGATION - a device for objecting to a previous

> utterance on any grounds whatever - including the conventional or conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization.' (Horn 1989: 363)

However, some aspects of a previous utterance seem to be excluded, despite the generality of this claim. Chapman (1993, 1996) makes some nice observations about them. According to Chapman, Grice's *particularized conversational implicatures* cannot be negated in metalinguistic negation. Consider (82), from Chapman (1993, 1996), originally from Grice (1975):

(82) A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.

According to Grice, B's utterance implicates that Smith has, or may have, a girl friend in New York. This implicature cannot be rejected in metalinguistic negation:

(83) !He hasn't been paying a lot of visits to New York lately; he's been paying a lot of visits there in order to see his accountant.

(83) sounds contradictory, and the contradiction cannot be resolved by pragmatic reanalysis of the negation as metalinguistic negation.

Sentence accent (as opposed to word stress) cannot be rejected in metalinguistic negation, either. Consider (84) - (85), from Chapman (1996):

(84) !He didn't make you feel GUILTY; he made you FEEL guilty.

(85) !We don't also buy QUALITY cars; we also BUY quality cars.

According to Chapman, the utterances in (84) and (85) can be used to deny the presuppositions arising from the different sentence accents, as Horn (1989: 403) also notes, but they are not acceptable as objections to a misplaced sentence accent.

Based on these observations, Chapman claims that only linguistic expressions can constitute the grounds for using metalinguistic negation:

> 'This suggests that metalinguistic negation can be used to object only to those aspects of a previous utterance which relate directly to the linguistic expression used. **It cannot be used to object to properties of the previous utterance which are non-linguistic, or entirely dependent on context.**' (my emphasis) (Chapman 1996: 397)

Then why is it that some of these aspects can be objected to, while others cannot? My relevance-theoretic account can explain why.

Metalinguistic negation can apply only to material in its own clause. Sentence accent is a formal property involving an utterance as a whole, which cannot be metarepresented in the negative clause because the form is broken up by 'not'. If the whole utterance is metarepresentationally used, as in (86) - (87), sentence accent can be singled out:

(86) It's not 'He made you feel GUILTY', 'He made you FEEL guilty'.

(87) Not 'He made you feel GUILTY', 'He made you FEEL guilty'.

In (86) - (87), where the whole utterance is metarepresented, sentence accent can be negated.

Grice's *particularized conversational implicatures*, which are inferred from a union of context and utterance, cannot be incorporated into another utterance, and metarepresented in their own right. It follows that they cannot fall within the scope of metalinguistic negation. By contrast, generalised implicatures based on a single word/phrase can fall within the scope of metalinguistic negation, because they are carried by the metarepresented word/phrase. Example (64) above is an illustration.

Finally, contra Chapman, non-linguistic representations can also be involved in metalinguistic negation. In section 3.2.1, I discussed some examples. Horn's piano playing case is one of them. Another is (88), modified from (23):

(88) [In court, a lawyer is defending his client.]
A: I heard two shots BANG-BANG.
B: You didn't hear BANG-BANG; you heard BANG (ten seconds' interval) BANG.

B is asserting that the two shots were fired with a ten second interval. Here, B's utterance is surely a metalinguistic negation in Horn's sense, but what is negated is not a linguistic expression.[15] Chapman's (1993,1996) claim that only linguistic expressions can be negated in metalinguistic negation is too restrictive to deal with these cases. In chapters 1 and 2, I have shown that my relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation can deal with metarepresentation of nonlinguistic representations, too.

In this section, I have argued that whether metalinguistic negation is used pragmatically to object to a previous utterance or not, it operates over its own clause: only those aspects that are metarepresented in the negative clause can be negated. In the next subsection, I will argue that metarepresentational elements in the negative clause may contribute to the proposition it expresses. Metalinguistic negation operates in the same way as descriptive negation, the only difference being that the metarepresented part contributes differently to truth conditions. This is possible in the relevance-theoretic framework, in which pragmatics plays an important role in deriving truth-conditional content. The problem is what and how the metarepresented part contributes to the propositional content of the negation. I will turn to this in the next section.

[15] There is room for dispute about the definition of 'linguistic'. Nonetheless, the time between the two BANGs is surely not linguistic in any sense.

3.4.3 Truth-conditional content of metalinguistic negation

Carston's analysis of metalinguistic negation as implicit echoic use leaves unanswered the question of 'how (if at all) the implicitly echoed/quoted material within the negation is pragmatically unpacked into an explicit representation by the hearer/reader' (Carston 1996: 327). I shall attempt to develop such an account, which will involve some revision of Carston's original proposals.

I have suggested that metalinguistic (and more generally metarepresentational) negation is a case of truth-functional negation where (part of) the material in the scope of negation is metarepresentationally used. It follows that metalinguistic negation must operate on a proposition. What is the truth-conditional content of the resulting utterance, and how is it identified? I would like to argue that the metarepresentational element needs pragmatic enrichment in order to have a determinate truth-conditional content. Suitably enriched with a descriptive comment indicating how it is to function, even a phonetic or perceptual representation can be incorporated into a propositional form (see chapter 2, section 2.3.3).

Consider (89):

(89) A: I bought tom[eiDouz].
B: You didn't buy tom[eiDouz], you bought tom[a:touz].

The logical form of B's negative clause may be something like (90a), which undergoes pragmatic enrichment to produce something like (90b):

(90) a. not [you bought 'tom[eiDouz]'], you bought 'tom[a:touz]'
b. not [you bought what is properly called tom[eiDouz]],
[you bought what is properly called tom[a:touz]]

(90b) expresses a fairly determinate proposition, with its own truth conditions (the only element of indeterminacy being in how closely the phonetic form resembles the original it is supposed to represent). By embedding the phonetic representation

'tom[eɪDouz]' into the descriptive expression 'what is properly called', the incomplete (90a) is converted into a legitimate case of mention, and can be assigned truth conditions accordingly.

While the contents of metalinguistic negation clauses themselves have been much debated, there has been little discussion of the following correction clauses. In (89B), the clause 'you bought "tom[a:touz]"' communicates that A bought tomatoes, and also indicates that the correct pronunciation is tom[a:touz]. It is odd to interpret the correction clause as conveying only 'you bought tomatoes'. This is not a correction at all, since A has just asserted exactly the same proposition. My claim is that just as 'tom[eiDouz]' is metalinguistically used in the negative clause, so 'tom[a:touz]' in the correction clause is metalinguistically used. As we have seen in chapter 2, metarepresentation is not limited to attributed cases, but also takes abstract representations as originals. Those who claim that the negative operator 'not' is metalinguistically used in metalinguistic negation cannot deal with the metalinguistic property of the correction clause, where there is no negative operator. This supports my argument that metalinguistic use can occur in simple clauses with no 'metalinguistic' operator.

Seuren (1990) proposes a similar structure for metalinguistic negation proper (i.e. involving linguistic properties). Consider (91) - (92), where (92) is a semantic analysis of (91), from Seuren (1990: 444):

(91) I didn't trap two mongeese, I trapped two mongooses.

(92) Not [the x [such that '*I trapped two x*' is properly said] is '*mongeese*'];
the x [such that '*I trapped two x*' is properly said] is '*mongooses*'].

According to Seuren, (91) has contrastive accent on *mongeese* and *mongooses*, which is a sign of a semantically underlying cleft form, with the general structure *'the x [such that ... x] be NP'*, as in (92). After undergoing certain lowering and deletion rules, (92) comes to have the surface form in (91).

Seuren's account implies that metalinguistic negation proper uses contrastive accent on both the offending item and the correcting one. As noted in section 3.2.2, metalinguistic negation does not necessarily have contrastive accent. Thus, in (91) above, the speaker can put stress on 'didn't' rather than on 'mongeese', for a garden-pathing effect. Furthermore, not all contrastive negations are cases of metalinguistic negation. Consider (93):

(93) I didn't trap two mongooses, I trapped two rabbits.

The negation in (93) may have contrastive accent and might be assigned the semantic analysis in (94), parallel to that in (92):

(94) not [the x [such that '*I trapped two x*' is properly said] is '*mongooses*'];
the x [such that '*I trapped two x*' is properly said] is '*rabbits*']

However, it is not clear if 'properly said' can be attached here. If it can, there is no distinction between descriptive contrastive negation, as in (93), and metalinguistic negation, as in (91). As I understand it, this is what Seuren wants to claim. But (91) and (93) are very different: In (91), the speaker trapped mongooses, but in (93), she did not. Understood in this way, Seuren's account does not distinguish between 'x is not properly said because of its morphology' and 'x is not properly said because it is false'.

Seuren might want to claim that 'properly said' is associated only with metalinguistic negation, and should not occur in (94). This is how Burton-Roberts (1990) understands Seuren. According to Burton-Roberts, Seuren's analysis implies that 'I trapped two mongooses' is ambiguous between 'I trapped two mongooses' and 'the x [such that "*I trapped two x*" is properly said] is "*mongooses*"'. If this were so, Burton-Roberts claims, it would follow that 'I trapped two mongooses' was indefinitely many ways ambiguous; not only 'properly said' but also 'properly spelt', or 'properly pronounced', would be needed. Whether or not Burton-Roberts is right, my analysis does not run into this problem, because the additional truth-conditional

content is not semantically but pragmatically derived. Pragmatically enriched meanings are not of course semantically ambiguous. Moreover, according to the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy, they should be constructed only where necessary to satisfy the hearer's expectation of relevance, and are thus very severely constrained.

Carston (1996/1994) proposes a similar representation to Seuren's semantic analysis. Consider (95) - (96):

(95) Her dissertation is not eSOTeric; it's esoTERic.

(96) Not [the correct pronunciation of the word x in 'her dissertation is x' is 'eSOTeric']; the correct pronunciation of the word x in 'her dissertation is x' is 'esoTERic'.

On Carston's analysis, this representation is derived pragmatically, so it does not involve the problem of semantic ambiguity that Seuren's runs into. But it has one minor effect which is the same as Seuren's. In (96), the semantic structure means that in 'her dissertation is x', x should be correctly pronounced as 'eSOTeric'. Her analysis does not say that 'esoteric' should be pronounced as 'esoTERic', but that x in 'her dissertation is x' should be pronounced as 'esoTERic'. It seems better to supply the value for 'x', as in (97a), or perhaps, more simply, as in (97b):

(97) a. Not [the correct pronunciation of the word 'esoteric' in 'her dissertation is esoteric' is 'eSOTeric']; the correct pronunciation of the word 'esoteric' in 'her dissertation is esoteric' is 'esoTERic'.

b. Not [her dissertation is correctly described using the pronunciation 'eSOTeric']; her dissertation is correctly described using the pronunciation 'esoTERic'.

There are some examples which can be explained by my account, but not by Seuren's. Consider (98):

(98) A: Did you talk to the pretty girl at the party?
B: The 'pretty girl' was not pretty. Her makeup deceived us.

Not only does B's utterance have no contrastive stress, but it is also not semantically equivalent to a cleft. So it does not have the semantic analysis given by Seuren in (92). However, the negative clause is not purely descriptive. The phrase 'pretty girl' in A's utterance is metarepresented in B's. In that case, it needs pragmatic enrichment to indicate the attributive use. It will convey something like 'The one who you call a "pretty girl" was not pretty'. Such cases occur very often. Consider (99):

(99) A: The first floor is not the first floor, it's the second floor.
B: Oh, now I remember that the first floor is the ground floor in London.

In (99), A's utterance, literally understood, sounds contradictory, but it has another interpretation. Suppose two Americans get in a lift in London. B presses the button numbered '1' to get to the ground floor (which corresponds to 'the first floor' in America). The first occurrence 'the first floor' in A's negative clause is likely to be understood as metarepresenting 'the first floor' in British English. The propositional meaning should include an attribution like (100a), not (100b):

(100) a. not [the floor that the English call 'the first floor' is the first floor]
b.*not [the floor that is properly called 'the first floor' is the first floor]

It is only after pragmatic enrichment of the metarepresentationally used material that we obtain the correct truth-conditional content, which is no longer contradictory. Metalinguistic negation as standardly understood is a subtype of this sort of case, with a combination of 'not' and metarepresentation. Without the pragmatic enrichment, the metalinguistic negation appears to be non-truth-functional.

Finally, Deirdre Wilson has pointed out that pure cases of mention can also be analysed using the same account. Consider (101):

(101) Not all banks are river banks.

The word 'bank' is ambiguous, and would normally be disambiguated as part of the comprehension process. In (101), though, disambiguation would yield either the falsehood 'not all (river) banks are river banks' or the trivial truth 'not all (financial) banks are river banks'. The correct interpretation must involve a metarepresentational element: the word 'bank' must be mentioned rather than used. In this case, what is metarepresented is neither an attributed utterance nor an attributed thought. (101) is not a case of metalinguistic negation as standardly understood. It does not object to a previous utterance, and does not question the appropriateness of using a word. Instead, the word 'banks' in a non-attributed utterance is mentioned, and (101) needs pragmatic enrichment as in (102):

(102) Not all things called 'banks' are river banks.

Examples (98B), (99A), and (101) above are cases where only a part of the negative clause is metarepresentationally used, from an attributed utterance, from an non-attributed utterance in another dialect (if British English can be called another dialect of English), and from a non-attributed utterance in the same language, respectively. All these go beyond the standard cases of 'properly saying' discussed by Seuren, but are handled naturally on my account.

To sum up: I have analysed 'metalinguistic negation' as involving metarepresentations of form or content (or both). The metarepresentationally used constituent needs to be pragmatically enriched in order to determine the truth-conditional content of the utterance. In consequence, a negative clause involving metarepresentation of formal linguistic properties need not contradict its follow-up correction clause, because the metarepresented forms contribute differently to truth-conditional content. Metalinguistic negation and descriptive negation are both truth-

functional: both negate a proposition. Descriptive negation is the case where every constituent of the proposition is descriptively used, while metalinguistic negation negates a proposition which contains a metarepresentational element that has undergone pragmatic enrichment.

3.5 Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed previous accounts of metalinguistic negation. Since Horn (1985, 1989: chapter 6), many attempts have been made to account for metalinguistic negation, notably by Burton-Roberts (1989a) and van der Sandt (1994). These analyse metalinguistic negation as mentioning or echoing a previous utterance. I have argued that metalinguistic negation is available even when there is no previous utterance.

Carston (1994/1996) claims that the negation operator as used in metalinguistic negation is truth-functional, as it is in descriptive negation. She analyses metalinguistic negation as involving the metarepresentation of another representation, with the speaker's dissociative attitude expressed by 'not'. This qualifies as echoic use as defined in relevance theory. Since echoic use as defined in relevance theory covers a wider range of data than previous definitions, this account is more comprehensive than previous accounts.

I have agreed with Carston that metalinguistic negation is truth-functional in the same way as descriptive negation, but I have questioned her view of 'not' as expressing the speaker's attitude to the original of the echoed material, because in some cases only part of the negated material is metarepresentational, on the original of which the speaker's dissociative attitude may have no bearing. What is essential in metalinguistic negation is that it contains an attributive metarepresentational element, which needs to be pragmatically enriched. The notion of metarepresentation as defined in relevance theory need not be echoic.

I have also distinguished metarepresentational negation into two subtypes - *metalinguistic negation* and *interpretive negation* -, depending on what kind of

property is singled out. I have argued that my relevance-theoretic metarepresentational account can deal with a wider range of data and avoid some of the problems of previous accounts. I have tried to show that 'metalinguistic negation' is truth-functional and operates on a pragmatically enriched truth-conditional content: the metarepresented part needs to be pragmatically enriched before the truth-conditional content is determined. Relevance theory thus sheds new light on the analysis of metalinguistic negation. In the next chapter, I will discuss echo questions in terms of the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation, and argue that echo questions can also be best analysed as cases of metarepresentational use.

Appendix to Chapter 3:

Metalinguistic Negation in Korean

3A. 1 Introduction

The view that metalinguistic negation is as truth-functional as descriptive negation would be considerably undermined if we were to find a language which had two linguistic forms for sentence negation, such that one was used exclusively for cases of descriptive negation, and so was truth-functional, and the other was inherently metalinguistic and was translated literally as: 'I object to your utterance ... on such and such grounds'. I know of no language for which this has been claimed, at least not as straightforwardly as this. However, when a language does have two ways of expressing negation, it is often observed that one form is standardly used for descriptive negation and the other for metalinguistic (or, more widely speaking, metarepresentational) negation. Korean is a case in point. Korean has two main ways of forming negative sentences: a short form and a long form, shown in (1) and exemplified in (2):[1]

(1) Short form: *an(i)*-verb

Long form: verb-*ci an(i)-(h)a*-suffixes

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[1] In transcribing the Korean examples, I use the Yale Romanisation system with glosses based on Sohn's (1994) approach. The abbreviations used in the glosses are:

AC: accusative case particle;	DC: declarative sentence-type suffix;
IN: indicative mood suffix;	NM: nominative case particle;
NOM: nominaliser suffix;	PST: past tense suffix;
Q: interrogative marker;	QT: quotative particle;
SH: subject honorific suffix;	TOP: topic marker.

(2) a. ku-nun ttena-ss-ta. 'He left.'
he-TOP leave-PST-DC

b. ku-nun **an** ttena-ss-ta. 'He didn't leave.'
he-TOP **not** leave-PST-DC

c. ku-nun ttena-**ci** **an-a**-ss-ta. 'He didn't leave.'
he-TOP leave-NOM **not**-do-PST-DC

In the short form, the negative particle 'an' or 'ani' is placed before the verbal element, and in the long form, it is placed after the verbal stem which has been suffixed by the nominaliser 'ci' and is attached to the main verb 'ha', which can be translated as 'do, be in the state of'. Some authors (e.g. Choi 1985, 1989; Horn 1985, 1989: chapter 6; Kim 1991) have claimed that the short form is exclusively used for descriptive negation and Horn (1985, 1989: chapter 6) has suggested that the long form, while able to occur with either descriptive or echoed material in its scope, tends to favour the metalinguistic reading. I will consider these two points in turn.

3A. 2 The short-form negation

The short-form negation is said to be used only descriptively. If this is right, my account runs into a problem, since according to this account, a negation operator should be able to take either descriptive or metarepresentational material, or both descriptive and metarepresentational material together, in its scope. Yoon (1994) has claimed that the short form 'an' operates syntactically like a prefix on the verb. If he is right, this would account for its restriction to descriptive use, since this would appear to be a perfectively general property of (bound) affixes. They combine with word stems to form a new word which functions as a single unit at a particular

representational level, either wholly descriptive or wholly metarepresentational, but not split level.

Yoon has some evidence to support his morphological analysis. First, the short form cannot be used as the second occurrence of a negative in a double negation; there the long form **must** be used, as shown in (3); this is exactly parallel with the behaviour of prefixal as opposed to free-form negation in English, exemplified in (4):

(3) a. Mina-nun pap-ul **an** mek-ci **an**-a-ss-ta.
Mina-TOP meal-AC **not**(S) eat-NOM **not**(L)-do-PST-DC
'Mina **didn't not** have a meal.'

b. Mina-nun pap-ul mek-ci **ani**-ha-ci **an**-a-ss-ta.
Mina-TOP meal-AC eat-NOM **not**(L)-do-NOM **not**(L)-do-PST-DC
'Mina **didn't not** have a meal.'

c. *Mina-nun pap-ul **an** **an** mek-ess-ta.
Mina-TOP meal-AC **not**(S) **not**(S) eat-PST-DC
'Mina **didn't not** have a meal.'

[L: long form, S: short form]

(4) a. It isn't untrue ...
b. It isn't not true ...
c. *It's un-untrue ...

Second, Yoon points out that while the long-form negation licenses negative polarity items, as we would expect of a negation operator, the short form does not. This is shown in (5), where the negative polarity item 'yekan' gives an ungrammatical sentence. This is what we would expect if the short form 'an' is functioning like a prefix. Consider the comparable data from English in (6), where the negative polarity

item 'at all' is triggered by the negation operator 'not' but not by the negative prefix 'im'):

(5) a. *Swuni-nun **yekan** **an** yeyppu-ta.
Swuni-TOP **ordinarily** **not** pretty-(be)-DC

b. Swuni-nun **yekan** yeyppu-ci **an**-h-ta.
Swuni-TOP **ordinarily** pretty-NOM **not**-be-DC

'Swuni is not ordinarily pretty.' (Yoon 1994)

(6) a. *It is improbable at all that ...
b. It is not at all probable that ...

This looks like a neat explanation: the short form is a negative prefix, therefore it cannot take metarepresented material in its scope.

However, I would take issue with both parts of this story: first, 'an' is not in fact a prefix, and, second, although there is a preference for descriptive use, I claim that the short form can, after all, be used for metalinguistic negation. Yoon (1994) ignores the fact that 'an' is simply not a bound morpheme - it is free from the following verb. Furthermore, his apparent evidence for the prefix-like nature of 'an' is open to a different sort of interpretation. I would claim that the double-negation example in (3c) is not in fact ungrammatical but is stylistically infelicitous and is avoided for that reason. The asterisk should be replaced by a milder indicator of unacceptability. The discomfort comes from the use of the identical forms side by side; this may arise to some extent in English too, unless one of the forms is given special emphasis and/or involves the metarepresentational use of one of the repeated forms:

(7) ?I do not not love you.

As for the claim that 'an' cannot license negative polarity items, it is just false, as the following examples from Sohn (1994: 134) show:

(8) a. na-nun **kyelkho** ku kos-ey **an** ka-ss-ta.
I-TOP **by any means** that place-to **not**(S) go-PST-DC
'I didn't go there by any means.'

b. na-nun Pwusan-ey **comchelem** **an** ka-n-ta.
I-TOP Pwusan-to **often** **not**(S) go-IN-DC
'I seldom go to Pwusan.'

Both the negative polarity items 'kyelkho' and 'comchelem' are licensed here by the short-form negation 'an'. According to the intuitions of some native speakers of Korean whom I have consulted, (5a) is, *pace* Yoon, also acceptable, with the negative polarity item 'yekan' licensed by 'an'.[2] Some of them do feel that (5b) is marginally preferable; if this proves to be a robust intuition, it does need to be explained, and may be yet another case of a stylistic intuition being mistaken for a grammatical one.

Finally, there are cases where 'an' simply cannot be taken to be targeting the verb, and must be given a wider scope interpretation:

(9) A: cha-ka kapcaki se-ss-ta.
car-NM suddenly stop-PST-DC
'The car stopped suddenly.'

B: cha-ka kapcaki **an** se-ss-ta.
car-NM suddenly **not** stop-PST-DC
'The car did**n't** stop suddenly.'

[2] I thank Professor Chung-Min Lee for helping me with the grammaticality of (5a).

Here, B's response cannot be taken as a descriptive verbal negation, since this would force the adverb to take scope over 'not stop', giving the very odd concept of suddenly not stopping. Now if 'an' were a prefix, this example should simply be found unacceptable or very odd, but there is a perfectly acceptable interpretation whereby the 'an' is understood as having wider scope, so that what is denied is that the stopping was sudden. In sum, it seems very clear that there is no evidence that 'an' functions like a prefix, so this cannot be the explanation for the apparent restriction on the way 'an' is used.

Instead of looking for some other explanation for the alleged inability of 'an' to function as metalinguistic or metarepresentational negation, I take issue with this point: there is no such restriction to be explained. When provided with an appropriate context, such as a preceding positive utterance from which something is apparently metarepresented within the following negative utterance, the short-form negation can be understood as having scope over metarepresented material. The example in (9) is such a case; as just mentioned, 'an' may be taken there as a wide-scope descriptive negation, but probably the most natural interpretation is that B is metarepresenting A's utterance and objecting to his use of the adverb 'kapcaki'. This is made even clearer in (10) - (12), which are instances of the standard sort of metalinguistic cases cited by Horn, and which are perfectly interpretable and acceptable cases of the short-form negation:

(10) A: ku-nun ku mwuncey-lul kyewu phwul-ess-tay.
he-TOP the problem-AC barely solve-PST-is said
'It is said that he managed to solve the problem.'

B: ku-nun ku mwuncey-lul kyewu **an** phwul-ess-e. Swiwe-ss-tay.
he-TOP the problem-AC barely **not** solve-PST-DC easy-PST-is said
'He didn't manage to solve the problem. He said it was easy.'

(11) A: emma pap mek-ess-e?
mum(NM) meal(AC) eat-PST-Q
'Has mum had a meal?'

B: pap **an** mek-ko, cinci tu-si-ess-ta.
meal(AC) **not** eat-and, meal(hon) eat(hon)-SH-PST-DC
'She didn't have a meal, she ate(honorific) dinner(honorific).'

In most of these short-form cases, there is quite a strong garden-pathing effect: the first interpretation accessed would most likely be the descriptive understanding, and only under the impact of the contradiction or irrelevance derived after processing the follow-up clause would a reanalysis be made, resulting in the metalinguistic negation. So the use of the short form rather than the long form in these cases is probably more rhetorically effective, that is, requires more processing effort and achieves a range of compensatory effects, as relevance theory would predict. It might be chosen on a particular occasion for just this purpose.

There is a final very strong piece of evidence we can bring to bear that short-form negation can be metalinguistic. The copula in Korean *i-ta* 'be-DC', can only be negated by the short form,[3] so (12b) with the long form is ungrammatical.

(12) a. na-nun sensayng-i **an**-i-ta.
I-TOP teacher-NM **not**-be-DC
'I am not a teacher.'

b. *na-nun sensayng-i-**ci** **an-h**-ta.
I-TOP teacher-be-NOM not-be-DC
'I am not a teacher.'

[3] Sohn (1994: 132 - 133) comments, 'the copula, which belongs to adjectives in Korean, is not acceptable in long forms'.

The copular predicate may be understood as metarepresentational, and in that case, the short form 'an' functions as a metalinguistic negation:

(13) A: ku salam neuy sensayng i-ci?
that man your teacher be-Q
'Is he your teacher?'

B: ku salam-un nauy sensayng-i **an**-i-ko sensayngnim-i-si-ta.
that man-TOP my teacher-NM **not**-be-and teacher(hon)-be-SH-DC
'He is not my teacher, he is(honorific) my teacher(honorific).'

Here, B is objecting to A's use of one form and correcting it with the honorific form, which is truth-conditionally equivalent. The result is clearly metarepresentational, despite the occurrence of the short-form negation.

3A. 3 The long-form negation

I have made a strong case against the short form being a verbal prefix and against it being restricted to descriptive use. I will now move to the second main claim about Korean negation, which concerns the alleged preference for a metalinguistic understanding when the long form is used. There is no doubt that this form *can* take metarepresentationally used material in its scope; the examples of metalinguistic negation above in (9) - (10) could all certainly have been expressed using the long-form negation, but, as Kim (1991) says, it is just as often used descriptively.

Horn (1989: 441) makes the tentative suggestion that **if** the decision to use the long form is often interpreted metalinguistically (rather than descriptively) in those contexts which would have also permitted a short form, this may be explained pragmatically, in terms of 'least effort' factors. However, he gives no worked-out account of the considerations involved. The idea translates nicely into relevance-theoretic terms, in that when there are two semantically equivalent forms, one of

which demands more processing effort of a hearer, the speaker's choice of the more effort-demanding form carries with it a presumption of extra, or at least different, effects from those that would have been achieved by use of the more economical form. Well-known examples of this are the contrast between simple verbs and their causative equivalents. For example, 'John caused the car to stop' generally achieves some effects that the simpler 'John stopped the car' does not. As I have shown, metarepresentational use inevitably has effects that a descriptive use does not have. Other things being equal, the descriptive use is unmarked (more accessible) and the metarepresentational use is marked (less accessible), so that, other things being equal again, we would expect the longer (linguistically more marked) form to be chosen for metarepresentational uses. In language use, linguistic markedness interacts with pragmatic factors, which affect the accessibility of interpretations, and therefore the processing effort they require of the addressee. For instance, as remarked above, when the short form is used for metalinguistic cases, as in (10) - (11), garden-pathing is very likely and extra effects are achieved as a result; in other words, use of the short form is the more costly (effort-requiring) option in this case.

With regard to this issue of the different pragmatic effects achieved by these truth-conditionally identical forms, it is of interest to note that some authors feel that when used descriptively, the long form is more emphatic (Kuno 1980) or more formal (Sohn 1994). The long form opens for possibilities not available to the short form: because the 'an' in the long form is followed by another (dummy) verb 'ha', it is more amenable to stress than the short form, and its relation to the content verb (effectively, in an embedded clause) is less direct. So in (14b), for instance, 'an' can be stressed, making the expression of dislike emphatic; or alternatively, if left unstressed, it may express a milder degree of dislike than the short form in (14a), because of its distance from the verb 'coaha'.

(14) a. na-nun ku sayngkak-ul **an** coahay-yo.
I-TOP that idea-AC **not**(S) like-DC
'I don't like the idea.'

b. na-nun ku sayngkak-ul coaha-**ci** **an**-ha-yo.
I-TOP that idea-AC like-NOM **not** (L)-do-DC
'I don't like the idea.'

The main point of this section is that the long form may be interpreted either descriptively or metalinguistically, that is, in my terms, the material within its scope may be used either descriptively or metarepresentationally; in either case it will achieve effects which the short form, used in the same context, would not achieve.

3A. 4 Summing up

I have looked at some of the facts of negation in Korean, a language unrelated to English, and found support there for my analysis: there is no negation operator in Korean which is exclusively used for descriptive negation or metalinguistic negation. The Korean data shed light on my claim, with respect to metalinguistic negation, that, semantically, there is a single unambiguous negation operator which may take within its scope either descriptive representations or attributed metarepresentations. In all cases, provided we allow for the inevitable pragmatic processes of enrichment that occur at the level of the proposition expressed, there is no reason to suppose that this is not the familiar truth-value-reversing operator. This single element of meaning happens to be encoded in two distinct linguistic forms in Korean, and as with any other pair of truth-conditionally equivalent forms, they are felt to give rise to different effects and to be appropriate or preferred in different contexts.

Chapter 4

Echo Questions

4.1 Introduction

In chapters 1 and 2, I discussed several literary and philosophical accounts of quotation, and claimed that they do not provide an adequate pragmatics for quotation. I proposed an alternative relevance-theoretic account in which quotation crucially involves a metarepresentational element; I showed how this account can be extended to a variety of cases not normally dealt with in the literature on quotation. In chapter 3, I looked at the case of metalinguistic negation. In this chapter, I will look at echo questions. My main claim will be that echo questions are like ordinary questions except for the occurrence of an additional metarepresentational element, which, as in typical cases of metalinguistic negation, involves the attribution of an utterance or thought.

The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 introduces some standard accounts of echo questions. Section 3 discusses the properties of echo questions. Section 4 compares echo questions and metalinguistic negation. Section 5 discusses Blakemore's (1994) relevance-theoretic account of echo questions and argue that echo questions are similar to ordinary interrogatives, except for the metarepresentation of an attributed utterance or thought. Section 6 is a summary and conclusion.

4.2 Standard Accounts of Echo Questions

'Echo questions' such as those in (1B1) and (1B2) are generally treated as a natural class from both linguistic and pragmatic points of view. (See Banfield (1982:124); Quirk *et al.* (1985: §11.33); Huddleston (1988: 140, 1994: 428 - 434); McCawley (1988: 720); Radford (1988: 463); Dirven (1989: §883); and Horn (1989: 381).):[1]

(1) A: I'm leaving on Tuesday.
B1: You're leaving on Tuesday?
B2: You're leaving when?

A typical analysis might assign them the following properties:

A. Echo questions are (full or partial) repetitions of a prior utterance.
B. The prior utterance may be of any syntactic type: e.g. declarative, interrogative, imperative.
C. Echo questions have more in common syntactically with these prior utterances than with related non-echoic interrogatives.

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[1] By contrast, Bolinger (1957: §7) divides repetitive questions into four types: *reclamatory* questions, in which the speaker calls for repetition of the preceding utterance or part of it, as in (i B), *ditto* questions, in which the speaker repeats his own question, as in (i A2), *echo* questions, in which the speaker repeats the other person's question, as in (ii B), and *reflex* questions, in which the speaker repeats, as a question, a part or all of the preceding non-question, as in (iii B).

(i) A1: When will Jane go to England?
B: What?
A2: When will Jane go to England?

(ii) A: Did you bring the book?
B: Did I bring the book?

(iii) A: I met Jane in the park yesterday.
B: Did you meet Jane yesterday?

D. The main function of an echo question is to clarify the form or content of the prior utterance.

I will call such analyses *standard.*[2]

Standard analyses of echo questions have the following consequences. First, while (1B1) and (1B2) qualify as echo questions, (2B1) and (2B2) do not, since there is no prior utterance (Property A):

(2) A: [A walks towards the door.]
B1: You're leaving?
B2: You're going where?

Second, not only declaratives, as in (1A), but also interrogatives, imperatives and exclamatives, as in (3) - (5), may be followed by echo questions (Property B):

(3) A: Have you read 'Great Expectations'?
B1: Have I read 'Great Expectations'?
B2: Have I read what?

(4) A: Talk to a fortune-teller.
B1: Talk to a fortune-teller?
B2: Talk to what/who?

(5) A: What a great pleasure this is!
B1: What a great pleasure this is?
B2: What a great what this is?

Echo questions can also be distinguished from other questions by their characteristic contrastive stress. This will not be discussed here.

As shown in (3) - (5), any type of sentence can be echoed. In each example, B1 repeats A's utterance as a whole, and B2 repeats A's utterance except for a constituent which is replaced by a *wh*-word.

Third, these echo questions have more in common syntactically with the prior (interrogative or non-interrogative) utterances, e.g. (1A), than they do with regular interrogatives such as (6a) and (6b) (Property C):

(6) a. Are you leaving on Tuesday?
b. When are you leaving?

Finally, the primary function of echo questions is to request clarification of the form or content of the prior utterances: for example, (1B1) might be paraphrased as asking whether the speaker said (or meant) 'I'm leaving on Tuesday', and (1B2) as asking when the speaker said (or meant) she was leaving (Property D).

In what follows, I want to argue against the standard analysis of echo questions for two main reasons. First, there is no good ground, either linguistic or pragmatic, for distinguishing 'echo questions' of the type in (1) from questions of the type in (2). The standard analysis misses this generalisation. Second, echo questions are just as much interrogatives as ordinary interrogatives, and their functions can be automatically predicted on the basis of the further fact that they involve a type of metarepresentation not present in ordinary interrogatives. I shall analyse the content of echo questions in informal terms, using the framework of relevance theory and its notions of metarepresentation and pragmatic enrichment. Continuing the argument of chapter 3, my main claim is that relevance theory can shed new light on several aspects of the analysis of echo questions

4.3 Do Echo Questions Require a Prior Utterance?

It is traditionally claimed that echo questions involve repetition of a prior utterance, of any sentence type, as can be seen in (1) and (3) - (5). In view of this, echo

questions are claimed to occur in a restricted context which must contain the echoed utterance:

> 'Echo questions are distinguished from other questions by their (restricted) context. An echo occurs in dialogue as a reaction to a prior utterance and is interpretable only with respect to it. ... Other questions may be the first or the only utterance in a discourse.' (Banfield 1982: 124)

In this section, I will argue against this claim on the ground that it misses a generalisation.

4.3.1. Echo questions without a prior utterance

Questions such as (7) - (9) are very similar to echo questions:

(7) [A French man is looking at a painting showing a bald king sitting beside a French flag. He says:]
The king of France is bald? We have no king.

(8) [Bill, who is lost in a conference building, sees the same arrow that he followed a few minutes earlier. He says:]
This is the way?

(9) [Looking at a London map, a freshman at University College says:]
The British Museum is near University College?

The questions in (7) - (9) are not echo questions as traditionally defined. What is echoed is information which may have been intentionally communicated, but not by means of a linguistic utterance.

Unexpressed thoughts (whether intentionally communicated or not) can also be echoed, as in (10) and (11):

(10) A: No, You'd better stop drinking now.
B: Ah, I'm drunk? (suggesting that A thinks 'You're drunk.')

(11) *Mozart's wife*: I have to take them back after you have seen them. He doesn't know I brought them.
Salieri: These are originals?
(adapted from the film *Amadeus*)

In (10), B does not echo A's utterance itself. Instead, he echoes a thought attributed to A on the basis of what has been said. The same holds for (11).

There is another type of question similar to echo questions, generally called a declarative question and described as follows: 'When you ask a question using the declarative mood, you expect the answer "yes", unless you use a negative construction, in which case you expect the answer "no"' (Collins Cobuild 1990: 205). Consider (12) - (14):

(12) A: Yesterday I met the doctor I told you about.
B: So he gave you the treatment?

(13) A: I was finally able to get the money.
B: Then you left for America?

(14) A: The prince proposed to Cinderella.
B: And her step-sisters couldn't maltreat her any more?

All these questions are declarative with final rising intonation. Traditionally, they would not be classified as echo questions, since they do not repeat the previous utterance. Intuitively, they present an inference drawn from that utterance, like the

telescoped tag question in 'He gave you the treatment, did he?' One suggestion is that they are similar to (10) and (11) in that they involve what the speaker takes to be an implicature/implication of the preceding utterance.

None of the questions in (7) - (14) repeats the form or content of a prior utterance, but they are very similar to echo questions in that their questioning attitudes are indicated by high-rise intonation only. Another similarity, which I will argue is important, is that both types of question involve the attribution of a thought or utterance to someone other than the speaker (or to the speaker herself at another time). As we have seen in chapter 2, section 2.3, in relevance theory, such attributions are treated as involving resemblance (in form or content) between a metarepresentation and an original. *Echoic* attribution involves the simultaneous expression of an attitude (endorsing, dissociative, questioning) to the original being echoed. *Interpretive* attribution is based on resemblance in content: between an utterance and another utterance, a thought and another thought, or an utterance and a thought. *Metalinguistic* attribution is based on resemblance in linguistic form. I want to argue that echo questions as traditionally defined fall together with a whole range of further questions, including those in (7) - (14), which involve echoic attributive use (see chapter 2, section 2.5.1; Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 1988b, 1992). Thus, by defining echo questions as repeating a prior *utterance*, an interesting generalisation is missed.

Deirdre Wilson (personal communication) has suggested that confirmation of this approach might be provided by the following examples, in which there is no prior utterance at all:

(15) [A sees B walking towards the door, and says:]

a. You're off to catch the train?

b. ?Henry VIII had seven wives?

c. Did Henry VIII have seven wives?

In (15), we see that declarative questions are not always appropriate. On the analysis I propose, (a) is acceptable because A attributes to B a thought that B could plausibly

be supposed to have; (b) is unacceptable because the thought attributed is one B could not plausibly be supposed to have in the circumstances; (c) is acceptable because it involves no attributed thought. So we can see that (a) and (b) are different: (a) is an echoic question in the broader sense defined in relevance theory, but (b) is not.

4.3.2. Echo questions reformulated

The claim that echo questions are echoic in Sperber and Wilson's sense has another merit: it allows an echo question to reformulate the original representation. The analysis of echo questions as involving interpretive use, or more generally representation by resemblance, allows for such reformulations, while accommodating identical repetitions as a special case. The following are some examples of non-identical echo questions (some of which have already been discussed in the relevance-theoretic literature, but others of which are new).

It has long been noted that echo questions need not involve exact phonetic reduplication, or word-for-word repetition. Banfield (1982: 125) discusses the example in (16):

(16) A: **My mother and father** are coming tonight.
B: **Your parents** are coming tonight?

Banfield claims that the possible reformulations are predictable on purely linguistic grounds, in that 'the departures permitted require a narrowly defined, language-internal synonymy' (1982: 125). However, this claim is rebutted by Blakemore (1994). Consider (17) - (18), taken from Blakemore (1994: 208 - 209):

(17) A: **My parents** will be arriving tonight.
B: **They'll** be arriving WHEN?

(18) A: **Mr. Clinton** will be speaking tonight.
B: **The president** will be speaking WHEN?

Though 'my parents' and 'they', 'Mr. Clinton' and 'the president' are not linguistically synonymous, the echo questions in (17) and (18) are clearly acceptable.

Blakemore (1994) argues that the notion of an acceptable reformulation must be pragmatically rather than linguistically defined, and that the relevance-theoretic concept of interpretive resemblance is an important element of such an account. As we have seen in chapter 2, section 2.3.1, interpretive resemblance is resemblance in content: two propositions resemble each other (in a context) if they share logical or contextual implications (in that context). Thus, in (17) 'my parents' and 'they' resemble each other in content because the resulting propositions have implications in common; and the same is true of 'Mr. Clinton' and 'the president' in (18).

A further type of reformulation which has been less often discussed involves the addition of speech-act or propositional-attitude information. Thus, (4A) above might receive any of the following responses:

(4) A: Talk to a fortune-teller.
B3: You want me to talk to a fortune-teller?
B4: You're telling me to talk to a fortune-teller?
B5: You think I should talk to a fortune-teller?
B6: You're saying I should go to an astrologer?
B7: You mean I should see a quack?

These reformulations also go beyond the original in various ways, by spelling out overtly an aspect of the intended interpretation that would otherwise have to be inferred. As we have seen in chapter 2, section 2.2.2, in relevance theory, these aspects are dealt with under the heading of 'higher-level explicatures'; they will be discussed in more detail in section 4.5.

The degrees of permitted reformulation are also pragmatically constrained. Within relevance theory, the claim is that interpretive use of utterances - and more

generally the exploitation of representation by resemblance - must satisfy the hearer's expectation of relevance: that is, in straightforward cases, the result must be relevant enough to be worth processing and as relevant as is compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences (see chapter 2, section 2.2.1) Reformulated echo questions fall under this constraint. In different situations, where the hearer has different expectations of relevance, different degrees of reformulation will be acceptable. Thus, consider (19):

(19) [Peter and Mary, who have heard that more than 5000 people died in the recent Japanese earthquake, are reading an article about the earthquake, in which it is claimed that 6,340 people died. He says to her:]
6,000 people died (in the earthquake)?

In the circumstances, this is an acceptable reformulation: the rough approximation achieves enough cognitive effects, at a low enough processing cost, to be worth the hearer's attention. By contrast, if he is proof-reading the article and doubts the figure, he may say, '6,340 people died?' Here the extra processing effort is offset by extra cognitive effects (See Sperber and Wilson 1985/6 and Blakemore 1993, 1994 for further discussion of acceptable and unacceptable reformulations).

In this section, I have shown that echo questions may merely resemble the content of a previous utterance, and may also focus on unspoken but attributed thoughts. In the next section, I would like to show that it is possible to use echo questions to focus on virtually any aspect of a previous utterance: presuppositions, implicatures (both conventional and conversational), pronunciation, morphology, etc., as well as straightforward truth-conditional meaning. In this respect, they are very similar to metalinguistic negation, and an adequate analysis of echo questions should account for this similarity.

4.4 Are Echo Questions Cases of Metalinguistic Use?

4.4.1. Echo questions and metalinguistic negation[3]

Echo questions can be used not only when the speaker did not hear or understand properly what was said, but also when he wants to express his incredulity at what he has heard. The incredulity expressed by echo questions with high-rise intonation can relate not only to content but also to form, including morphology, phonology, style or register, foci, and connotations, which are often ignored in the literature on echo questions. In this section, I will give some examples, draw some parallels with metalinguistic negation, and discuss whether echo questions can be analysed as a type of metalinguistic use.

Consider first some examples used to focus on the form of a previous utterance:[4]

(20) A: We trapped two mongeese.
B: You trapped two mongeese? You mean mongooses.

(21) A: I love[luv] my wife. (love[luv]: Pronunciation of Northern England)
B: You love[luv] your wife? I love[l∧v] my wife.

(22) A: Did you call the POlice?
B: POlice? I called the poLICE.
(Capital letters indicate the syllable on which word stress falls.)

[3] Most of the examples in this subsection, in particular examples (20), (22), (24), (25), (34) and (35) are adapted from Horn (1989: chapter 6).

[4] Banfield (1982: 125) also points out that echo questions are used to comment on pronunciation: 'Echo questions may very well comment on an oddity of the echoed speaker's pronunciation or a discrepancy between the echoed speaker's and the echoer's dialect.'

In (20) - (22), the plural morphology 'mongeese', the pronunciation '[luv]', and the word stress 'POlice' are the grounds for using the echo questions. Echo questions can also be used to question the register or style of the echoed utterance, as in (23), its focus, as in (24), or its connotations, as in (25):

(23) A: His father kicked the bucket.
B: Kicked the bucket? Is he your friend?

(24) A: We have a half-empty bottle of wine.
B: Half-empty? It's half-full.

(25) A: She is a black policewoman.
B: A black policewoman? She is a policewoman who is black.

Such echo questions tend to echo only the words or phrases concerned, as in (23) - (25), though a fuller echo is possible.

Consider now some examples used to focus on some aspect of the content of the previous utterance:

(26) A: The king of France is bald.
B: The king of France is bald? There is no king of France.

In (26), B questions A's utterance on the ground that its *presupposition* that there is a king of France is not fulfilled. Echo questions can also focus on aspects of non-truth-conditional meaning, as in (27) - (28):

(27) A: You finally managed to solve the problems.
B: Managed? I solved them in two minutes.

(28) A: He is rich, but he is friendly.
B: But? Not every rich man is unfriendly.

(27B) questions the implication of the verb 'manage' - that solving the problems was difficult -, and (28B) questions the contrastive connotations of 'but'. In each case, the ground on which B questions A's utterance lies in the non-truth-conditional meaning.[5]

Now consider some examples illustrating the use of echo questions to focus on the implicatures of the previous utterance:

(29) A: I saw you kissing a woman on Oxford Street yesterday.
B: You saw me kissing a woman? That was my wife. We went out last night.

(30) A: What was he doing?
B: He was stirring all ingredients in a saucepan.
C: I was stirring all ingredients in a saucepan? I was cooking a Chinese stir-fry.

The conversational implicature of (29) is that 'the woman' is not B's wife, and the implicature of (30) is that his cooking lacked skill. These implicatures are singled out by the echo questions. In both cases, it is possible to echo only the words concerned, rather than the whole utterance. For example, in (29), B can repeat only 'a woman' without losing any of the effect of an echo question.

These grounds for using echo questions are very similar to those often cited for using metalinguistic negation (see chapter 3 of this thesis; or Horn 1989: chapter 6). Let us look at some examples of metalinguistic negation corresponding to the echo questions above:

[5] These meanings are analysed as conventional implicatures in Grice (1975) and Horn (1989). In relevance theory, the meaning of 'but' is analysed in procedural terms. See Blakemore (1987, 1989).

(31) A: The king of France is bald.
B: The king of France is not bald; there is no king of France.

(32) A: What was he doing?
B: He was stirring all ingredients in a saucepan.
C: I was not stirring all ingredients in a saucepan; I was cooking a Chinese stir-fry.

(33) A: Are you meeting a woman tonight?
B: I'm not meeting a woman; I'm meeting my wife.

(34) A: Did you call the POlice?
B: I didn't call the POlice; I called the poLICE.

(35) A: We have a half-empty bottle of wine.
B: It is not half-empty; It's half-full.

In (31), the focus of the negation is the *presupposition* that there is a king of France. In (32) - (35), implicatures, word stress, and focus, respectively are the targets of the metalinguistic negation. The question is how this similarity between echoic questions and metalinguistic negation is best explained. I will first consider the proposal of Horn (1989) that both are cases of metalinguistic use, and then offer a more general solution using the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation developed in chapters 2 and 3.

4.4.2 Horn (1989) and Cooper (1983)

Horn (1989: chapter 6) also points out that echo questions are similar to metalinguistic negation. As we have seen in chapter 3, he treats metalinguistic negation as 'a device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever,

including the conventional or conversational implicatures it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization' (p. 363). Regarding echo questions, he says:

> 'What are generally labeled ECHO questions (---) might, in the present context, be aptly renamed METALINGUISTIC questions. As with the most natural occurrences of metalinguistic negation, echo questions generally require a linguistic context in which the original utterance (be it a declarative, an imperative, or itself a question) has been previously uttered within the discourse.' (Horn 1989: 381)

For Horn, *metalinguistic* use involves an operation on a previous linguistic utterance. His proposal that echo questions are metalinguistic thus seems to miss the same generalisation about echo questions that I outlined in section 4.3, and is subject to the same objections listed there, at least until his proviso that they 'generally' require a linguistic context is clarified and explained. Another problem is that he analyses the negation operator (in metalinguistic negation) and the question operator (in echo questions) themselves as metalinguistic, which runs into the problem of semantic ambiguity discussed above. (See chapter 3, section 3.2.1.1.)

Before turning in more detail to the notion of metalinguistic use, I would like to consider a further range of arguments that echo questions are metalinguistic. Cooper (1983) claims that all questions in English must begin with a *wh*-phrase. He notes that echo questions do not begin with a *wh*-phrase, but does not regard them as counterexamples, on the ground that they are metalinguistic and do not need to be dealt with by the basic rules for questions.

First, Cooper argues that *wh*-phrases in echo questions play the same role as a pause or a gap, as in (36):

(36) A: I saw her at the party.
B1: You saw her WHERE?
B2: You saw her ...

He claims that as the grammar need not generate sentences like (B2), it does not need to generate sentences like (B1); they are metalinguistic.

Second, Cooper notes that the *wh*-phrase in an echo question can replace any syntactic category or syllable, cannot occur at the front of the sentence, and therefore falls outside the regular rules for questions. Consider (37) - (41), from Cooper (1983: 149 - 150):

(37) A: This animal is totally quercivorous.
B: This animal is totally WHAT?

(38) A: He voiced a querimony.
B: He voiced a WHAT?

(39) a. *What is this animal totally?
b. *Totally what is this animal?

(40) a. *What did he voice a?
b. *A what did he voice?

(41) a. This animal is totally whativerous?
b. He voiced a whatimony?

The echo questions in (37) and (38) are very different from normal questions, in that the *wh*-word *what* can replace an adjective as well as a noun, which cannot occur at the front of the sentence, as shown in (39) and (40). In other words, whereas *what* belongs to a definite syntactic category in normal questions, there is no constraint on what it can replace in an echo question, so that it can even replace parts of words, as in (41). Because of this irregularity, Cooper claims, there is no need to generate echo

questions and normal questions by the same set of rules.[6] In this sense, he regards echo questions as metalinguistic.

This analysis of echo questions is problematic, since echo questions have much in common with ordinary questions. Both use high-rise intonation and can have *wh*-words, even though in echo questions these are not fronted. What is needed is an analysis that brings out both the similarities and the differences between echo questions and ordinary interrogatives. I will attempt that in section 4.5.

4.4.3 Metarepresentational use in echo questions

I have shown that echo questions are not adequately analysed as cases of metalinguistic use, if this is defined as requiring a previous utterance, because the parallels with (2) and (7) - (9) are missed. In chapters 2 and 3, however, I introduced another notion of metalinguistic use, which involves representation based on resemblance of linguistic form - whether or not this form has been used in an immediately preceding utterance. We have seen that there are also many cases involving looser forms of resemblance. Thus, Cooper's 'whativerous' in (41) may be analysed as metarepresenting a word which it only partly resembles in form. In what follows, I will argue that although some echo questions are plausibly analysed as cases of metalinguistic use in the sense defined above, others are better analysed as involving resemblance in content rather than form. Such cases are not so much metalinguistic as metaconceptual: in other words, they are cases of interpretive use.

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[6] Compare Sobin (1990), who proposes an analysis of English echo questions which brings them into the realm of normal question syntax, arguing for 'a discourse strategy called Comp-freezing' and 'unselective binding of in-situ wh-phrases'. However, Sobin deals only with echo questions where *what* replaces a noun phrase, and can therefore occur at the front of the sentence. He also notices that the fronting is only possible in 'questionable statements'. Cooper and Sobin appear to have opposite ideas, but in fact they don't. They are dealing with different examples, or rather, Sobin's examples are a subset of Cooper's.

In much of the literature, echo questions have been treated purely as cases of what relevance theorists would call interpretive use. That is, it is generally claimed that what is echoed is the content of the original, as in (42), repeated from (1):

(42) A: I'm leaving on Tuesday.
B1: You're leaving on Tuesday?
B2: You're leaving when?

In (B1) and (B2), it is the content rather than the form of A's utterance that is echoed, as can be seen from the shifted personal pronoun 'you', characteristic of indirect rather than direct quotation. Such questions are indeed very common. Examples (16) - (18), discussed in section 4.3.2, are illustrations, and these have been clearly analysed within the relevance-theoretic framework as cases of interpretive use (see Blakemore 1994).

As we have seen, however, echo questions can also be used to metarepresent form, as in (43) - (45), repeated from (20) - (22):

(43) A: We trapped two mongeese.
B: You trapped two mongeese? You mean mongooses.

(44) A: I love[luv] my wife. (love[luv]: Pronunciation of Northern England)
B: You love[luv] your wife? I love[l∧v] my wife.

(45) A: Did you call the POlice?
B: POlice? I called the poLICE.
(Capital letters indicate the syllable on which word stress falls.)

Here, the forms 'mongeese', '[luv]', and 'POlice', respectively, are quoted or mentioned. These are true cases of metalinguistic use.

In this section, I have sketched an analysis of echo questions as involving metarepresentation of either content or form. In the next section, I will present this

analysis in more detail, and also consider whether echo questions should be analysed as interrogatives (Property C above).

4.5 A Relevance-Theoretic Account of Echo Questions

It is generally claimed that echo questions are of the same sentence-types as the utterance they echo:

> 'Morphologically and syntactically, echo questions seem to have more in common with the sentence-types they are used to echo than with the corresponding nonecho questions.' (Radford 1988: 464)

I want to argue that echo questions are interrogatives, despite their morphological and syntactic similarities to the sentence-types echoed. The difference between echo questions and ordinary interrogatives is that the former involve an extra layer of metarepresentation of an attributed content or form.

I will start with Blakemore's (1994) argument that echo questions are best treated as interrogatives within the framework of relevance theory. After outlining some points of disagreement with her approach, I will show how echo questions can be analysed as interrogatives, and go on to show how the content of an echo question may be systematically derived, using on the one hand Sperber and Wilson's account of interrogatives, and on the other Carston's (1988) approach to pragmatic enrichment.

4.5.1 Blakemore (1994)

Wilson and Sperber (1988a) claim that all interrogative utterances are cases of interpretive use: they achieve relevance by interpretively metarepresenting information which the speaker would regard as desirable, or relevant (see chapter 2,

section 2.5.2; for further discussion, see Clark 1991.) On this account, someone who uses an interrogative utterance is metarepresenting an abstract representation - a proposition - which resembles it in content, and which she would regard as relevant if true. As in all cases of interpretive use, the resemblance must be close enough to be pragmatically acceptable. In other words, a question must be a faithful enough representation of an answer that the speaker would regard as relevant if true. Blakemore (1994) treats echo questions as interrogatives in this sense. On her account, their main difference from ordinary questions lies in the type of answer they expect. This in turn follows from the fact that they metarepresent previous utterances:

> '... it is possible to see all the different concerns [behind echo questions] ... as particular instances of a more general concern, namely, whether B's utterance (the echo question) is a faithful enough representation of A's utterance, or, in the case of wh-echo, what would make B's utterance an adequately faithful representation of A's utterance.' (brackets mine) (Blakemore 1994: 205)

According to Blakemore, in echoic *Yes-no* questions, the speaker can be understood as communicating 'the proposition that his utterance is being used as a representation of A's utterance [a previous utterance]. Moreover, he is communicating that *this* proposition is being used as an interpretation of a desirable thought' (p. 205). In other words, the questioner metarepresents a previous utterance and asks whether that metarepresentation is faithful enough. Let us look at some examples:

(46) A: Jane married a millionaire.
B1: Jane married a millionaire?
B2: Jane married a miller?

According to Blakemore, B1 is asking whether his utterance is an adequately faithful representation of A's utterance. So the answer that A should provide will be 'Yes'. For the same reason, the answer to B2's question should be 'No'.

In *wh*-echo questions, on Blakemore's account, the speaker can be understood as metarepresenting a previous utterance and asking what would make her metarepresentation faithful enough. So the answer should concern the value of the *wh*-words. Consider (47):

(47) A: Jane married a billionaire.
B: Jane married a WHAT?

According to Blakemore, B is asking what value of the *wh*-word would make her utterance an adequately faithful representation of A's utterance. The answer should be 'billionaire'.

This analysis of echo questions raises several points that need further clarification. First, although Blakemore claims that echo questions are echoic in the sense defined in relevance theory, she accepts the standard assumption that echo questions require a previous utterance. This assumption is even built into her account of the function of echo questions in the quotation given at the beginning of this section. I have argued that the relevance-theoretic notion of echoic use allows for echoic questions with no prior utterance. It is not clear how Blakemore would deal with these.

Second, let us think more generally about her analysis of echo questions as interrogatives. The term 'interrogative' is generally used to indicate a type of sentence; but when Blakemore claims that echo questions are interrogatives, she sometimes seems to mean it pragmatically. Thus she says:

> 'I shall argue that the fact that from a syntactic point of view echo questions resemble the sentences they echo does not necessarily mean that they cannot be interpreted as communicating a questioning attitude.' (Blakemore 1994: 198)

From this, we might conclude that sometimes what she means by 'interrogative' is a pragmatic notion having to do with illocutionary force. By contrast, what Wilson and Sperber (1988a) mean by 'interrogative' is a syntactic category. The common properties that they see in rhetorical questions, exam questions, guess-questions, surprise-questions, expository questions, self-addressed questions, and speculative questions, all of which are interrogative sentences, are formal rather than pragmatics: inverted main-clause word-order, *wh*-words, rising intonation, etc.

In ordinary interrogatives, the proposition expressed by the utterance is the one that is taken to metarepresent the desirable (relevant) answer. However, what is metarepresented (i.e. what is questioned) by an echo question on Blakemore's account is something else. She argues:

> '... as in the case of all utterance interpretation, what is encoded by the linguistic form of the utterance is only a set of hints for constructing an interpretation. There are always aspects of interpretation which are not linguistically encoded and which must be worked out on the basis of the context and pragmatic principles'. (p. 198)

This is, of course, correct. What is needed, however, is a pragmatic explanation of how the interpretation of echo questions can be systematically derived on the basis of their semantic and pragmatic properties.

It is not clear that what the speaker of an echo question communicates is 'the proposition that his utterance is being used as a representation of the echoed utterance' and that '*this* proposition is being used as an interpretation of a desirable thought' (Blakemore 1994: 205). In other words, it is not always clear that the speaker of an echo question is asking whether her utterance is a faithful enough representation of the previous utterance. Consider (48), from Blakemore (1994: (1a, b)):

(48) a. A: I've bought you an aeroplane.
B: You've bought me an AEROPLANE?
b. A: I've bought you an aeroplane.
B: You've bought me a WHAT?

According to Blakemore, the echo question in (48) can be used to 'communicate an attitude of incredulity towards the proposition that A expressed the proposition that he has bought B an aeroplane' (Blakemore 1994: 205). I agree. But is this really the same as asking whether B's utterance is an adequately faithful representation of A's utterance? I doubt it. Blakemore might claim that B is asking for verification of what he has heard, in order to express his incredulity indirectly. However, the examples in (49) and (50) are hard to account for on this approach:

(49) A: Two and three makes four.
B: Two and three makes four/what?

(50) [After proceeding 1 mile in an hour, a driver sees a road sign which reads 'ROADWORKS AHEAD, DELAYS POSSIBLE'. The driver says:]
Delays possible?

In (49), B is not asking whether his utterance is a faithful enough representation of A's utterance. Rather he is asking whether A really thinks two and three makes four. In the same way, in (50), the driver is not interested in whether his utterance represents the road sign properly. He is asking whether those who are in charge of the road sign believe/believed what it says. If the driver's companion says 'Yes', it might not mean 'Yes, that's what it says', but 'Yes, that's what they think'. This suggests that what is communicated in echo questions is not quite what Blakemore claims.

In the next section, I will argue that echo questions are indeed interrogatives, but not in quite the way Blakemore suggests. In this way, I hope to solve the

problems raised by Blakemore's very interesting account, as well as the other problems raised earlier in this chapter.

4.5.2 Echo questions as attributive metarepresentations

As we have seen in chapter 2, one of the main arguments of relevance theory has been that identification of the explicit aspects of communication is governed by the same pragmatic principles as identification of the implicit aspects. In particular, both the proposition expressed by an utterance and its higher-level explicatures are recovered by a mixture of decoding and inference, subject to the general expectation of optimal relevance.[7] In this section, I will show in relatively informal terms how the explicit content of echo questions can be systematically derived.

We have seen in chapter 2 that in the framework of relevance theory, a distinction is drawn between the proposition explicitly expressed by an utterance and various 'higher-level explicatures' which may also be communicated. The proposition expressed constitutes the basic truth-conditional content of the utterance (in the case of declarative sentences), and the higher-level explicatures carry speech-act or propositional-attitude information (see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Clark 1991). What I want to argue is that echo questions communicate higher-level explicatures appropriate to interrogative utterances, and determined by *wh*-words or rising intonation; but that embedded under these may be metarepresentations of the higher-level explicatures of the original utterance being metarepresented. Consider (51):

(51) [Mary is talking to Peter about her meeting with her supervisor.]
Peter: Then what did she say?
Mary: The argument is invalid.

[7] See chapter 2; for more detailed discussion, see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Carston 1988; Wilson and Sperber 1988b, 1998a, b; Blakemore 1992.

In (51), Mary leaves Peter to infer that the proposition expressed by her utterance represents not her own opinion but what the supervisor said. The clause 'The argument is invalid' is interpretively rather than descriptively used, and should be understood as embedded under a metarepresentation of the type 'She said'. That is, Mary's utterance explicitly communicates an attitude to the proposition 'She said the argument is invalid'.

Similar pragmatic enrichment processes can also be applied to echo questions, which are metarepresentationally (interpretively or metalinguistically) used. Consider (52) - (53), repeated from (1), (3) and (4) above:

(52) A: I'm leaving on Tuesday.
B1: You're leaving on Tuesday?
B2: You're leaving when?

(53) A: Have you read 'Great Expectations'?
B1: Have I read 'Great Expectations'?
B2: Have I read what?

(54) A: Talk to a fortune-teller.
B1: Talk to a fortune-teller?
B2: Talk to what/who?

In these examples, whether B uses the echo question because he has not heard A's utterance properly, or because he wants to express his incredulity at what he has heard, the questions may be paraphrased as follows:

(52) B1': Are you saying that you're leaving on Tuesday?
B2': When are you saying that you're leaving?

(53) B1': Are you asking whether I have read 'Great Expectations'?
B2': Of what are you asking me whether I have read it?

(54) B1': Are you telling me to talk to a fortune-teller?
B2': What/Who are you telling me to talk to?

As can be seen from these paraphrases, the echo questions in (52) - (54) can be analysed as asking questions about metarepresented illocutionary acts, which may themselves be of various types, including *saying*, *telling* and *asking*. Thus, there is no incompatibility between saying that these echo questions are interrogatives and acknowledging that they take metarepresented assertions, requests or questions in their scope. In more complex cases, one might imagine more elaborate forms of metarepresentation, involving e.g. a thought the speaker attributes to herself, or a thought about another thought. Paraphrases of echo questions of this type might go 'Am I correct in attributing to you the thought/meaning/assertion that ...?' or 'Am I correct in inferring that ...?' The notion of metarepresentation allows for several layers of higher-level explicatures, and this possibility does seem to be exploited in more complex types of echo questions.

Huddleston (1994) also claims that what is essential in echo questions is repetition at the level of illocutionary acts:

> 'What is essential is repetition - or rather, since we are concerned here with variable echo questions, repetition plus variable substitution - at a more abstract level, that of illocutionary acts. (...) The repetition, I have suggested, is a kind of citation, and the citation includes the illocutionary component of the original utterance ... ' (Huddleston 1994: 433)

Accordingly, Huddleston argues, echo questions do not have to repeat the actual words used in the previous utterance. Consider his example (55):

(55) A: As soon as the alarm goes, phone your father.
B: I'm to what?

According to Huddleston, a declarative form such as in (55B) can be used to echo A's imperative because of their equivalent illocutionary forces as directives. This analysis is very similar to mine in that not only the propositional content of an original utterance but also its sentence-type is echoed in an echo question.

However, there are several differences between us. First, Huddleston's account does not consider echo questions which focus on the form of the original, as in (56) - (57), repeated from (20) - (21) above:

(56) A: We trapped two mongeese.
B: You trapped two mongeese? You mean mongooses.

(57) A: I love[luv] my wife. (love[luv]: Pronunciation of Northern England)
B: You love[luv] your wife? I love[l∧v] my wife.

In (56) - (57), the echo questions focus on the plural morphology 'mongeese' and the pronunciation '[luv]'. In these examples, the notion of illocutionary force seems not to be enough. It is not clear how Huddleston would deal with these cases. (For my analysis, see below.)

Another difference from my account is that Huddleston does not regard echo questions as interrogatives. He claims instead that they perform indirect speech acts of the type 'Did you say...?'. Ordinary interrogatives, of course, ask questions directly rather than indirectly. For Huddleston, this indirectness is essential in echo questions. I disagree. As we have seen above, the paraphrase 'you say/mean' is a higher-level explicature of the original, which is metarepresented in the echo question together with the original propositional content. By pragmatic enrichment, it becomes part of the direct speech act performed. Consider (58) - (59):

(58) A: He is a gentleman.
B: He is a gentleman?

(59) A: Is he a gentleman?

B: Is he a gentleman?

In (58), if B echoes A's utterance including the higher-level explicature 'A says/believes/means', then the questioning attitude indicated by high-rise intonation is enough to communicate 'Do you say/believe/mean...?' By the same token, if in (59), A's utterance means 'I ask whether ...', then B's utterance communicates 'Are you asking whether ...'. The questioning attitude is indicated by the intonation. There is no need for indirect speech act in accounting for B's echo question.

There is a further minor point that might be worth mentioning. According to Huddleston, the echo question 'Did Kim answer the phone?' conveys 'Did you say "Did Kim answer the phone?"'(p. 433). It follows that the echo question in (55) above, 'I'm to what?', should be analysed as conveying 'Did you say "I am to what?"' This is, of course, not correct. Echo questions are not direct quotations of the original. The fact that paraphrase relations are possible (as Huddleston himself points out) shows that free indirect quotation is involved.

Another advantage of my analysis is that the higher-level explicature of the original of an echo question may be not only 'You say' but also 'You ask' or 'You tell'. That is, the content of an echo question varies depending on the sentence type of the original. This follows naturally from my account, as does the possibility of further paraphrases, such as 'You think', 'You believe', or 'You mean' - all possible higher-level explicatures (49) and (50) above.

All the echo questions analysed in this section have involved interpretive resemblance, or resemblance in content. We have also seen that echo questions may involve metarepresentation of linguistic form, e.g. pronunciation or morphology, as in (60) - (61), repeated from (56) - (57) (and (20) - (21) above):

(60) A: We trapped two mongeese.

B: You trapped two mongeese? You mean mongooses.

(61) A: I love[luv] my wife. (love[luv]: Pronunciation of Northern England)
B: You love[luv] your wife? I love[lʌv] my wife.

In (60), the echo question in (B) may be enriched to communicate something like 'Are you saying you trapped two "mongeese"?' The same holds for the echo question in (61B). Again, the relevance-theoretic framework allows for more complex paraphrases, e.g. 'Am I correct in thinking you said ...?' or 'Do you think it's correct to say ...?', by stacking several higher-level explicatures, involving several propositional attitudes, together. What is common to all echo questions is that they metarepresent an attributed representation (based on resemblance in content or form).

Quirk et al. (1985: 836 - 837) include questions such as in (62) - (63) in the category of echo questions:

(62) A: Oh dear, I've lost the letter.
B: WHAT letter have you lost?

(63) A: His job was to check the invoices.
B: Sorry, WHAT was his job?

However, these questions are not normally considered to be echo questions, from which they differ formally in several respects. First, in echo questions, fronting a *wh*-word is not possible when the *wh*-word is used as a noun, adjective, part of a word, etc. (see Cooper 1983; Huddleston 1994 and section 4.3.2 for illustrations). In addition, fronting is excluded when the original utterance is interrogative (see Sobin 1990; Huddleston 1994), as in (64):

(64) A: Was she there in the morning?
B: a. Was she there WHEN?
b. *WHEN was she there?

Echo questions based on imperative utterances do not allow fronting either, as in (65):

(65) A: Go to the temple.
B: a. Go to WHERE?
b. *WHERE go to?

I therefore agree with Huddleston and Cooper that the questions in (62) and (63) are not echo questions. [8]

However, my metarepresentational account enables us to explain the similarities and differences between a genuine echo question and an ordinary question which follows another utterance. Consider (66):

(66) A: It's cold.
B1: Is it cold? It's freezing.
B2: It's cold? It's freezing.

I would claim that in (66), (B1) metarepresents only the word 'cold', while (B2) metarepresents A's utterance as a whole, including the higher-level explicature. They may thus be paraphrased as follows:

(67) B1: Is it - as you put it - 'cold'?
B2: Do you think/assert that it is cold?

It is hard to interpret (66B1) as an ordinary interrogative, given that A has just asserted that it is cold. The metalinguistic interpretation of (B1) given in (67) makes it more relevant by focusing on A's choice of words, with the implication that they were too weak. The difference between (B1) and (B2) is that the latter metarepresents the whole prior utterance - including the higher-level explicature -

[8] Huddleston (1994) also claims that these questions are not echo questions because they repeat the propositional component of A's utterance only, without repeating the illocutionary component.

while the former is an ordinary interrogative except that it contains a single metarepresented constituent.

Similarly, consider the *wh*-questions in (68):

(68) A: Columbus discovered America in 1492.
B1: When did Columbus discover America?
B2: Columbus discovered America WHEN?

In (68B1), I would argue that there are two possible interpretations: the *wh*-word 'when' may attributively metarepresent 'in 1492' in A's utterance, or it may be a regular *wh*-interrogative, with no attributive metarepresentation of A's utterance. Thus, (68B1) is more naturally interpreted as a question about the facts, or the facts according to the speaker, whereas (68B2) is more naturally interpreted as a question about the utterance, or the thought behind it, meaning 'On what year do you say/think Columbus discovered America?' In a similar vein, the questions in (62) and (63) are taken to be about the facts, rather than about the previous utterances. Along these lines, I think that a full analysis of the possible interpretations of echo questions, and their differences from non-echoic interrogatives, might be developed.

Returning to questions of the type in (2), which are not normally considered in the literature on echo questions, my metarepresentational account offers several possibilities of analysis. For (2B1), there are two main lines of interpretation, on one of which the utterance requests confirmation of a thought attributed to the hearer (= 'Are you intending to leave?'), and on the other of which it requests confirmation of a conclusion drawn by the speaker (= 'Am I correct in thinking that you're leaving?'). In different circumstances, one or other of these lines of interpretation would be favoured. Such questions may also occasionally be used to metarepresent anticipated utterances, as when A is about to speak and B says 'You're leaving now?'

In the case of (2B2), which contains a *wh*-word, the possibilities of interpretation are rather narrower. The question seems to mean, eventually, 'Where do you intend to go?'; that is, it metarepresents an attributed thought. However, it

has also been noticed that the preferred form of quiz questions involves non-fronted *wh*-phrases, as in (69):

(69) a. The north pole was discovered by *what Norwegian explorer*?
b. The United Kingdom is made up of *which four countries*?

These are not generally discussed in the literature on echo questions. On my metarepresentational account, they are naturally interpretable as metarepresenting *desirable utterances*: the answers that the contestant is to produce. Thus, my account captures a generalisation that is missed by other accounts.

4.5.3. Echo questions as interrogatives

Wilson and Sperber (1988a) survey a range of examples designed to show that interrogatives are not always requests for information (see also Clark 1991). Here are some illustrations, from Blakemore (1994):

(70) *Exam questions*
Examiner: Who discovered Australia?

(71) *Expository questions*
What are the objections to this analysis? First, ...

(72) *Rhetorical questions*
Am I always going to have to listen to your boring stories?

(73) *Guess questions*
[The speaker hides an object behind his back.]
Which hand is it in?

In (70), the examiner is not asking the question because he wants to know the answer, but because he wants to assess the candidate's attempt at an answer. In the same way, none of the questions in (71) - (73) is a straightforward request for information. Sperber and Wilson claim that interrogatives achieve relevance by representing their answers as desirable (i.e. relevant). They also claim:

> 'Like imperatives, they [interrogatives] are semantically indeterminate, and the indeterminacy must be pragmatically resolved by making some assumption about who it is that the speaker thinks would regard the thought in question as desirable. As always, the first assumption tested and found consistent with the expectation of optimal relevance is the only such assumption, and is the one the hearer should choose.' (Wilson and Sperber 1988a: 96 - 97)

If the indeterminacy is resolved in favour of the speaker, that is, if it is assumed that the speaker regards the answer as relevant to herself, the interrogatives will be requests for information, exam-questions, guess-questions, surprise-questions, self-addressed questions or speculative questions. Further contextual assumptions are needed to distinguish the various subtypes of this broad type. Consider (74), from Wilson and Sperber (1988a):

(74) a. *Mary*: Where did I leave my keys?
b. *Peter*: In the kitchen drawer.

In (74), depending on the contextual assumptions that Mary have, her question would be understood differently. If the answer is regarded as desirable to herself, and the hearer (Peter) is expected to know and supply the answer, her question would have the force of a request for information. By contrast, if Mary regards an answer as desirable to herself, and there is no one in the room, so is addressing herself, it would have the force of a self-addressed question or speculation.

I now want to show that similar points apply to echo questions, which, as we have seen, are also generally analysed as requests for information - in this case about a prior utterance. Consider (75):

(75) A: I loved the painter.
B: You loved the painter?

In (75B), on my analysis, what is questioned would be the proposition 'you say/mean/think you loved the painter'. In this case, A manifestly knows the answer. Suppose that the speaker B regards the answer as desirable to herself, and manifestly expects him to supply it. Then the echo question would have the force of a request for information; this is the only case normally considered. By contrast, if B is manifestly not addressing A (but talking to herself), then it would have the force of a self-addressed echo question or speculation. Self-addressed questions are not normally treated as requests for information. Let us take another example. Consider (76):

(76) *Mary*: a. I left. I left? I mean, I didn't leave.
b. I left. I what? I mean, I didn't leave.

In (76), Mary is not requesting information about her previous utterance, nor is she asking herself for clarification. She is indicating that the proposition that she said she left would be relevant if true - because if so, she would need to correct it. When we are trying to remember something, we sometimes say to ourselves, 'I left on Sunday? I left on Monday?' until the bell rings, and some moment of recognition takes place. Again, we are not requesting information, or clarification of a prior utterance. (Note that these are further types of question ignored by the standard analysis of echo questions.) We are attributing possible thoughts to ourself and asking, 'Is this what I believe?' This account can also deal with the non-basic cases as well as the standard cases where the speaker is requesting clarification of a previous utterance.

4.6 Summary and Conclusion

I have analysed echo questions as cases of attributive metarepresentational use, based on metarepresentation of either content or form. I have shown how the standard analysis of echo questions misses several generalisations which are captured on this account, and how the range of possible interpretations of echo questions may be derived. I have also looked at the similarities between echo questions and other types of metarepresentational utterance - e.g. metalinguistic negation.

I have argued that the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation enables us to deal with echo questions involving not only public representations (e.g. utterances) but also mental representations (e.g. thoughts), not only identity with the original but also loose attributions, and not only the content of the original but also its linguistic properties. My metarepresentational account captures generalisations about the range of questions involving such attributive metarepresentations which alternative accounts fail to capture. I have also argued that it is possible, using the relevance-theoretic notions of metarepresentation and pragmatic enrichment, to show that echo questions are like ordinary interrogatives except in one respect: echo questions metarepresent attributed representations, and require pragmatic enrichment in order to be properly understood. Without taking pragmatic enrichment into account, what is questioned appears not to be the propositional form of the utterance, but something else, e.g. an indirect speech act or implicature. On my relevance-theoretic account, where the proposition expressed may include the higher-level explicatures of the original, the parallel with ordinary interrogatives can be maintained. In the next chapter, I will explore a certain range of 'non-basic' conditionals which may be regarded as metarepresentational, and continue my argument that the relevance-theoretic approach provides a better account than existing alternative accounts.

Chapter 5

Metarepresentational Uses in Conditionals

5.1 Introduction

In chapters 3 and 4, I analysed metalinguistic negation and echo questions as cases of metarepresentational use, and tried to show that my relevance-theoretic account can handle them better than alternative accounts. One advantage of my account is that it allows us to preserve a unitary, truth-functional analysis. In this chapter, I will turn to some uses of conditionals that have been seen as resisting truth-functional treatment, and argue that a reanalysis in metarepresentational terms will allow us to preserve a unitary, truth-functional analysis of 'if'.

The semantics of indicative conditionals (henceforth, simply conditionals) has been much debated. Some people (e.g. Smith 1983; Jackson 1986; Smith and Smith 1988; Grice 1989: chapter 4) claim that natural language 'if' is semantically identical with material implication in logic (whose semantics is given by the truth-table for '$\rightarrow$'; see below). Others (e.g. Stalnaker 1976; Akatsuka 1986; Comrie 1986; van der Auwera 1986, Sweetser 1990; Dancygier 1992, 1993) claim that natural language 'if' encodes some non-truth-functional relation between antecedent and consequent; this is generally seen as *causal* or *consequential*. Both accounts can deal with many 'basic' conditionals which convey a non-truth-functional relation, the only difference being whether this is regarded as pragmatically determined or semantically encoded. Here I shall tentatively adopt the material-implication semantics, assuming that the causal-consequential overtones can be dealt with pragmatically, via enrichment of the proposition expressed.

However, there are further types of conditional which have been seen as presenting problems for the material-implication account. My main concern in this chapter is with these types of 'non-basic' conditional. I will argue that some of them can be interestingly analysed in terms of the notion of metarepresentation developed in earlier chapters, and that this analysis makes it possible to deal with these non-basic types on a material-implication semantic account.

The chapter is organised as follows: in section 2, accounts of natural-language conditionals in general are surveyed. In section 3, 'given' antecedents are reanalysed in metarepresentational terms. In section 4, 'speech-act conditionals' are reanalysed as having metarepresentational consequents. In section 5, it is suggested that some conditionals have both a metarepresentational antecedent and a metarepresentational consequent. Section 6 is a summary and conclusion.

5.2 A Survey of Accounts of Conditionals

Natural-language conditionals appear to be so diverse that the material-implication account cannot deal with all of them. Some conditionals certainly seem to involve non-truth-functional relations between antecedent and consequent, and in the linguistics literature, the causal-consequential semantic approach has been more popular. However, this approach also encounters the problem that not all conditionals involve such a semantic relation between antecedent and consequent. In this section, I will argue that the truth-table material-implication account can deal with conditionals better than the alternative semantic approach, as long as it is combined with proper pragmatic explanations. This section will also be an introduction to the problematic types of conditional which will be dealt with in detail in the following sections.

In the truth-table account (see Lemmon 1965; Allwood *et al.* 1977; Newton-Smith 1985), natural language 'if' is analysed in terms of the truth-table in (1):

(1)	Antecedent	→	Consequent
	T	T	T
	T	F	F
	F	T	T
	F	T	F

(1) says that the whole conditional is true in all circumstances except where the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Consider (2):

(2) If he dies, his son will inherit the castle.

According to the truth-table for material implication, (2) rules out only one possibility: that he dies and his son does not inherit the castle. It is thus equivalent to 'Either he will not die, or his son will inherit the castle'. On this approach, additional meanings like 'His death causes his son's inheritance of the castle' are treated as pragmatically determined. Grice (1989: chapter 4) claims that the additional meanings are conversationally implicated via his Co-operative Principle and maxims; and Smith and Smith (1988) claim that relevance theory can provide a better explanation of those meanings. A further problem, which is again often dealt with pragmatically, involves the so-called 'paradoxes of material implication', which predict that (2) will be true if the antecedent is false, or the consequent is true, regardless of the truth values assigned to other clauses. I will not discuss these problems here in detail, but see Jackson (1987) for a detailed defence of a material-implication semantics for 'if'.

In alternative semantic accounts, some stronger relation than material implication is claimed to be semantically encoded. Akatsuka (1986: 335) sees this as an abstract relation of 'correlation' or 'correspondence', which may be contextually narrowed to causation or consequence. Van der Auwera (1985: 189 - 202, 1986: 200) puts forward a Sufficiency Hypothesis, on which *if p, then q* means that *p* is a sufficient condition for *q*. On this account, (2) entails that his death is a sufficient condition for his son to inherit the castle. These alternative semantic accounts seem to explain why conditional (3) sounds odd, while (2) does not:

(3) If he dies, the butler has a son.

The difference is that in (3), the antecedent cannot normally be a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent, while it is in (2).

However, not all conditionals express sufficient conditions. Consider (4):

(4) If you are hungry, there's a sandwich in the fridge.

In (4), the hearer's hunger is not a sufficient condition for the presence of a sandwich in the fridge. Or consider (5), from Sweetser (1990: 116):

(5) If John went to that party, (then) he was trying to infuriate Miriam.

In (5), John's having gone to that party is not a sufficient condition for his having tried to infuriate Miriam. In neither of these examples is a cause-consequence analysis of conditionals easy to maintain.

Sweetser (1990) tries to deal with these types of conditional while retaining the Sufficiency Hypothesis. She claims that conditionality functions in three different domains: content, epistemic and speech-act domains, and that in each domain the Sufficiency Hypothesis can be maintained. Content conditionals relate events or states of affairs, and indicate that 'the realization of the event or state of affairs described in the protasis [antecedent] is a sufficient condition for the realization of the event or state of affairs described in the apodosis [consequent]' (p. 114). The result is an ordinary, causal interpretation: for example, (2) means that his death causes his son's inheritance of the castle.

In the epistemic domain, the relation is between epistemic states, and the conditional may be paraphrased as 'If *I know* [antecedent], then *I conclude* [consequent]' (Sweetser 1990: 121). For example, (5) is an epistemic conditional which means 'If I know that John went to the party, I conclude that he was trying to infuriate Miriam'. She adds that this gloss is not enough: it is necessary to assume some connection between knowledge and conclusion, which she sees as a causal

connection such that 'the knowledge causes the conclusion' (p. 117). Here the causal link is at the epistemic level. This analysis enables her to maintain her Sufficiency Hypothesis.

Sweetser's speech-act conditionals are analysed as indicating that truth of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for a speech-act involving the consequent. Consider her examples:

(6) If I may say so, that's a crazy idea.

(7) If I haven't already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go.

(8) If it's not rude to ask, what made you decide to leave IBM?

According to Sweetser, each conditional purports to perform the speech-act assigned to the consequent on condition that the antecedent is true. For example, in (6), the conditional is used to state an opinion only conditionally on the hearer's permission. The conditional in (4) belongs to this type. It means something like 'If you are hungry, I inform you that there is a sandwich in the fridge', which can be analysed as indicating that your being hungry is a sufficient condition for my informing you of the existence of the sandwich.

I will not examine the adequacy of Sweetser's three domains for conditionals in detail, but her account of 'speech-act conditionals' is discussed in section 5.4. I should note here, though, that if we maintain the truth-table account, we do not need to postulate the class of 'epistemic conditionals' at all. Compare the content conditional (2) and the epistemic conditional (5). Though the implied relations between antecedent and consequent are different, both share the truth conditions of material implication in logic.[1] That is, (2) rules out the case where he dies and his

[1] See also Smith (1983: 4), where conditionals similar to 'epistemic conditionals' are claimed to have 'if' identifiable with material implication. Sweetser (1990: 117) also notes that 'epistemic conditionals are, not surprisingly, the ones closest in usage to the formal-logical *if-then* structure'. However, Sweetser claims that the truth-

son does not inherit the castle. Similarly, (5) rules out the case where John went to the party and was not trying to infuriate Miriam. Thus the distinction between content and epistemic conditionals is not needed in the truth-table account.

The Sufficiency Hypothesis runs into a real problem in that even when there is no sufficient-condition relation between antecedent and consequent, we do not say that it is **false**. On the Sufficiency Hypothesis, the causal-consequential relation is semantically encoded by 'if':

> 'Here I propose a Sufficiency Hypothesis saying that **a propositional content** *if p, then q* means that *p* is a sufficient condition for *q*'. (my emphasis) (Van der Auwera 1986: 200).

So if there is no such relation between antecedent and consequent, the conditional should be false. But there are many cases where our intuitions seem to go the other way. The following are some examples in which the antecedent is not a sufficient condition for the consequent in any of the three domains.

One type of counterexample to the Sufficiency Hypothesis involves conditionals chosen only for the truth values of antecedent and consequent, as in (9):

(9) If the sun rises in the east, I am innocent.

(9) may be used to emphasise the truth of the consequent, by combining it with an antecedent which is obviously true. This does not seem to fit into any of Sweetser's categories. The sun's rising in the east does not seem to be a sufficient condition for the speaker's innocence, for the speaker's conclusion that she is innocent, or for the assertion that she is innocent. This utterance simply rules out the case where 'The sun rises in the east' is true, and 'I am innocent' is false, as the material-implication analysis predicts. Hence, the Sufficiency Hypothesis seems too strong.

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conditional account does not suffice to ensure the felicitousness of an epistemic conditional.

A second type of counterexample was suggested by Grice (1989: chapter 4), who says one might invent a bridge bid of, say 'Two Hearts', which means 'If I have a red king, I have a black 10'. Here, it is quite clear that there is no causal connection between cards randomly dealt at bridge. The bid, interpreted as communicating this conditional, would simply rule out the case where I have a red king and do not have a black 10. In other words, it functions exactly as predicted by the truth-table account. A famous range of conditionals of this type have been studied in the psychology-of-reasoning literature under the heading 'Selection Task' (for survey and discussion, see Sperber, Cara and Girotto 1995). Here, subjects are shown a set of cards with a number on one side and a letter on the other, and asked which cards they would have to turn over to check the truth of a 'rule' of the form 'If a card has a "G" on one side, it has a "7" on the back'. Here, the domain is clearly content rather than epistemic or speech-act, since it describes facts rather than inferences or utterances. However, there is no causal connection between the values on the front and back of the cards: what is ruled out is merely the possible combination 'G and not-7'. Such conditionals again function exactly as predicted by the truth-table account.

However, if we want to maintain the material-implication account, we need to provide some analysis of those conditionals which do not seem to involve the predicted truth-functional relations. One type is the so-called speech-act conditionals in (6) - (8) above. These do not seem to fit the truth-table account. For example, in (6) ('If I may say so, that's a crazy idea'), the speaker does not seem to be communicating that **either** she may not say that it's a crazy idea **or** it is a crazy idea, as the truth-table account implies. I will attempt to deal with this type of conditional in section 5.4, using the relevance-theoretic notions of metarepresentation and pragmatic enrichment developed earlier in this thesis. I will also argue that these notions shed light on another type of conditional, where the antecedent is often analysed as 'contextually given'. Consider (10):

(10) A: Two and eleven makes thirty.

B: If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on maths.

In (10 B), the conditional is not equivalent to 'Either two and eleven does not make thirty or you need more work on maths', as the truth-table account predicts. (10 B) is also a counterexample to the Sufficiency Hypothesis, because it does not mean that the truth of 'Two and eleven makes thirty' is a sufficient condition for your needing more work on maths, nor for concluding or asserting that you need more work on maths. I will analyse it as having a metarepresentational antecedent. This will be dealt with in the next section.

We have seen that the truth-table account needs to be supplemented with a proper pragmatic analysis, which will allow the hearer to infer a more specific connection between antecedent and consequent when appropriate in the context, and give an explanation for non-basic conditionals. The first part has been attempted by Smith (1983) and Smith and Smith (1988) within the framework of relevance theory. In this chapter, I will concentrate on the second part. Using the notions of metarepresentation and pragmatic enrichment, I hope to show that some of the problematic non-basic conditionals can be analysed as having a metarepresentational antecedent, or consequent, or both, and that the result will allow us to maintain the truth-table analysis of 'if'.

5.3 Metarepresentational Use of Antecedents

A conditional with a 'given' antecedent is generally known as a 'given' conditional. The notion of a 'given' antecedent has been analysed in two different ways: in the stronger sense, a 'given' antecedent must be known (or accepted) by both speaker and hearer; in the weaker sense, it must merely be 'contextually given', i.e. recoverable from the prior discourse but not necessarily accepted by both speaker and hearer. In the literature on conditionals, various claims about 'givenness' of antecedents have been proposed and defended. In this section, I will try to evaluate and reanalyse some of these conditionals using the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation.

5.3.1 'Given' antecedents in the literature

5.3.1.1 'Givenness' in general

The general notion of given-new information has figured prominently in the linguistic literature. Prince (1981) distinguishes three notions of givenness, of which two will concern me here.

In the first sense, an item is 'given' when it is salient in the hearer's consciousness as a result of having been present in the discourse or environment. According to Chafe (1976: 32), an NP is 'given' if its referent has been explicitly introduced in the discourse, or is present in the physical context, or can be categorised in the same way as a referent previously introduced or physically present. I shall talk of such items as 'contextually given'.

The second sense of 'givenness' is one that Prince talks of as involving 'shared knowledge', but not necessarily salience in consciousness. Prince (1981: 230) defines it as follows:

(11) **Givenness$_K$**: The speaker assumes that the hearer 'knows', assumes, or can infer a particular thing (but is not necessarily thinking about it).

An NP is *given* in this sense if its referent has been mentioned in the previous discourse or is 'in the permanent registry' (Kuno 1972: 270), where 'the permanent registry' corresponds to what the speaker assumes about the hearer's assumptions. (Prince 1981: 231) The difference between 'contextual givenness' and 'givenness' as in (11) lies in this 'permanent registry' and consequent possible lack of salience.

Prince claims that the two senses of givenness are related: 'an understanding of givenness in the sense of 'shared knowledge' is germane (and perhaps, prerequisite) to an understanding of givenness in the other two senses' (Prince 1981: 232). In other words, on her view, both senses of 'givenness' involve 'shared knowledge'. It seems to be assumed that when the speaker uses a definite referential NP, she already knows the referent of the NP, and as long as the hearer knows it, it is

regarded as shared knowledge. However, this is not strictly speaking true. For example, when a referential NP is used echoically, the speaker can use the NP without knowing its referent. Consider (12):

(12) *Mary*: I loved the painter.
Peter: You loved **the painter**?

In (12), Peter may have used the echo question because he does not know who 'the painter' refers to. Accordingly, speakers do not always know what/who the NPs they use refer to. Hence, it is misleading to talk of 'givenness' of a metarepresented NP in either of the senses defined above as involving shared knowledge.[2] I will argue that the same point applies to 'given' antecedents, which are not, in fact, typically treated as involving shared knowledge, but more as 'contextually given'.

5.3.1.2 Accounts of given antecedents

Prince's claim that all the senses of 'givenness' involve 'shared knowledge' runs into the same problem with 'given' propositions in general as it does with 'given' NPs. Consider (13):

(13) *Housemaid*: Madam wrote a letter to the gentleman every day. She was in love with him.
Detective: She loved him.

[2] Since the work of Prince (1981), Ariel (1991) has proposed an Accessibility Scale for referring expressions and Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) a Givenness Hierarchy. Both of these involve a linguistic expression (an NP) and a referent in the world; they therefore do not apply to NPs such as those in Peter's utterance in (12), which are not used to refer to a thing in the world, but to metarepresent another NP. See Fretheim and Gundel (eds.) (1996) for recent accounts and arguments about givenness.

In (13), the proposition expressed by the detective's utterance is 'given' in both senses defined above, but it need not be shared knowledge if he has just repeated the housemaid's utterance in order to express doubts about whether it is true. We should not be surprised, then, to find that the same point applies to 'given' antecedents.

Akatsuka (1986) considers the following example of a 'contextually given' antecedent:

(14) *Pope to a telephone operator in a small Swiss village*: I'm the Pope.
Operator: If you're the Pope, I'm the Empress of China.

Akatsuka argues that a contextually given proposition can be presented as the antecedent of a conditional only if it is newly learned *information,* as opposed to speaker's *knowledge.* (My analysis of (14) is in section 5.5.2.) Hence, for her, a 'contextually given' antecedent must not involve shared knowledge.

Sweetser (1990) claims that 'given' antecedents are not always accepted by the speaker. Consider her examples in (15):

(15) a. Well, if (as you say) he had lasagne for lunch, he won't want spaghetti for dinner.
b. If you're so smart (as you seem to think), what was the date of Charlemagne's coronation?

Sweetser points out that the conditional in (15a) can be followed by 'but I don't believe he had lasagne for lunch'. The parenthetical expression in (15b), which she uses in order to indicate a *given* reading, confirms this view. Obviously, 'as you seem to think' shows that *given* means 'accepted or proposed by the hearer', but not necessarily by the speaker. The speaker may not admit that the hearer is 'so' smart. Here, 'given' antecedent seems to mean 'contextually given'.

Both Akatsuka and Sweetser treat 'given' antecedents as 'given' in the sense of 'contextually given', defined above. By contrast, Haiman (1978) treats them as 'given' in the sense of shared knowledge. He comments:

> 'A conditional clause [antecedent] is (perhaps only hypothetically) a part of the knowledge shared by the speaker and his listener. As such, it constitutes the framework which has been selected for the following discourse.' (square brackets mine) (Haiman: 1978 (51))

As far as I can understand from the parenthesis 'perhaps hypothetically', he is not claiming that every antecedent is shared knowledge between speaker and hearer, but that it functions **as if** it is shared between them.[3] So this claim does not prevent us from concluding that 'contextually given' antecedent are not necessarily speaker's knowledge.

5.3.1.3. 'Given' antecedents and speaker's knowledge

The claim that 'given' antecedents are not necessarily speaker's knowledge implies that they may still, on occasion, be shared knowledge. However, Akatsuka (1986) argues that speaker's knowledge can never be presented in antecedents, and only newly learned information can be used. I want to argue against this.

Let us start with Akatsuka's example (16):

(16) [A mother and her son are waiting for the bus on a wintry day. The son is trembling in the cold wind.]
Son: Mommy, I'm so cold.
Mother: Poor thing! If you're so cold, put on my shawl.

Akatsuka claims that in (16), as the fact that her son is cold is *information* which is only indirectly accessible to her, and hence not knowledge, the mother can express it

[3] This claim is contrasted with the claim that conditionals convey the speaker's uncertainty (Akatsuka 1986) or epistemic distance (Dancygier 1993) from the antecedent. See section 5.3.1.3.

as an antecedent of a conditional. By contrast, the son cannot express his inner state in the form of 'if p'; instead he must use 'because' or 'since', as in (17):

(17) *Son*: *If/ Because/ Since I'm so cold, please let me use your shawl.

Akatsuka claims that not only knowledge of the speaker's inner state but other knowledge acquired from direct perception is ruled out in antecedents of conditionals, as in (18), from Akatsuka (1986):

(18) [Son looking out of the window and noticing the rain]
Son: *If it's raining, let's not go to the park!

In (18), 'if' is ruled out because the speaker is a direct experiencer of the proposition. Using these examples, Akatsuka claims that antecedents can only involve newly presented information, not the speaker's own knowledge.

In fact, this claim is too strong. Compare (19a), from Akatsuka (1986), and (19b):

(19) *Son*: (looking out of the window) It's raining, Mommy.
a. *Mother*: (going to the window and noticing the rain herself)
You're right. *If it's raining, let's not go to the park.
b. *Mother*: (following him to the door)
If it's raining, why don't you take an umbrella with you?

According to Akatsuka, the conditional in (19a) is not felicitous because the antecedent involves the speaker's knowledge. Notice, though, that in (19b) the antecedent is acceptable; it does not matter whether the mother has noticed the rain or not. She is asking her son why he does not take an umbrella when he says/knows it is raining. Her antecedent is really equivalent to 'If you know/say it's raining, ...'. The antecedent of the conditional in (19a) may also be possible on a similar interpretation.

In a similar vein, the conditional in (17) can be used in the following context:

(20) *Mother*: Oh, you're cold. Your lips look blue.
Son: If I'm cold, please let me use you shawl.

The antecedent in (20) is acceptable when understood as equivalent to 'If you think/know I am cold'. Hence, not only speaker's knowledge but also speaker's inner state can be presented in antecedents. I want to argue that the antecedents in (18) and (20) are used to metarepresent not the speaker's knowledge, but preceding utterances. For example, in (20), the antecedent metarepresents the hearer's utterance that the speaker is cold. In such cases of interpretive use, an assumption that is in fact known by the speaker can be felicitously used, contrary to Akatsuka's analysis. This argument will be developed further in section 5.3.2.

Here are some more examples of the same general type:

(21) [A mother and her daughter are insisting on their own preferences in a clothes shop.]
Daughter: Mum, I'm a girl.
Mother: If you're a girl, why don't you choose this flower-printed dress?
Daughter: That is really out-of-date. You don't want your daughter to look like a girl fresh from the country, do you?

We can all imagine what is happening. Now, does the fact that the daughter is a girl belong to newly learned information, as Akatsuka would claim? Both the mother and daughter know that she is a girl. The mother is metarepresenting her daughter's utterance in the antecedent of the conditional, meaning 'if you are a girl, as you say/know'.

In fact, even without a previous utterance, speaker's knowledge can be used in an antecedent. Akatsuka considers one such conditional, in (22):

(22) If 2 + 2 = 4, my client is innocent.

She argues (p. 346) that this is a 'rhetorical device' enabling the speaker to show her certainty that the consequent is true. For this analysis to work, the speaker must be certain that 2 + 2 = 4. This goes against Akatsuka's general claim that 'if' is a marker of uncertainty, and cannot be used to introduce speaker's knowledge.

Sweetser (1990) claims that 'given' antecedents cannot be used in content conditionals, which link two events or states of affairs. In her view, if an antecedent is 'given' (in the sense of already known to the speaker and the hearer), the speaker should simply utter *Y*, rather than saying 'If X, then Y', in accordance with the maxim of informativeness. Consider (23), repeated from (15a):

(23) Well, if (as you say) he had lasagne for lunch, he won't want spaghetti for dinner.

In (23), if the speaker and hearer know that 'he' had lasagne for lunch, according to Sweetser, the speaker should simply say, 'He won't want spaghetti for dinner'.

On Sweetser's view, conditional (23) without the parentheses is ambiguous between content and epistemic readings. However, once we regard the antecedent as 'given', the only available reading is epistemic. She contrasts 'given' with 'hypothetical', and claims that antecedents of content conditionals are always hypothetical. However, we need to clarify her notion of 'given' antecedents, since she seems to waver between 'contextually given' and 'shared knowledge' readings. Consider her claim that there are no content-conditionals with 'given' antecedents. According to her, if the speaker and hearer already know the information in the antecedent, there is no need to repeat it in the antecedent clause, in accordance with the maxim of informativeness. Here, she is using 'given' in the sense of shared knowledge. By contrast, in (15), whose antecedent Sweetser says is 'given', the correct sense is 'contextually given'. Sweetser's claim is that 'given' antecedents based on shared knowledge (accepted as true by the speaker) cannot be used in content conditionals. As we have seen above, speaker's knowledge can be used in the antecedent of a conditional as a metarepresentation of another representation, e.g. an attributed utterance or thought.

I would now like to look at her reasons for making this claim. Sweetser claims that it is useful for speakers to present a 'given' antecedent in the epistemic or speech-act domains because these conditionals serve some purposes which content-domain conditionals do not. She calls these purposes 'social', and comments that presenting a speech act as subject to a condition makes it politer (Sweetser 1990: 131 - 132). Moreover, the epistemic and speech-act worlds are intangible; in epistemic conditionals, the display of a reasoning sequence marks the conditional as expressing an epistemic-domain event and, in speech-act conditionals, the use of a speech-act condition may help to show that the conditional is in the speech-act domain.

However, 'given' antecedents in epistemic or speech-act conditionals can be used in the absence of any audience. Consider (24):

(24) [Reading a newspaper on the bomb explosion at Aldwych, A says:]
   a. If a bomb exploded at Aldwych, Waterloo Station (which is near Aldwych) must be closed.
   b. If a bomb exploded at Aldwych, I will not go to school (which is near Aldwych) today.

Here, it is clear that the speaker can use 'given' antecedents in the absence of any hearer. So I doubt that it is only for social reasons that a 'given' antecedent is deleted in content conditionals and used in non-content conditionals.

If antecedents known to both the speaker and hearer can be used to guide the hearer to recognise that the conditionals are epistemic or speech-act, as Sweetser claims, there is no reason why in content conditionals the speaker cannot use a 'given' antecedent to guide the hearer to see the consequential link. Dancygier (1993) sheds light on this point. She claims that 'if' can be a marker, used to signal the speaker's epistemic distance from an antecedent that she does not know or believe to be true. In other conditionals, the speaker can use her knowledge in an antecedent to show the hearer how to arrive at a conclusion, as in (25) - (26):

(25) If two and two make four, four is an even number.

(26) If you're having a steak, you're not a vegetarian.

According to Dancygier, in (25), the speaker, putting aside her knowledge of the fact that two and two make four, presents it as background leading to the conclusion that '4' is an even number. Similarly, in (26), even when the speaker sees the hearer having a steak, she can say (26). Whether the proposition is shared knowledge or not, the *if*-clause can be used to show the consequential link. Here Dancygier (and Sweetser, too) claim that speaker's knowledge can be used as a hypothetical antecedent. It follows that it is not crucial whether the antecedent is speaker's knowledge or not.

To sum up: Akatsuka claims that only newly-learned information (as opposed to knowledge) can be expressed in an antecedent, but admits that knowledge can be used for rhetorical reasons. In the cases where she claims speaker's knowledge cannot be used, we have seen that it can be if it is used metarepresentationally. Sweetser claims that 'given' antecedents cannot appear in content conditionals, but they can be used in non-content conditionals for social or expository reasons. In content conditionals, the antecedent must be understood as hypothetical. Similarly, Dancygier claims that speaker's knowledge can be used as background for argument, when it is presented not as knowledge, but as an assumption. Ultimately, all of them agree that in some cases knowledge can be used in antecedents. What is important is not whether the antecedent is known by the speaker, but whether it is presented as known by the speaker or not. Accordingly, the distinction between information and knowledge is not sufficient to account for the appropriate use of antecedents of conditionals. I will now try to provide a more explanatory account, based on the notion of metarepresentational use.

5.3.2 Metarepresentational antecedents

In 5.3.1, we have seen that 'given' antecedents are neither necessarily shared knowledge nor necessarily information. I propose to analyse them in terms of the notion of metarepresentational use: 'given' antecedents are used to represent another representation in the context, that is, to metarepresent an attributed utterance or thought. As we saw in chapter 2, section 2.3, metarepresentation involves the use of one representation to represent another which it resembles. If the resemblance is in content, it is a case of *interpretive use*. If the resemblance is in form, it is a case of *metalinguistic use*. The original of metarepresentation can be public, private or abstract. Thus, the term 'metarepresentation' covers a variety of subtypes of metarepresentation by resemblance.

5.3.2.1 Varieties of metarepresentational antecedents

Metarepresentational antecedents are those used to represent another representation. As we have seen in previous chapters, what is important in metarepresentation is faithfulness to the original, rather than truthfulness; so the distinction between *information* and *knowledge* is unlikely to play much role in accounting for metarepresentational antecedents. I shall now attempt a categorisation of the various types of metarepresentational antecedent.

First, there are metarepresentational antecedents which are used to represent the proposition expressed by a previous utterance, as in (27):

(27) A: I loved her.
B: If you loved her, why didn't you come to the party?

In (27), the antecedent of B's conditional would be understood as representing A's utterance, as in (28):

(28) a. If you believe/say you loved her, why didn't you come to the party?

b. If you loved her, as you say, why didn't you come to the party?

(28a) is the case where A's utterance including its higher-level explicature is metarepresented, while (28b) metarepresents only the propositional form, with a parenthetical 'as you say'.

The utterances metarepresented can be written as well as spoken, as in (29) and (30):

(29) [Seeing a road sign 'ROADWORKS AHEAD, DELAYS POSSIBLE']

Driver: If delays are possible, delays are necessary.

(30) A: [writing in his notes '2 + 1 = 4']

B: If 2 + 1 = 4, you need more homework.

Here, (29) would communicate something like 'If they say delays are possible...,' and (30) would communicate something like 'If you say 2 + 1 = 4...'. As we have seen, unspoken thoughts may also be interpreted, as in (31):

(31) [Mother raises a finger to her lips, indicating a baby's cot]

Boy: If I have to be quiet, I will play outside.

This would communicate something like 'If you mean I have to be quite...'. For further discussion of these cases, see below.

A second type of metarepresentational antecedent exploits resemblances of linguistic form. I am treating these as metalinguistic uses (see chapter 2). Consider (32) - (33):

(32) A: I like tom[eiDouz](American pronunciation of 'tomatoes').

B: If you like tom[eiDouz], you must be from America.

(33) A: I trapped two mongeese.
B: If you trapped two mongeese, you trapped two mongooses.

(34) A: I called the POlice.
B: If you called the POlice, the poLICE will not come. (jokingly)
(Capital letters indicate the syllable on which word stress falls.)

In (32) - (34), what is metarepresented in the antecedent is not the content of the previous utterance, but its pronunciation, morphology, and word stress, respectively. My analyses of these would parallel those used for the similar examples of metalinguistic negation and echo questions in chapters 3 and 4.

The form of an utterance can also be metarepresented for other reasons. Consider (35) - (36):

(35) A: His father kicked the bucket.
B: If his father kicked the bucket, you don't seem to have respected him.

(36) A: The wine bottle is half-empty.
B: If it is half-empty, you are a pessimist.

In (35), the phrase 'kick the bucket' is singled out because of its register, and in (36), 'half-empty' is singled out because of its emphasis on the dark side of things (as contrasted with 'half-full'). These too are cases of metalinguistic use, which would communicate something equivalent to 'If you say his father "kicked the bucket"', etc.

As these examples show, metarepresentational antecedents allow the speaker to single out not only the proposition expressed by a previous utterance, but also pronunciation, morphology, word stress, register, foci, etc. They thus allow the speaker to represent something *given* in the context - namely a prior utterance or thought. Reanalysing 'given' antecedents in terms of attributive metarepresentational use should enable us to provide a more explanatory and general account of their semantic and pragmatic properties.

5.3.2.2. Truth conditions of metarepresentational antecedents

If we treat 'if' in English as semantically equivalent to material implication, the conditional as a whole will be true in all cases except where *p* is true and *q* is false, and will invariably be equivalent to 'Not-*p* or *q*', and 'Not both *p* and not-*q*'. This truth-table approach (like the Sufficiency Hypothesis) appears to run into problems with some metarepresentational antecedents. Consider (37), repeated from (10):

(37) A: Two and eleven makes thirty.
B: If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on maths.

In (37B), as the proposition literally expressed by the antecedent is false, the whole conditional is predicted as true on the material-implication account. But this is a wrong interpretation. The truth-value relation is not between 'two and eleven makes thirty' and 'you need more word on maths'.

Before examining the truth conditions of metarepresentational antecedents, let us consider (38), which is metarepresentationally, specifically interpretively, used:

(38) [Mary is talking to Peter about her meeting with her supervisor]
Peter: Then what did she say?
Mary: The argument is invalid.

In (38), Mary may be interpreting her supervisor's utterance. In this case, as I have argued in prior chapters, what is important is not whether the argument is really invalid or not, but whether the supervisor said something resembling that or not. In interpretive use, faithfulness, not truthfulness, is important. To put it another way, when intended as a metarepresentation, Mary's utterance in (38) will be true if and only if 'The argument is valid' is a faithful enough interpretation of what her supervisor said.

Consider (37) again. In (B), the antecedent is used to represent A's utterance, including its higher-level explicature. In other words, the proposition expressed by

the antecedent is enriched into 'if you say/believe that two and eleven makes thirty'. The truth conditions of (37) will be correctly assigned as long as this enrichment takes place. My claim is, then, that the relevance-theoretic notions of metarepresentation and pragmatic enrichment make it possible to assign truth conditions correctly to metarepresentational antecedents, using the regular truth table for 'if', as long as the fact that they are metarepresented can be represented via enrichment.

Example (39), repeated from (29), is a case similar to (37), which involves interpretive use plus representation of speech-act information:

(39) [Seeing a road sign 'ROADWORKS AHEAD, DELAYS POSSIBLE']
Driver: If delays are possible, delays are necessary.

Here, as noted above, the proposition expressed is something like 'If *they say* delays are possible, delays are necessary'. The truth-table account applies without problems. Since it is manifest in the circumstances that the antecedent is true (they do say delays are possible), the utterance will implicate that the consequent is also true, i.e. delays are necessary.

Now consider (40) and (41), repeated from (32) and (36), which involve metalinguistic use:

(40) A: I like tom[eiDouz] (American pronunciation of 'tomatoes').
B: If you like tom[eiDouz], you must be from America.

(41) A: The wine bottle is half-empty.
B: If it is half-empty, you are a pessimist.

In (40), the proposition expressed by the antecedent is something like 'If you like things you call "tom[eiDouz]"', or 'If you say you eat "tom[eiDouz]"'. Once the attribution of pronunciation is included in the proposition expressed, the truth-table account of 'if' becomes adequate. The proposition expressed by (41) will be 'If you

say it is "half-empty", you are a pessimist', rather than 'If it is half-empty, you are a pessimist'. Again, since the antecedents are manifestly true and highly salient in the circumstances, the utterances will implicate that the consequents are true.

In this section, we have seen that metarepresentational antecedents can express propositions different from those expressed by descriptively used(i.e. ordinary) antecedents. This is possible as long as pragmatic enrichment processes can flesh out the linguistically encoded material in such a way as to distinguish between descriptive and metarepresentational use. As a result, the truth table for material implication applies to these 'non-basic' conditionals just as it does to more basic ones, and a standard argument against the truth-table account dissolves.

5. 4 Metarepresentational Use of Consequents

5.4.1 Introduction

As we have seen in section 5.2, natural-language 'if' has been analysed in two ways: as equivalent to material implication in logic, or as encoding a causal-consequential link between antecedent and consequent, so that the truth of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent. As we have also seen, some conditionals seem to present problems for both analyses. Consider (42):

(42) If you're thirsty, there's beer in the fridge.

In (42), there is no causal-consequential link between antecedent and consequent. (42) does not mean that the speaker's thirst is sufficient for the presence of beer in the fridge. Nor are its truth conditions adequately given by the truth table for material implication. The truth table says that if the antecedent is false, the conditional will be true regardless of whether the consequent is true or false. But (42) does not suggest that the truth-functional relation is between the hearer's thirst and the presence of beer in the fridge: In fact, regardless of the truth conditions of the antecedent, the

consequent is presented as true. (42) suggests that even if the hearer is not thirsty, the beer is still in the fridge.

In this section, I attempt to give an account of conditionals like (42), using the notion of metarepresentation developed in earlier chapters. My account will be consistent with the view that the 'if' in natural-language conditionals is semantically equivalent to material implication and that any differences are due to pragmatics. I will also argue against the speech-act analysis based on the Sufficiency Hypothesis.

5.4.2 Speech-act accounts

5.4.2.1 Speech-act conditionals

The Sufficiency Hypothesis treats *p* in 'if *p*, *q*' as a sufficient condition for *q*. However, Sweetser (1990), who supports such an analysis, notes that the required sufficiency relation does not exist in (42) ('If you are thirsty, there's beer in the fridge'). She tries to reanalyse this type of conditional as a speech-act conditional, where the truth of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the performance of a speech act involving the consequent. Thus, (42) would be analysed as conditionally informing the hearer that there's beer in the fridge, the condition being that the hearer is thirsty.

Van der Auwera (1986), who also supports the Sufficiency Hypothesis, has a similar but more restrictive view of speech-act conditionals. He regards as speech-act conditionals only those whose antecedents directly involves one of the Gricean maxims of conversation or politeness. Examples are given in (43) - (45):

(43) If I can speak frankly, he doesn't have a chance.

(44) Where were you last night, if you wouldn't mind telling me?

(45) Open the window, if I may ask you to.

In these conditionals, according to van de Auwera, the antecedent, *p*, is not presented as a sufficient condition for *q*. Instead, it is presented as a sufficient condition for the performance of a speech-act involving *q* - in (43) an assertion, in (44) a question, and in (45) a request. Van der Auwera sees these utterances as performing 'conditional speech-acts', and analyses (45), for example, along the lines of (46), where '|→' = the speech-act operator of assertion, '!' = the speech-act operator for requests, and '→' = a sufficient condition):

(46) |→ ((I may ask you to open the window) → (!(you open the window)))

This means, roughly, 'I assert that on condition that I may ask you to open the window, I ask you to open the window'. In (46), the wide scope speech act is an assertion '|→', and the antecedent is outside the scope of the imperative '!'. The imperative speech act is performed under the condition presented in the antecedent, hence the term 'conditional speech act'. Van der Auwera comments that (46) is both an imperative and an assertion about that imperative.

Lauerbach (1979: 215 - 53) analyses the conditionals in (43) - (45) in Gricean terms: the antecedent is a comment on a conversational or politeness maxim concerning the speech-act performed by the consequent, and functions as an indicator of politeness or of opting out of a maxim. Van der Auwera, who adopts the same terminology, argues that 'conditional speech-acts' occur only in these 'commentative conditionals', and constitute a 'very idiomatic type of speech act'.

Van der Auwera distinguishes commentative conditional speech acts, such as those in (43) - (45) from a range of ordinary ('non-commentative') speech acts about conditionals, which he analyses in different terms. Consider (47), from van der Auwera (1986: 198):

(47) If you saw John, did you talk to him?

Holdcroft (1971: 129) treats (47) as performing a conditional speech-act. By contrast, van der Auwera treats it as asking a question about an ordinary conditional.

In his view, the only difference between (47) and ordinary conditionals is that the antecedent is expected to have a positive answer: in other words, it is 'given' in the sense discussed in the last section. Van der Auwera then proposes the following rule, which applies to interrogative conditionals with given antecedents:

(48) $(?(p \rightarrow q) \wedge \text{GIVEN}(p)) \rightarrow ?(q)$

According to (48), an interrogative conditional ($?(p \rightarrow q)$) with a 'given' antecedent (GIVEN (p)) indirectly perform a speech act of questioning the consequent ($?(q)$). The effect is similar to that of the formulation given in (46), but for different reasons. In short, van der Auwera's basic contention is that all alleged 'conditional speech acts' should be analysed as involving ordinary conditionals, except for the limited cases of commentative conditional speech acts such as those in (43) - (45).

However, it seems that many non-commentative conditionals cannot be analysed as ordinary conditionals whose antecedents are 'given', in either sense of 'taken to be true' or 'contextually given'. (42) is a case in point. In (42), the antecedent has nothing to do with Gricean maxims of conversation or politeness, so it is not a commentative conditional in van der Auwera's sense. However, it does not have a 'given' antecedent, either. If we formulate it in accordance with van der Auwera's analysis, the result will be as in (49):

(49) $(\vdash\!\rightarrow$ (*you are thirsty* $\rightarrow$ *there's beer in the fridge*) $\wedge$ GIVEN (*you are thirsty*) $\rightarrow (\vdash\!\rightarrow$ (*there's beer in the fridge*))

where '$\vdash\!\rightarrow$' = assertion, '$\rightarrow$' = a sufficiency condition, and '$\wedge$' = conjunction. The point is that (42) does not mean something like (49); the antecedent is not given in the context in the relevant sense. Moreover, as noted above, the fact that someone is thirsty is not generally a sufficient condition for the presence of beer in the fridge, so '(you are thirsty $\rightarrow$ there's beer in the fridge)' in (49) presents a problem for this analysis. I will provide further arguments against it, in section 5.4.2.3.

As noted above, Sweetser (1990) analyses speech-act conditionals as performing conditional speech acts in a less restrictive sense than van der Auwera's, which she paraphrases as 'If p, then let us consider that I perform this speech act' (p.121). Consider her examples (6) - (8), repeated below as (50) - (52):

(50) If I may say so, that's a crazy idea.

(51) If I haven't already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go.

(52) If it's not rude to ask, what made you decide to leave IBM?

According to Sweetser, these conditionals purport to perform the speech-act assigned to the consequent only on the condition stated in the antecedent. For example, in (50), the conditional is used to state an opinion only if the hearer permits it. In Sweetser's account, the felicity conditions picked out by the antecedents are those proposed by Searle (1969), Lakoff (1973) or Grice (1975). For example, she applies Lakoff's maxim 'Leave options' to the conditionals in (50) and (52): if the conditional forces the hearer to accept the opinion or to answer the question without any option, (50) is not an appropriate statement and (52) is not an appropriate question.

This is similar to van der Auwera's Gricean analysis of '(commentative) conditional speech acts'. The main difference is that Sweetser includes cases where the antecedent **implicitly** refers to the conditions, whereas van der Auwera does not. She comments:

> 'It thus becomes clear that there are a great variety of conditional speech acts, some more overtly referring to the general felicity conditions on the relevant class of speech acts, while others refer implicitly to these general conditions by referring overtly to some more specific felicity condition on the particular utterance (a sub-case of the general condition).' (Sweetser 1990: 121)

Consider her example (53):

(53) If you went to the party, was John there?

Sweetser claims that (53) can be interpreted as meaning '*If* you went to the party, *then* consider that *I ask you* whether John was there'. The hearer's going to the party would enable him to have the relevant knowledge to answer the question. A higher-level paraphrase might be, 'If you *do* know the answer, then take me as asking this question seriously'. Sweetser includes this kind of conditional in her class of speech-act conditionals, whereas van der Auwera does not.

5.4.2.2 Metalinguistic conditionals

Horn (1989: chapter 6) claims that the conditional operator 'if' can be used either descriptively or metalinguistically; when used descriptively, it is equivalent to material implication, but when used metalinguistically, it is not. Here are some of his examples of metalinguistic conditionals:

(54) If you're thirsty, there's some beer in the fridge.

(55) If you haven't already heard, Punxsutawny Phil saw his shadow this morning.

(56) If I may say so, you're looking particularly lovely tonight.

According to Horn, the antecedents in (54) - (56) specify 'a sufficient condition for the appropriateness or legitimacy of asserting the consequent' (Horn 1989: 380). This analysis is nearly identical with Sweetser's analysis of speech-act conditionals, except that it relates only to declarative consequents. If we extend it to non-declarative consequents, the result will be very similar to Sweetser's.

Another type of 'metalinguistic conditional' discussed in Horn (1989: 380 - 381) includes the following examples from Ducrot (1972: 175 - 178):

(57) If the Cité is the heart of Paris, the Latin Quarter is its soul.

(58) If the Bois de Boulogne is the lungs of Paris, the neighbourhood square is its pores.

Horn says that these conditionals mean, 'If you're willing to grant p, you must equally grant q' (Horn 1989: 381). These are not speech-act conditionals, in that the antecedents do not state felicity conditions for the speech-acts performed by the consequents. They will be dealt with in section 5.5.3.

Horn's position might be described as middle-of-the-road. For descriptive conditionals, he uses the truth-table account, while for metalinguistic conditionals, which do not seem to be truth-functional, he uses a Sufficiency Condition account and its notion of speech-act conditionals. Though he regards these different uses as resulting in a pragmatic ambiguity, they also seem to imply a semantic ambiguity: 'if' is either logical or metalinguistic, and the two meanings are irreducible to each other. This account faces not only all the problems of speech-act accounts, but all the problems of ambiguity accounts. (See chapter 3, section 3.2.1.1.)

Finally, a look at Dancygier's notion of metatextual conditionals is in order. Dancygier (1992) holds the same idea about speech-act conditionals as Sweetser, but she also discusses a class of metatextual conditionals, which she sees as different from speech-act conditionals. They include the following:

(59) a. He trapped two mongeese, if that's how you make a plural of 'mongoose'.
b. He trapped two mongeese, if 'mongeese' is the right form.

(60) a. Grandma is feeling lousy, if I may put it that way.
b. Grandma is feeling lousy, if that's an appropriate expression.

(61) a. Chris managed to solve the problem, if solving it was in any way difficult for him.

b. Chris managed to solve the problem, if 'manage' is the right word.

(62) The Queen of England is happy, if not ecstatic.[4]

Regarding these conditionals, Dancygier comments that the antecedent may highlight a certain fragment of the consequent by echoing it, as in (59b) and (61b), or referring to it anaphorically, as in (60b). It may also offer a repair, as in (62), or explain the reasons why the speaker is not sure about the appropriateness of some expression, as in (59a), (60a), and (61a). To generalise, 'The speaker ... is not sure if she chose the right expression to render an aspect of the utterance - whether pertaining to form or interpretation. To mark the lack of certainty, the speaker appends to the utterance an *if*-clause expressing her doubt about a part of the text' (Dancygier 1992: 70).

Horn's metalinguistic conditionals and Dancygier's metatextual conditionals differ as to what the antecedent is commenting on: the antecedents of metatextual conditionals are commenting on the linguistic properties of the consequents, while the antecedents of metalinguistic conditionals are commenting on the assertability of the consequents. I think that these two types do belong to the same class as speech-act conditionals,[5] which contrast with ordinary conditionals. Dancygier (1992: 71) also says:

> 'The similarities are not incidental. Both speech-act and metatextual clauses are comments on utterances presented in their "consequents", and are thus

[4] This elliptical conditional is claimed to be ambiguous between ordinary and concessive readings. The one used as an example of metatextual conditionals is the ordinary case, which means 'The Queen of England is happy, and maybe even ecstatic'. On the concessive reading, it means, 'The Queen of England is happy, though she is not ecstatic'. Wilson (1970) also points out this ambiguity.

[5] Quirk et al. (1985: 15.38) define both types as involving an 'indirect condition', which is contrasted with the 'direct condition' of the truth-functional relation.

markedly different from standard conditionals, which express a content relation between clauses (in the sense introduced by Sweetser 1990).'

In both cases, the standard semantic analysis of 'if' as material implication, or as a sufficiency condition relating contents, is violated. Postulating metatextual conditionals is not a new approach, but an extension of speech-act accounts. If we could generalise them into one category, the analysis would be more explanatory.

To sum up: there are some conditionals which do not appear to express a truth-functional relation or a sufficiency relation between the literally expressed propositions. Van der Auwera and Sweetser argue for an analysis in terms of speech-act conditionals, to preserve the Sufficiency Condition account. Horn tries to analyse them as metalinguistic conditionals. Dancygier admits the existence of speech-act conditionals, and postulates another related type of conditional (which she calls metatextual conditionals) in which the antecedents comment on the linguistic properties of their consequents, rather than on the speech-acts performed by their consequents. All these are seen as based on the same type of Sufficiency Condition analysis as speech-act conditionals. Thus, accounts of both metalinguistic and metatextual conditionals should face the same problems as accounts of speech-act conditionals.

5.4.2.3 Some problems with speech-act accounts

Here I will argue only against Sweetser (1990), but since van der Auwera (1986) and Horn (1989) offer similar analyses, my arguments should also raise problems for their accounts.

One problem is that though speech-act accounts appear able to deal with so-called speech-act conditionals, there are some conditionals which are neither content nor epistemic, and cannot be dealt with by those accounts. Consider (63) - (64):

(63) [Son to Mother who is going out:]
Mum, don't worry. If I'm hungry, there's a sandwich in the fridge.

(64) If he dies without a will, I am his son, though not from his first marriage.

(63) is neither a content nor an epistemic conditional. It does not mean that the speaker's hunger is sufficient for the presence of the sandwich, nor that knowing he is hungry will lead him to conclude that the sandwich is in the fridge. Rather, it is very similar to speech-act conditionals, in Sweetser's terms. But it does not mean that if the speaker is hungry, he will be performing a speech-act of informing someone/asserting that there is a sandwich in the fridge or offering the sandwich. The speaker's hunger cannot be a felicity condition for informing his mother that there is a sandwich in the fridge. Indeed, the truth of the antecedent will be established in the future, whereas the consequent is being asserted now. Similar arguments hold for (64). The father's death will happen some day in the future but the consequent is being asserted now (as Sweetser (1990: 118) acknowledges, noting of these examples that 'their actual pragmatic status is somewhat nebulous'). And, as in (63), the father's death in (64) is not a felicity condition on asserting that he is his son.

Another problem is that some consequents seem to invoke a speech act to be performed by the hearer, rather than the current speaker. Consider (65):

(65) [The door bell is ringing.]
Mary to Jane: If that's John, I'm not here.

(66) If anyone talks to you about the treasure map, you don't know anything about it, you have never heard of it.

In (65), the conditional is neither a content nor an epistemic conditional. Is it then a speech-act conditional? What kind of speech act could the speaker be performing with the consequent 'I'm not here'? Whatever it may be, the truth of the antecedent will not be a felicity condition on the speech-act. The same holds of (66). In both

cases, intuitively, the speaker is telling the hearer what to say if the antecedent turns out to be true. Such cases are not normally considered in the literature.

There are many other types of conditional similar to speech-act conditionals, but the antecedents do not state a felicity condition for the speech act performed by the consequents. Consider (67) - (68):

(67) The war was started by the other side, if you remember your history lessons.
(Quirk *et al.* 1985: §15.38)

(68) I am very interested in foreign stamps, if you get any letters from abroad.
(Davies 1979: 1042)

(67) is very similar to the genuine speech-act conditional 'The war was started by the other side, if you don't remember your history lessons', where the antecedent is likely to state a felicity condition for informing the hearer of the consequent. In (67), however, it is not obvious what kind of felicity condition the hearer's remembering the lessons could be. In (68), which Davies (1979: 1042) argues is not a speech-act conditional, again the antecedent does not seem to state a felicity condition for informing the hearer of the consequent.

To conclude: speech-act accounts cannot accommodate all these cases. So we need another approach which can cover a wider range of conditionals, including not only speech-act conditionals but also the further examples given above.

5.4.3 A metarepresentational account

5.4.3.1 Metarepresentational consequents

In section 5.4.2.3, we have seen that there are some conditionals which speech-act accounts cannot deal with. I will look at these first, and then extend the account to 'speech-act conditionals' proper. Consider (69), repeated from (65):

(69) [The door bell is ringing.]
Mary to Jane: If that's John, I'm not here.

This conditional is different from standard speech-act conditionals in that the antecedent is not commenting on the consequent, either on its linguistic properties or on the speech act performed. I propose to treat this consequent as metarepresenting an utterance which the speaker wants the hearer to make in the situation described by the antecedent, that is, a desirable utterance (see chapter 2, section 2.5.2).

As we have seen above, metarepresentational use is different from descriptive use in that it does not describe a state of affairs, but represents another representation in virtue of resemblance in content or form; resemblance in content results in interpretive use, and resemblance in form in metalinguistic use. Conditional (69) is a case of interpretive use: it communicates that in the situation where the visitor is John, the speaker wants the hearer to tell him that she is not there. Or consider (70), repeated from (66):

(70) If anyone talks to you about the treasure map, you do not know anything, you have never heard of it.

This conveys to the hearer that if someone talks about the treasure map, he should say that he does not know anything about it. It is a case of interpretive use, where the content of a desirable utterance is being represented.

Metarepresentation can also involve metalinguistic use. For example, an utterance may be metarepresented as direct rather than indirect speech. Consider (71) - (72):

(71) [At a primary school, a teacher to a new student:]
If you come across me in school, 'How are you Miss Smith?' Understand?

(72) [The door bell is ringing.]
Mary to Jane: If that's John, 'Sorry, I'm afraid she's out'.

In (71), the consequent directly quotes the utterance that the student should make. It is hard to analyse this as involving a speech-act performed by the speaker (i.e. the teacher), nor is the antecedent a felicity condition for such a speech-act. The same holds for (72).

The utterances metarepresented in consequents of this type are not restricted to those that the speaker wants the hearer to produce. The speaker can metarepresent a desirable utterance which she herself would like to make in the case that the antecedent is true. Consider (73) - (74):

(73) If I don't see you before then, 'Merry Christmas!'

(74) If you are the winner, 'Congratulations!'

In these conditionals, the consequent metarepresents the utterance that the speaker would want to make in the case that the antecedent is true. For example, (73) means that the speaker would like to say 'Merry Christmas!' on the assumption that she will not see the hearer before Christmas. Whether she meets the hearer before Christmas or not, he can see what she wants to do. The same holds for (74). Has the speaker of (74) performed the speech act of congratulating? That is not entirely within her power: you cannot succeed in congratulating someone who is not a winner. What the speaker can do is metarepresent an utterance she would like to make, assuming that the appropriate conditions hold. And this is what she does. Notice too that in (73), the antecedent does not state a felicity condition for the greeting. If I wish you 'Merry Christmas!', and we meet again before Christmas, we do not say that the wish was infelicitous. So the antecedent of (73) does not involve a speech-act condition, as Sweetser would have to claim.

Let us look now at conditionals where the antecedent represents a future state of affairs. Consider (75) - (76), repeated from (63) - (64):

(75) [Son to Mother who is going out:]
Mum, don't worry. If I'm hungry, there's a sandwich in the fridge.

(76) If he dies without a will, I am his son, though not from his first marriage.

In (75), the consequent of the conditional metarepresents a thought that would be relevant to the speaker if the antecedent were true. So the conditional communicates that if the speaker gets hungry, which his mother may be worrying about, it will be relevant for him to remember that there's a sandwich in the fridge. (This is a case where what is metarepresented is a thought, not an utterance.) A similar analysis holds for (76). If the father dies without a will, it will be relevant for the hearer to remember (or the speaker to assert that) he is his son (who can inherit his property). Here, the consequent metarepresents a desirable utterance or thought.

Now let us apply this approach to 'speech-act conditionals' proper. Consider (77) and (78), repeated from (51) and (52):

(77) If I haven't already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go.

(78) If it's not rude to ask, what made you decide to leave IBM?

In (77), the speaker is metarepresenting a direction which she would want to give if the condition stated in the antecedent is satisfied. Similarly, in (78), the consequent can be said to metarepresent a question which she would want to ask if it was not rude. Accordingly, the new approach can deal with speech-act conditionals in the same way as it deals with the counterexamples to the speech-act approach. All these are the cases of metarepresentation of a desirable utterance or thought.

Metatextual conditionals can also be handled in metarepresentational terms. Consider (59) - (60), repeated as (79) - (80) below:

(79) a. He trapped two mongeese, if that's how you make a plural of 'mongoose'.
b. He trapped two mongeese, if 'mongeese' is the right form.

(80) a. Grandma is feeling lousy, if I may put it that way.
b. Grandma is feeling lousy, if that's an appropriate expression,

In (79), we can say that in the consequent, the speaker metarepresents a term that she would want to use if it's the right one. This is a case of metalinguistic use. Notice that this is compatible with the view that the rest of the consequent is descriptively used - an option that seems incompatible with standard speech-act accounts, and may explain why metatextual conditionals are not analysed by Dancygier in speech-act terms. It contrasts with the case where the whole utterance is metarepresented, as in (73) - (74). The same holds for (80).

The main difference between the speech-act account and the metarepresentational account I have sketched here is that on the speech-act account, a speech-act is performed at the time of the utterance and by the speaker, whereas a metarepresentation can represent not only past or present utterances and thoughts, but also future or possible ones. A second difference is that the metarepresentational account can deal with the cases where linguistic forms are represented, as in e.g. 'metatextual' conditionals. A third difference is that the metarepresentational account can explain how the consequent can have interrogative or imperative form. The consequent can have those forms because it is used to metarepresent another representation, i.e. an interrogative or an imperative utterance, which is implicitly embedded under a speech-act or propositional-attitude verb. This is a problem for the speech-act account, since in general the force of the main clause of a conditional should determine the force of the utterance as a whole - but as we can see in van der Auwera's analysis in (46) above, the consequent is imperative, while the whole conditional is analysed as an assertion. Finally, as it is used to metarepresent another representation, the proposition literally expressed by the consequent is given a guarantee not of truthfulness, but of faithfulness. This explains why the consequents

in these conditionals do not have a regular truth-functional relation with their antecedents, which describe a state of affairs in the world.

5.4.3.2 Truth conditions of metarepresentational consequents

Now we need to examine the truth conditions of these conditionals. As mentioned in the introduction to this section, these conditionals have been seen as distinguished from ordinary conditionals by their supposedly non-truth-functional status. However, if we analyse them as metarepresentational, we can see that they do involve a truth-functional relation between propositions. Before putting the case, we need to recall two points. One is that a metarepresentational utterance should be faithful rather than truthful, and its truth conditions are different from those of descriptive use. As we have seen in many places above, when an utterance is intended as a metarepresentation, it will be true if and only if it is a faithful enough metarepresentation of the original being metarepresented.

A second point is that declarative and non-declarative sentences share a propositional form. Consider (81) - (83):

(81) John will go to school.

(82) Will John go to school?

(83) (To John) Go to school.

All these utterances have something like (84) as their propositional form:

(84) [John will go to school]

The difference is in their higher-level explicatures: in speech-act terms, in (81) the speaker is saying that P, in (82) she is asking whether P, and in (83) she is telling the

hearer to make it true that P; in propositional attitude terms, in (81) the speaker is presenting P as a description of a state of affairs, in (82) she is presenting P as an interpretation of a desirable thought, and in (83) she is presenting P as a true description of a desirable state of affairs. (See Wilson and Sperber 1988a; Clark 1991, 1993a for details.) By the same token, conditionals with declarative, interrogative, or imperative consequents should be seen as having the same propositional forms, regardless of the different speech acts they may perform; the truth-functional relation should hold at the level of propositional form.[6]

Now let us look at conditional (85), repeated from (69):

(85) [The door bell is ringing.]
Mary to Jane: If that's John, I'm not here.

In (85), the consequent metarepresents the utterance that Mary wants Jane to make if John is at the door. I propose to consider the truth conditions of these conditionals in the same way as we did in the last section. That is, the fact that something is metarepresented should be included in the propositional form, as in (86):

(86) If [that's John], [you tell him I am not here]

In (86), the antecedent and consequent have a regular truth-functional relation, as predicted by the truth table for material implication. Notice that the consequent of (86) can have the same propositional form regardless of whether it is a declarative, interrogative or imperative sentence. In (86), the hearer is being tacitly requested to make true a conditional of the form 'If John's at the door, you (the hearer) tell him I am not here'. So the information communicated by (85) will be something like (87):

[6] Sweetser seems not to consider this point. She says (1990: 142) 'The analysis of epistemic and speech-act conditionals presents particularly strong evidence for a non-truth-functional, sufficient-conditional analysis of *if-then* sentences in natural language. First of all, the "apodoses" [consequent clauses] of conditional speech acts often have no truth-values, since they can be questions, commands, or requests as easily as assertions.'

(87) The following is a desirable state of affairs:
If [that's John], [you tell him I am not here]

Now we have a proposition which expresses a regular truth-functional relation between antecedent and consequent.

Now consider an interrogative example:

(88) [The door bell is ringing. Jane knows that Mary does not want to see John]
Jane to Mary: If that's John, are you not here?

This is more complicated than (85) in that it involves two layers of metarepresentation: one for interrogatives and one for attributed speech, as well as being tacitly requestive, in the same way as (85). But we can apply our analysis in the same basic way. In (88), the consequent is interrogative, as seen in the description in (89):

(89) The following would be a relevant thought if true:
If [that's John], [you want me to tell him you are not here]

In (89), the consequent has a requestive element, which would be further analysed along the lines proposed above for (85). The result would be something like (89'):

(89') The following would be a relevant thought if true:
The following is a desirable state of affairs:
If [that's John], [I tell him you are not here]

The utterance is thus equivalent to, 'I want to know whether you want me to make it true that if that's John, I tell him you are not here'. In (89'), we can see that the propositional form of the conditional has a regular truth-functional relation.[7]

Deirdre Wilson (personal communication) points out that a consequent can be ambiguous between descriptive and metarepresentational uses. Consider (90):

(90) If you are available, our meeting will be in Hilary Term.

This can be interpreted as a regular descriptive conditional, or as a conditional with a metarepresentational consequent, as in (91):

(91) a. We will meet in Hilary Term on condition that you are able to come and speak to us then.

b. If you are available, we would want to let you know that our next meeting will be in Hilary Term.

In (91a), the consequent is used to describe a state of affairs and in (91b), it is used to metarepresent information that would be relevant to the hearer if the antecedent were true. We can clearly see the different truth conditions of the two uses of language (i.e. descriptive and metarepresentational) determined by the different propositions expressed by the conditional.

In this section, I have discussed 'speech-act conditionals'. I have argued that speech-act accounts (where the antecedent clause is a felicity condition for the speech

[7] On my account, the truth-functional relation holds at the level of propositional form. By contrast, on Sweetser's account, the Sufficiency Condition is not always applied at this level. Consider (i) (Sweetser 1990: 119):

(i) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.

Sweetser analyses the consequent as an implicit or indirect *offer*, and treats the antecedent as related to this indirect speech act, as in 'I hereby *offer* you some biscuits on the sideboard, *if* you want them' (p. 119). It is not clear how the antecedent can be semantically linked to an indirect speech act performed by the consequent.

act supposed to be performed by the consequent clause) are faced with many counterexamples. I have proposed to analyse the consequents of certain conditionals as involving metarepresentational use in the sense defined in relevance theory. This analysis can handle not only speech-act conditionals but also some counterexamples to the speech-act approach. Using the relevance-theoretic notions of metarepresentation and pragmatic enrichment should enable us to maintain that natural-language 'if' is semantically equivalent to material implication.

5.5 Metarepresentational Use in Antecedent and Consequent

We have seen in section 5.3 some cases where the antecedent is metarepresentationally used, and in section 5.4 some cases where the consequent is metarepresentationally used. In this section, I shall suggest that some conditionals can be analysed as having both a metarepresentational antecedent and a metarepresentational consequent.

5.5.1 Metarepresentational uses in both clauses of a conditional

If antecedents and consequents can be metarepresentationally used, we should expect there to be cases where both clauses are so used. Consider (92):

(92) *Travel agent*: Mexico City is beautiful.
Customer: If Mexico City is beautiful, do they have a room?

In (92), the propositions 'Mexico City is beautiful' and 'they have a room' are not put forward as truth-functionally related. That is, the speaker is not asking whether they have a room if Mexico City is beautiful. Rather, the antecedent is used to metarepresent A's utterance, meaning either 'If you say/think Mexico City is beautiful', or 'If Mexico city is beautiful, as you say'; and the consequent is used to

metarepresent an utterance which B wants to make in the case where the antecedent is *uttered* or *entertained.* The proposition expressed will be something like (93a) or (93b):

(93) a. If you say/think Mexico City is beautiful, I want to ask 'do they have a room?'

b. If Mexico City is beautiful, as you say, I want to ask 'do they have a room?'

(These propositions will in turn be unpacked in the way outlined for (88) above.) This is a case where both clauses are interpretively used.

There are also examples where both clauses are metalinguistically used. Consider (94):

(94) A: I like tom[eiDouz].

B: If you like tom[eiDouz], I like tom[a:touz].

In (94), the antecedent is used to metarepresent A's pronunciation of 'tomatoes' and the consequent is used to metarepresent B's pronunciation of 'tomatoes'. (In (94B), there is no sufficiency relation in any of Sweetser's three domains.) The proposition expressed by the conditional will be something like 'If you say you like "tom[eiDouz]", I say I like "tom[a:touz]"', or 'If you like what you call "tom[eiDouz]", I like what I call "tom[a:touz]"'. This can be truth-functionally analysed in the regular way.

5.5.2. Counterfactual indicative conditionals

Akatsuka (1986) calls the conditional in (95), repeated from (14), a 'counterfactual indicative conditional', in the sense that both the antecedent and the consequent are presented as false:

(95) *Pope to a telephone operator in a small Swiss village*: I'm the Pope.
Operator: If you're the Pope, I'm the Empress of China.

Akatsuka claims that this conditional is used as a denial of a 'given' assertion, which she represents as in (96):

(96) *Pope*: p
Operator: If p, as you say, then q

In (96), on her analysis, *p* is a 'contextually given' antecedent which is a quotation, and *q* conveys the speaker's attitude to the quotation. So in (95), the speaker expresses her dissociative attitude to what was given by the hearer, i.e. 'I am the Pope'.

I would like to suggest that (95) means something like 'If you say you're the Pope, I say I'm the Empress of China'. The antecedent is used to represent the hearer's utterance, and the consequent is used to represent an utterance that the speaker wants to make in the case where the proposition expressed by the antecedent is uttered/entertained. The speaker is not describing a state of affairs where she is the Empress of China. She is asserting that if the hearer is saying that he is the Pope, she will say that she is the Empress of China. Both utterances are presented as blatantly false.

The main advantage of this treatment is that it allows a unitary account of these conditionals and corresponding non-conditionals of the type in (97):

(97) A: I'm the Pope.
B: And I'm the Empress of China.

As Dan Sperber has suggested (personal communication), (B) is best analysed as echoing/mimicking at a rather abstract level the utterance in (A). What (A) and (B) have in common, and hence what is being echoed back in (B), is the property of being

patently false. My analysis of the conditionals in (95) allows us to preserve this intuitive idea of how such utterances function as abstract echoes.

5.5.3. Horn's metalinguistic metaphorical conditionals

In 5.4.2.2, I mentioned that Horn analyses the metaphorical conditionals in (57) - (58), repeated as (98) - (99) below, as metalinguistic:

(98) If the Cité is the heart of Paris, the Latin Quarter is its soul.

(99) If the Bois de Boulogne is the lungs of Paris, the neighbourhood square is its pores.

I think that in (98), too, a metarepresentational account might be of use. The antecedent represents the thought/utterance that the Cité is the heart of Paris, meaning 'If we think/say the Cité is the heart of Paris'. The consequent represents a thought/an utterance which the speaker wants to make in the case that the antecedent is thought/uttered, meaning something like 'We should think/say the Latin Quarter is its soul'. The same account holds for (99).

In this section, I have suggested that 'counterfactual indicative conditionals' and Horn's metalinguistic metaphorical conditionals should be analysed as belonging to the same type, i.e. the type where both the antecedent and the consequent are used to represent another representation, but not to describe a state of affairs. This is not a fully worked out idea, but I think it is worth pursuing.

5. 6 Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that some 'non-basic' conditionals (i.e. 'given' conditionals and speech-act conditionals) can be analysed in terms of the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation. This has enabled us to get the right interpretation of an antecedent or consequent and maintain the truth-table account for 'non-basic' as well as 'basic' conditionals.

I have explored 'given' antecedents (or 'given' conditionals), and argued that a 'given' antecedent need not necessarily be shared knowledge or newly learned information. What is essential is that it is a metarepresentation of an attributed utterance or thought. As I have claimed in previous chapters, metarepresentations need to be pragmatically enriched. If the 'given' antecedents are properly enriched, the relation between antecedent and consequent turns out to be truth-functional.

I have also looked at 'speech-act conditionals'. On speech-act and other similar accounts based on the Sufficiency Hypothesis, the antecedent of a 'speech-act conditional' is analysed as stating a felicity condition on the speech act performed by the consequent. I have discussed some counterexamples which cannot be dealt with by those accounts, and proposed an alternative analysis on which the consequent is used to metarepresent a desirable thought or utterance. This metarepresentational account can deal with 'speech-act conditionals' as well as the counterexamples to the speech-act account. I have also argued that once the metarepresentational consequent is pragmatically enriched, the truth-functional relation between antecedent and consequent is preserved; and I have illustrated this claim using several different types of examples.

Finally, I have suggested that there should be cases where both antecedent and consequent clauses are metarepresentational, and argued that so-called 'counterfactual indicative conditionals' and Horn's metalinguistic metaphorical conditionals can be analysed along these lines.

Metarepresentations of the type I have looked at in this chapter are not generally considered as quotations; most are cases neither of mention nor of reported speech. As a result, the theories of quotation which we have examined in chapter 1

cannot deal with these cases, and miss a generalisation. My account enables us to capture both the similarities and the differences between quotations and metarepresentations. It is thus preferable to standard accounts of quotation on both descriptive and explanatory grounds.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have argued that the relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation can be fruitfully applied both to paradigmatic cases of quotation (mention, reported speech and thought, mixed quotation) and to a variety of non-central cases that are not generally treated together with paradigmatic cases of quotation. What all these cases have in common is that a representation is used to represent another representation, which it resembles in some respect, e.g. in content or in form. I have argued that what is crucial in metarepresentational use is that the representation should be adequately faithful to the original; I have also tried to show that the presence or absence of metarepresentational use makes a difference to the truth conditions (or acceptability conditions) of utterances in which it occurs.

The relevance-theoretic notion of metarepresentation allows for variation along the following parameters, not all of which may be linguistically marked: (i) the type of the original being metarepresented, which may be public (e.g. utterances), private (e.g. thoughts) or abstract (e.g. propositions or linguistic expressions); (ii) the source of the original, which may be the hearer, the speaker herself, or some other person or group of people; (iii) the degree of the resemblance between the metarepresentation and the original, which ranges from full identity to weak or partial resemblance; (iv) the type of shared properties involved, which may include logical and/or linguistic properties (phonetic, syntactic, graphemic, etc.); and (v) the purpose of use. As noted above, the values for these parameters need not be linguistically encoded, leaving an element of indeterminacy in the utterance. I have argued that, where necessary for reasons of relevance, these values will be pragmatically inferred, and may contribute to the proposition expressed by the utterance, thus affecting its truth conditions (in the case of declarative utterances) or propositional form.

This thesis provides further evidence for the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy, by showing how it can be systematically used to resolve the indeterminacies in metarepresentational utterances. I have shown, in chapter 1, that traditional and more recent alternative analyses of quotation do not provide adequate pragmatic accounts of how these indeterminacies are resolved. In chapter 2, I have shown that satisfactory results are obtained by using the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy of following a path of the least effort in computing cognitive effects, until the expected level of relevance is reached. Not only paradigmatic cases of quotation but also a variety of other types of metarepresentation fit well into the relevance-theoretic account. I have illustrated this claim in the Appendix to chapter 2, by looking at the Korean dialect expression 'kesiki'.

In the remainder of the thesis, I have extended this account to deal with three more complex and controversial cases: metalinguistic negation, echo questions, and a certain range of conditionals. I have argued that all these cases involve metarepresentational elements, in which the indeterminacies are pragmatically resolved. In chapter 3, I have looked at previous accounts of metalinguistic negation, both inside and outside relevance theory. I have argued that metalinguistic negation is truth-functional, and differs from descriptive negation in that the negated material is metarepresentationally (interpretively or metalinguistically) used. A particular point I have emphasised is that the metarepresentationally used material contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance via the proposition expressed. In the Appendix to chapter 3, I have extended this metarepresentational account to negation in Korean.

In chapter 4, I have looked at previous treatments of echo questions, both inside and outside relevance theory, and shown how I propose to deal with some standard and non-standard types of echo question. An original feature of my account is that I analyse echo questions as ordinary interrogatives, which differ from ordinary questions in that the questioned material is metarepresentationally (interpretively or metalinguistically) used. As with metalinguistic negation, the pragmatic inference processes may contribute to the proposition expressed by an echo question, and hence to its conditions for semantic evaluation.

In chapter 5, I have looked at previous analyses of a variety of indicative conditionals, and developed a relevance-theoretic account. My main claims are that so-called 'given' antecedents can be analysed as attributive metarepresentations, and that the consequent clauses of so-called 'speech-act conditionals' can also be analysed in metarepresentational terms. I have also argued that once the metarepresentationally used material is pragmatically enriched, we can maintain the material-implication account of 'if'. This is another major difference from previous accounts of these examples, which are generally seen as counterexamples to the material-implication account.

This thesis suggests that further research in the following areas might be worth pursuing: First, my account predicts that metarepresentational uses should be found in all languages although different languages may have different types of linguistic device for encoding its presence. I hope I have provided a framework in which cross-linguistic studies of metarepresentational markers can be conducted, but the work is still to be done. What seems obvious is that there is a huge variety of metarepresentational markers of non-echoic attributive use: from verbs (e.g. *said, believed*) to adverbs (e.g. *allegedly, reportedly*), adjectives (e.g. *alleged, reported*), nouns (e.g. *claim, report*), which occur very widely, but that other metarepresentational markers (e.g. interrogative, echoic) have been much less studied and might benefit from cross-linguistic comparison. It appears from preliminary work that the conceptual-procedural distinction applies to metarepresentational markers as well as to discourse connectives, with adverbials such as *allegedly* falling on the conceptual side and various types of hearsay and interrogative particle on the procedural side (see Ifantidou 1994). This idea would also be worth pursuing cross-linguistically. Finally, the idea of distinguishing metarepresentational markers by the type of original reported (e.g. utterance, thought, proposition) is new and would also benefit from cross-linguistic work.

Second, the word 'semantics' as I have used it in this thesis refers more to linguistic semantics, which relates natural-language sentences to mental/conceptual representations, than to formal or truth-conditional semantics, which relates conceptual representations to states of affairs. My work has implications for truth-

conditional semantics, via the contribution of metarepresentational elements to the proposition expressed, but the integration of relevance theory with formal semantics remains an area for future research (see Breheny forthcoming).

Finally, in this thesis, I have discussed only linguistic metarepresentations, and shown that recognising the presence of metarepresentation is essential in inferring the intended interpretation. However, as I mentioned in the Introduction, in interpreting any type of utterance, the hearer may have to entertain multiple layers of metarepresentations of the speaker's thought in order to arrive at the intended interpretation. More generally, the topic of metarepresentation is currently being investigated in areas of cognitive science not directly connected with linguistics: developmental psychology, various types of pathology, primate behaviour, evolutionary psychology (see Sperber (ed.) forthcoming). Ultimately, all these studies of metarepresentation should be integrated into a unified framework.

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